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Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to detail the raising of the first internal Dáil Éireann Loan and to 
examine the responses of the British administration in Ireland to its establishment and its 
progress. The internal Dáil Éireann Loan, which was launched in August 1919, was integral 
to the Dáil Éireann republican state that was created in the aftermath of the general election 
of December 1918 by the elected members of Sinn Féin. The loan was part of a wider 
sequence of historical events which led to the signing of the first ever treaty between 
respective Irish and British governments in December 1921. This period encompassing the 
Easter Rising of 1916 to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and subsequent Civil War of 
1922 and 1923 is widely referred to as the Irish revolution.
1
 It is a period characterised by a 
bitter guerrilla war, but it also witnessed important political developments such as the 
establishment of Dáil Éireann. The programme of passive resistance to British rule in Ireland 
espoused by the first Dáil was largely overtaken by the armed struggle waged against the 
British forces in Ireland by the Irish Republican Army, with many participants involved in 
both. It is the latter that is celebrated, whereas the passive revolution, which was just as 
significant in its own way, is widely ignored in the historiography of this period. This thesis 
assesses the importance of the internal Dáil Éireann Loan during the Irish revolution. 
 The emergence of the Sinn Féin movement was the dominant political trend in the 
aftermath of the 1916 rising. Sinn Féin were endorsed by the electorate in 1918 when they 
won seventy-three out of the 105 Irish seats in the general election. Rather than take up their 
seats in the Westminster parliament, the elected Sinn Féin representatives instead formed 
their own republican government in Dublin in January 1919. This counter-state was to be 
known as Dáil Éireann and those behind its creation were determined to appropriate it with 
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real government functions. However, substantial funding was needed in order to develop 
even a skeletal state administration. Michael Collins was appointed as the Minister for 
Finance and he announced plans to issue state bonds to the public in order to finance the 
Dáil’s activities. £250,000 worth of bonds were to be issued in Ireland with more to be sold 
overseas. This thesis focuses solely on the internal Dáil Loan because very little of the 
overseas funds reached Ireland before late 1921. Therefore, most of the activities and 
development of Dáil Éireann prior to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty were financed by 
the proceeds of the internal loan.  
 In August 2010, Brian Lenihan, the then finance minister, addressed the annual 
Michael Collins commemoration at Béal na mBláth. During his oration Lenihan spoke in 
glowing terms of Michael Collins and his achievements as finance minister in the first Dáil: 
It was Michael Collins who set up in its basic form a system of financial 
administration, important elements of which persist to this day. Of course, it was the 
task of raising the loan to finance the work of the revolutionary government that 
preoccupied him most as Minister for Finance. History has recorded the extraordinary 
success of that venture in the most adverse circumstances of suppression and constant 
hindrance by the British authorities. It was a truly remarkable feat and it added greatly 
to the authority and capacity of the first Dáil at home and abroad.
2
 
This thesis assesses the raising of this loan without which Dáil Éireann could not have 
functioned. By examining the organisation and progress of the loan campaign, an accurate 
evaluation of the scale of Collins’s achievements can be given. This evaluation is made in the 
context of the British administration’s response to the loan campaign. The attempts of the 
Dublin Castle government to suppress the loan and seize the funds are also analysed. Several 
different strategies were employed with the objective of crushing the loan effort. These 
ranged from the police tearing down advertising posters, to bank managers being summoned 
before an inquiry and questioned as to whether they had any accounts in their branch that 
                                                          
2
 Department of Finance, ‘Minister for Finance speech at Béal na mBláth, 22 Aug. 2010’ 
(http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=6422) (18 Oct. 2011). 
3 
 
contained Dáil Loan funds. Each of these different strategies are examined, and an evaluation 
of their effectiveness is offered. 
 Although the period from 1919 to 1921 in Ireland is a subject area that has been 
covered comprehensively, the raising of the internal Dáil Loan and the British reactions to it, 
poses many questions that remain unanswered. Existing literature on the period tends to 
concentrate almost exclusively on the more dramatic military episodes at the expense of the 
establishment and development of Dáil Éireann. However, the raising of the internal loan, 
and all it entailed, was also important in determining the ultimate outcome of the period 
under consideration. The historiography of Dáil Éireann and the Dáil Loan focuses more on 
how the loan funds were spent, rather than examining the actual process of raising the loan 
and the British administration’s responses to it. This thesis explores these subjects and 
provides a fresh perspective on the Irish revolution.  
 The historiography of the period concerned in this thesis stresses the centrality of 
guerrilla violence, intelligence and espionage. Important political developments like the 
establishment of Dáil Éireann are somewhat understated, but there are a handful of valuable 
historical works that chart these events. Secondary sources concerning the Dáil Loan are 
quite limited with Francis Carroll’s Money for Ireland: finance, diplomacy, politics, and the 
first Dáil Éireann loans, 1919-1936 being the sole detailed survey of the subject. Carroll 
skilfully details how Dáil Éireann financed its activities. The opening chapter of the book is 
of particular relevance to any study of the first internal Dáil Loan as Carroll outlines the 
financial circumstances within which the first Dáil was to operate. He discusses the plans for 
the bond drive, both in Ireland and overseas. He also examines the loan results and the 
breakdown of how the Dáil government used the funds in furtherance of their goals. The 
suppression of the loan by the British authorities is also briefly mentioned but not in any 
significant depth. Outside of the opening chapter, this work is not overly relevant to any 
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study of the internal Dáil Loan. Carroll devotes large sections to the external loan, 
particularly the American fundraising, and to the status of the loan post-independence, which 
encompasses the legal disputes over the funds between supporters of the Free State and die-
hard republicans. Nevertheless, Carroll provides a good starting point for this research, and 
he also identifies some valuable source material. His methodology in dissecting these sources 
is also well worth taking note of, considering similar sources are utilised for this research. 
 Literature relating specifically to the first Dáil Éireann is also quite sparse given its 
historical significance. J. L. McCracken’s Representative government in Ireland: a study of 
Dáil Éireann 1919-48 and Brian Farrell’s The founding of Dáil Éireann are short but reliable 
guides, and they provide a good initial base for any research concerning the first Dáil. 
Following on from their work, Arthur Mitchell’s Revolutionary government in Ireland: Dáil 
Éireann, 1919-1922 greatly expands the scope of scholarly knowledge of the first Dáil. 
Mitchell provides a comprehensive account of both the establishment and the development of 
Dáil Éireann. It is a balanced account which clarifies greatly the ambiguous relationship 
between Dáil Éireann and the I.R.A. Mitchell provides quite a favourable account of the 
effectiveness of the first Dáil and particularly the success of its fundraising capacities. 
Mitchell devotes a reasonably detailed section of his second chapter to how the Dáil 
administration financed itself. This section provides very helpful information on the Dáil’s 
finances. Like Carroll, Mitchell includes brief explanations of how the internal loan was 
raised and how Dublin Castle attempted to suppress it. However, this section still allows vast 
scope for expansion of these topics. Mitchell’s study is undoubtedly the most authoritative 
work on Dáil Éireann to date and it is an essential work for any research relating to the first 
Dáil. 
 A wide ranging history of the Dáil’s finance department is available in Ronan 
Fanning’s The Irish Department of Finance, 1922-1958. Strictly speaking, Fanning’s study 
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charts a time period that lies outside of the scope of this thesis. However, Fanning does detail 
the establishment of the finance department during the first Dáil in the opening stages of his 
book. Fanning provides an interesting perspective on the primacy of the department within 
the first Dáil relative to the other government departments. He stresses the importance of the 
internal loan and briefly discusses both the raising of the loan and some of the responses to it. 
Fanning also emphasises Michael Collins’s role as the finance minister. This is a role that is 
frequently understated in the historiography of Collins, the principal historical figure during 
the period 1919 to 1921.  
 Collins is perhaps the most analysed and debated individual in twentieth century Irish 
history. It is evident that Collins’s biographers have tended to focus almost exclusively on the 
more romantic and dramatic aspects of his military activities, to the relative exclusion of his 
role as Minister for Finance. The likes of Tim Pat Coogan, Margery Forester, James A. 
Mackay, Michael T. Foy and T. Ryle Dwyer only fleetingly touch on Collins’s work as 
Minister for Finance during the period concerned. This is despite the fact that it was through 
his work as a minister in the first Dáil, that Collins gained widespread public recognition. 
Indeed, the establishment and organisation of the internal loan is arguably Michael Collins’s 
greatest achievement but it is continually glossed over by many of his biographers. However, 
there are some historians that delve a little bit deeper into the nuances of Collins’s role in the 
raising of the loan. Peter Hart, in his Mick: the real Michael Collins, conducts a reasonably 
thorough examination of Collins’s work within the finance ministry. Hart draws on the same 
sources as Arthur Mitchell when outlining Collins’s efforts concerning the Dáil Loan. He 
does go into a greater depth of analysis regarding the organisation of the loan at a local level. 
Hart’s detailing of Collins’s frustration with the efforts in various constituencies, or more 
accurately the lack of effort, is particularly relevant for this thesis. Hart provides a far more 
critical analysis of Michael Collins’s legacy than other historians, but his section relating to 
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the Dáil Loan does not really draw on many new sources. Most of the information he 
provides can be obtained in other secondary literature.  
 Similar comments can be applied to Francis J. Costello’s Michael Collins: in his own 
words. Costello dedicates an entire chapter to Collins’s role as finance minister in the first 
Dáil. Costello makes use of a wide selection of sources, ranging from the files of Dáil 
Éireann to private letters between Collins and other individuals. Consequently, he provides a 
reasonably comprehensive account of Collins’s motivations and the strategies he adopted in 
the furtherance of the loan campaign. Costello manages to skilfully compile these sources 
together, but this account only focuses on Collins’s efforts, so the operation of the loan at a 
local level, and the British reactions and responses to it, are not discussed in any great detail.  
 There are a number of books written by contemporaries of Collins which are of 
significant interest. Piarás Béaslaí, Frank O’Connor and Batt O’Connor have each produced 
accounts of the revolutionary period with a particular focus on Michael Collins. Piarás 
Béaslaí’s Michael Collins and the making of a new Ireland is a vast account of Collins’s life 
and times. Béaslaí was chosen by Collins’s family to write his ‘official biography’ after his 
death in 1922 and the book was first published in 1926. Béaslaí was the Dáil Éireann member 
for East Kerry and was a close colleague of Collins. Any work of this nature should be 
treated with a degree of scepticism and particularly so considering these facts. The biography 
is presented in two volumes with an account of Collins’s role during the loan campaign 
contained within the first volume. This account is quite detailed and it includes a very helpful 
reproduction of letters between Michael Collins and Éamon de Valera pertaining to Dáil 
Loan business. However, Béaslaí’s account is not wholly reliable as it has been widely 
criticised for numerous inaccuracies. One such inaccuracy is evident in his section on the 
Dáil Loan. He claims that Collins submitted a loan advertisement for publication in 
newspapers which made no mention of Dáil Éireann – so as to avoid giving the authorities a 
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pretext to act against the newspapers that published the notice according to Béaslaí. An 
examination of the newspapers concerned shows that this was not the case. Surprisingly, 
many of the more recent histories quote this believing it to be fact. Frank O’Connor’s The big 
fellow: Michael Collins and the Irish revolution was first published in 1937. O’Connor was a 
noted author and playwright who had fought in the I.R.A. during the Anglo-Irish War. He 
fought for the anti-Treaty side during the subsequent Civil War. O’Connor was motivated to 
write the book as a sort of reparation for the regret he experienced for his actions during the 
Civil War. His biography is seen as required reading for any research dealing with Collins 
because it focuses more on the human character of the man rather than his political 
achievements. While it is certainly quite a biased account, O’Connor does succeed in creating 
an effective illustration of how Collins’s meticulousness, and his demanding personality, 
advanced the Dáil Loan campaign. He also discusses Collins’s reaction to Dublin Castle’s 
attempts to suppress the loan effort. Batt O’Connor’s With Michael Collins in the fight for 
Irish independence is another contemporary account that is essential reading for any study of 
the internal Dáil Loan. O’Connor was a close personal friend of Collins. He had met Collins 
while they were both interned in Frongoch after the Easter Rising. His occupation as a builder 
enabled him to purchase properties for Dáil Éireann’s use without drawing much suspicion 
from the authorities. Although his account is heavily biased and favourable towards Collins, 
O’Connor provides some excellent information with regard to the loan. He tells of his 
experiences and some of the individuals he encountered while working as a loan collector, 
and he describes how he was entrusted with gold that had been subscribed during the loan 
campaign.   
 There are also several accounts from individuals on the British side that offer 
alternative views of this period. John Charles Street’s The administration of Ireland, 1920 
provides a good insight into the policies of Dublin Castle in light of the establishment and 
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growth of Dáil Éireann. Street acted as Information Officer for Dublin Castle which was an 
important role within the British administration in Ireland. Thomas Jones, the Deputy 
Secretary to the British cabinet, sheds light on the reactions of the British government to the 
developments in Ireland in his Whitehall diary: Ireland 1918-1925. Sir Ormonde Winter, 
Dublin Castle’s Director of Intelligence, gives his account of his years in Ireland in his 
autobiography Winter’s Tale. Winter was deeply involved in the Castle’s attempts to seize 
Dáil Éireann funds post 1920 so his memoirs of the period are an important source for this 
thesis. Sir Nevil Macready’s Annals of an active life is also of relevance to any research of 
this period. Macready was General Officer Commanding-in-Ireland from the spring of 1920 
onwards and he provides an illuminating account of the escalation in violence that occurred 
concurrent to the Dáil Loan campaign. These contemporary accounts from both the Irish and 
British sides cannot be examined in isolation considering the inherent bias of the individuals 
concerned. However, they do provide interesting insights into the thoughts and attitudes of 
those who were deeply involved in the historic events of the time.  
 There is an abundance of other general monographs that chart the events in Ireland 
during the years covered by this research. Joost Augusteijn’s The Irish revolution, 1913-23, D. 
G. Boyce’s The revolution in Ireland, 1879-1923, David Fitzpatrick’s Politics and Irish life, 
1913-1921: provincial experience of war and revolution, Tom Garvin’s Irish nationalist 
revolutionaries, 1858-1928, Michael Hopkinson’s The Irish War of Independence, Conor 
Kostick’s Revolution in Ireland: popular militancy 1917 to 1923, Michael Laffan’s The 
resurrection of Ireland: the Sinn Féin party, 1916-1923, and T. D. Williams’s The Irish 
struggle, 1916-26 are all of certain relevance to any study of this period. These studies mostly 
focus more on the militancy of this period with less of an emphasis placed on Dáil Éireann’s 
development. As a result, these books are only useful up to a point. They only fleetingly 
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make reference to the Dáil Loan and the minimal information they provide is widely 
available in greater detail in the histories which are more specific to Dáil Éireann. 
 There are also a handful of other historical works which discuss the British 
involvement in Ireland during this time. These include D. G. Boyce’s Englishmen and Irish 
troubles: British public opinion and the making of Irish policy, 1918-1922, Sheila Lawlor’s 
Britain and Ireland 1914-23, John McColgan’s British policy and Irish administration, 
Eunan O’Halpin’s The decline of the union: British government in Ireland, 1892-1920, and 
Charles Townshend’s The British campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921: the development of 
political and military policies. These works offer a solid analysis of the British 
administration’s response to the formation and growth of Dáil Éireann. However, like the 
general monographs mentioned previously, they have a tendency to focus more on the 
militant aspects of the revolution, rather than the significant political developments like the 
establishment of the first Dáil.     
 In terms of primary sources, this research draws on material in a number of different 
repositories. However, the material is quite fragmentary and follows no definite order. The 
National Archives of Ireland contains the archives of Dáil Éireann, 1919-1923. This 
collection of files is invaluable to any research concerning the first Dáil. The DÉ 2/ series, the 
Dáil Éireann secretariat files, contain the papers relating to the internal Dáil Loan. These files 
include various documents relating to the loan and the work of the finance department of the 
first Dáil. Letters between the department, the finance minister and the different 
constituencies are found amongst other items of miscellaneous correspondence. Official loan 
documents like loan certificates, collectors’ cards and receipts can also be found within this 
collection. A copy of the clauses of agreement under which the trustees of the loan funds 
were bound to is also available. The documents in this collection, which are of relevance to a 
study of the Dáil Loan, range from the informative to the mundane. Often valuable and 
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important files are located within a glut of largely irrelevant and unimportant documents. 
This is not overly surprising considering the conditions under which the loan was raised. 
Among the correspondence within this collection, Michael Collins himself detailed the 
difficulties his department faced, given the amount of paperwork and documentation that was 
seized by the police and military. Some other assorted loan documentation is available in the 
National Library of Ireland. This consists of promotional and propaganda material, as well as 
the final internal loan account totals. Generally speaking, the cataloguing of the relevant 
sources reflects the chaos of the period under investigation for this thesis.  
 Plenty of other relevant source material is available in the British National Archives. 
The Dublin Castle papers are held within the Colonial Office files. The CO 904/ file series is 
of particular relevance. This collection contains valuable information regarding the reaction 
and responses of the British administration to the raising of the Dáil Loan. Important files 
include the Royal Irish Constabulary Inspector General’s and County Inspectors’ monthly 
confidential reports. These reports detail the measures taken by the police in order to suppress 
the loan campaign in Ireland and they are referred to constantly throughout this study. Other 
items of significance include the papers of Alan Bell who summoned bank managers to an 
investigation with the objective of uncovering the Dáil’s funds. The documents in the British 
National Archives provide a useful counter-point to the records held in Ireland. 
 Private papers of various prominent individuals from the period concerned are also of 
interest. The papers of Terence MacSwiney are available in both the archives of University 
College Dublin and the Cork City and County Archives. These files contain some particularly 
useful information on the organisation and progress of the loan campaign at a local level. 
Also available in the Cork City and County Archives is an R.I.C. report detailing their 
suppression of a Sinn Féin meeting in Macroom that was convened to make arrangements for 
the loan campaign. Other private papers of relevance include the papers of General Richard 
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Mulcahy which are held in the archives of University College Dublin. The Mulcahy papers 
are one of the most extensive collections of material from the revolutionary period in Ireland. 
The papers of Lord French which are held in the Imperial War Museum, London, are also 
worthy of consultation. French was the Viceroy during the years examined in this research 
and his files contain interesting information pertaining to the organisation of Dublin Castle’s 
intelligence system, and the police forces. Similar to the contemporary accounts of the period, 
these private papers give a good indication of the attitudes that prevailed among those 
individuals who defined the years from 1919 to 1921.  
 In recent years, the people of Ireland have had many stark reminders of the 
importance of economic sovereignty. In August 1919, the launch of the first internal Dáil 
Loan was the first step in the achievement of economic sovereignty from Britain. This thesis 
evaluates the raising of this loan and assesses the obstacles that were placed in its path. The 
existing literature relating to the Dáil Loan is limited and little has been researched 
concerning the actual raising of the internal loan and the attempts made by Dublin Castle to 
suppress it. This thesis offers a new window on the years termed as the Irish revolution. The 
existing historiography largely focuses on the many militant episodes that took place during 
this period, but this thesis emphasises the role of Dáil Éireann, and the means by which it 
financed its activities, in the context of the wider Irish revolution. It is important that the 
significant role played by Dáil Éireann during these years is re-evaluated in advance of the 
centenary of its establishment in 2019. This examination of the internal Dáil Loan, and the 
responses to it, will form a part of that process. 
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Chapter I – The establishment of Dáil Éireann and the urgent need for funds 
Ireland at the turn of the twentieth century was a land in a state of political instability. The 
home rule movement that emerged in the late nineteenth century had the support of the vast 
majority of Irish nationalists. Home rulers demanded that a devolved Irish parliament within 
the United Kingdom of Britain and Ireland be established in Dublin. This parliament would 
have responsibility for Ireland’s domestic affairs. The issue of home rule would dominate the 
Irish political agenda from the 1880s and into the formative years of the twentieth century. 
The Irish Parliamentary Party, under a variety of different leaders most notably Charles 
Stewart Parnell, had mixed success within the Westminster parliament in their quest to have a 
home rule bill passed. At the start of the second decade of the twentieth century, it appeared 
as if their ambition would be realised when the Third Home Rule Bill was passed in May 
1914, despite strong unionist opposition. The Home Rule Act received the royal assent and 
was placed on the statute books but its implementation was suspended for the duration of the 
war which broke out in August.
1
 The assumption at the time was that the war would be 
concluded within a matter of months but by the start of 1915 it was clear that this was not 
going to be the case. Nationalists were frustrated by the delay of home rule and they shared a 
growing fear that the island of Ireland would be partitioned to pacify the unionists in Ulster. 
Furthermore, the Allied wartime rhetoric regarding the rights of small nations to self-
determination was music to the ears of Irish nationalists. By April of 1916, with the war in 
Europe showing no signs of coming to a conclusion, the leaders of the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood working on the old Fenian dictum of Britain’s difficulty being Ireland’s 
opportunity, mounted a rebellion in Dublin during Easter week. The rising was defeated, but 
its impact and aftermath would completely alter the political climate in Ireland. Sinn Féin 
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emerged from the embers of the 1916 rising as the dominant voice of Irish nationalism. They 
comprehensively outpolled the I.P.P. in the general election of 1918 and their elected 
candidates revealed their intention to abstain from Westminster. Instead, they set up their 
own revolutionary government, Dáil Éireann, in Dublin in January 1919. This chapter 
examines the background to the establishment of Dáil Éireann, analyses how Sinn Féin 
intended to structure the revolutionary government, and, most importantly, how they would 
finance its activities.   
The Sinn Féin party had been founded in 1905 by Arthur Griffith. Griffith was a 
constitutional nationalist but, rather than home rule, he advocated a different solution to the 
Irish question. Griffith’s idea was that Ireland and Britain would return to an arrangement 
similar to that which was in place prior to the 1800 Act of Union. There would be two 
separate kingdoms under one monarch, but the Kingdom of Great Britain and the Kingdom of 
Ireland would each have their own separate government.
2
 This proposal was similar to the 
arrangement between Hungary and Austria. Griffith had few supporters at the time and Sinn 
Féin was a political irrelevance during its early years of existence. Then in 1916, events 
conspired to bring the party in from the periphery and would eventually lead to Sinn Féin 
becoming the main political voice for Irish nationalism. 
The 1916 rising was a major milestone in Irish history. Although militarily speaking, 
the rebellion was an unmitigated disaster and was doomed to failure from the outset; its 
legacy would shape the course of Irish politics for much of the twentieth century. It appeared 
in the immediate aftermath that the Easter Rising had no popular support whatsoever and 
there was little sympathy for the captured participants. This situation changed completely in 
the days and weeks that followed. The British military had fifteen men, including the seven 
signatories of the Proclamation of Independence, executed by firing squad between 3 May 
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and 12 May 1916. Other captured participants were interned in England and Wales. The Irish 
nationalist public were repulsed with what they perceived was a very heavy handed response 
towards the participants. The British would also inadvertently create an indelible connection 
between Sinn Féin and the Easter Rising. British politicians would label the rising as the 
‘Sinn Féin Rebellion’ even though Sinn Féin had no involvement. General Maxwell wrote in 
July 1916, that the rebellion was instigated ‘by Sinn Féiners, presumably acting under orders, 
shooting in cold blood certain soldiers and policemen’.3 The ideals of the leaders of the 
Easter Rising went far beyond Griffith’s proposal of dual monarchy but nonetheless Sinn 
Féin were now permanently linked to the rising and the party was now propelled into a 
position whereby it could become the largest nationalist party. 
A variety of different factors would enable Sinn Féin to become the largest nationalist 
party after 1916, not least the decline of the I.P.P. The 1916 rising had a major impact on the 
psyche of Irish nationalists, so much so that home rule would no longer satisfy a large 
proportion of nationalists. Irish nationalism would now become far more radical and 
separatist than it had been at any stage prior to the Easter Rising, and Sinn Féin were to the 
forefront of this shift. By early 1917, the party was not yet organised to take advantage of this 
opportunity. A number of by-elections took place in early 1917. The first of these was in the 
North Roscommon constituency in February where George Noble Plunkett, the father of 
Joseph Mary Plunkett, who was shot after the 1916 rising, contested the election as an 
independent candidate.  Plunkett was duly elected and announced his intention to abstain 
from taking his seat in Westminster.
4
 Despite the fact that he stood as an independent 
candidate, Plunkett espoused the principles which Sinn Féin would adopt. His election 
showed what could be achieved, and it was after the successful campaign in North 
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Roscommon that Sinn Féin commenced a process of reorganisation.
5
 This process was aided 
by the release from Frongoch at Christmas 1916 of many of the men who had been interned 
in the aftermath of the rising. Sinn Féin expanded rapidly in the spring and early summer of 
1917 as a result of this reorganisation and restructure. Sinn Féin clubs were set up locally 
across the country, and by October 1917, Sir Joseph A. Byrne, the Inspector General of the 
Royal Irish Constabulary reported that there were 1,200 clubs nationwide with a membership 
of a quarter of a million.
6
 Further by-election success followed for the revitalised movement 
when Joseph McGuinness was elected for South Longford in May, and the East Clare seat 
was won by Éamon de Valera in July.
7
 Electoral success was no surprise given the 
groundswell of support for the Sinn Féin movement across the country. Patrick Sarsfield 
O’Hegarty, a Sinn Féin member, attributed the rise in popular support for the movement as a 
reaction to the threat of conscription which reared its head again in early 1918, and the belief 
that the country would be partitioned if home rule was introduced at the end of the war. He 
wrote in The victory of Sinn Féin that ‘everything combined to throw more and more 
elements in the country over to Sinn Féin’.8 The increase in popular support for Sinn Féin 
continued throughout the early months of 1918. There was now a growing belief that Sinn 
Féin would eclipse the I.P.P. as the dominant voice of Irish nationalism when the public 
would next go to the polls. 
The acid test of the extent of Sinn Féin’s development would come in late 1918. The 
war ended on 11 November and following on from the British military’s success on the 
Western Front, Lloyd George dissolved parliament and announced that a general election 
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would take place in December.
9
 The announcement was not unexpected as the election was 
long overdue. There had been no general election in Britain since December 1910, over three 
years before the outbreak of war. Lloyd George’s popularity as prime minister was at its 
zenith owing to Britain’s victory in the war, and he was keen to copper fasten his position. 
Sinn Féin had been in preparation for this development in the years prior to 1918. The 
succession of by-elections during 1917 and 1918 had enabled them to perfect an electoral 
strategy. An effective grassroots organisation had been established nationwide in 1917 and 
Sinn Féin had gained credibility and support through their prominence in the anti-
conscription movement in local areas. Their members were buoyed by the wartime Allied 
propaganda which emphasised the rights of small nations to govern their own affairs.
10
 The 
general election of 1918 provided Sinn Féin with the opportunity to capitalise on the post-war 
international sentiments regarding small nations and their right to self-determination. The 
timing was ideal for Sinn Féin to demonstrate that they were now the dominant force in Irish 
nationalist politics. 
The election campaign began in earnest after Lloyd George’s dissolution of 
parliament. Sinn Féin issued a manifesto outlining their principles. The manifesto detailed 
their four key intentions that would hasten the establishment of an Irish Republic. Sinn Féin 
planned to withdraw ‘Irish representation from the British Parliament’, ‘to render impotent 
the power of England to hold Ireland in subjection by military force or otherwise’, to 
establish ‘a constituent assembly comprising persons chosen by Irish constituencies’, and to 
appeal ‘to the Peace Conference for the establishment of Ireland as an Independent Nation’.11 
Sinn Féin’s intentions were clear. The party had long moved away from Griffith’s proposal of 
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a dual monarchy. Sinn Féin was now a fully fledged separatist republican party. This 
transformation was driven by the released prisoners of the 1916 rising. The internees released 
from Frongoch at Christmas 1916 were prominent in the reorganisation of the movement 
during the first half of 1917. Meanwhile, the prisoners from Lewes Jail assumed the 
leadership of Sinn Féin during the latter half of 1917 after their release in June. Among those 
released from Lewes were the most prominent participants in the rising that had not been 
executed. One of these men, Éamon de Valera, would become the de facto leader of the Sinn 
Féin movement after his release. Arthur Griffith still held the title of president but he had 
little yearning for power or prominence, and he was satisfied so long as Sinn Féin pursued 
principles of which he approved.
12
 The British authorities were obviously concerned by the 
rise of such radical zealots within the movement, because in May 1918 they had seventy-
three Sinn Féin members arrested and imprisoned for supposedly plotting with the Germans 
to open up another military front in Ireland.
13
 Griffith, De Valera, Plunkett and McGuinness 
were among those arrested under this so-called German Plot.
14
 The actions taken by the 
British authorities to imprison such a considerable number of prominent Sinn Féin men 
would further solidify Sinn Féin’s support during the 1918 election campaign. Not only did it 
foster even more public sympathy and support for the movement, it made the party’s 
selection of candidates to stand in the election all the easier. The majority of the candidates 
put forward by Sinn Féin in constituencies across the country were men who had been 
imprisoned in the wake of the German Plot. The thinking behind this strategy was that they 
were likely to garner huge popular support and that many would be elected on a wave of 
sympathy for their plight. Sinn Féin coined the slogan ‘put them in to get them out’. An 
election poster for Arthur Griffith who ran in the North-West Tyrone constituency reads: ‘Put 
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him in to get him out, Vote for Griffith: the man in jail for Ireland.’15 This poster was typical 
of the sort of propaganda that Sinn Féin dispersed nationwide. 
 
Fig I: Sinn Féin 1918 election poster 
(Source: The National Archives, Kew, London) 
 
Polling day was set for 14 December 1918 and it was the first general election where 
voting took place in all constituencies, apart from the three university constituencies, on a 
single day. The Representation of the People Act of 1918 had also significantly increased the 
electorate, from approximately 700,000 to almost 2,000,000.
16
 The count did not commence 
until 28 December, with the results forthcoming on 30 December. These results were eagerly 
anticipated by Sinn Féin supporters and their campaigning efforts were to be rewarded. Sinn 
Féin won seventy-three seats out of the 105 overall. This figure dwarfed the I.P.P.’s return of 
six seats. Unionists won twenty-two seats with Labour Unionists winning a further three 
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seats.
17
 Sinn Féin received 497,107 votes in the election. Unionists received 257,314 votes 
while the I.P.P. received 220,837 votes. Sinn Féin’s percentage of the popular vote amounted 
to 46.9 percent. This figure compared to the I.P.P.’s 21.7 percent.18 The scale of the I.P.P.’s 
collapse is evident when contrasted with the results of the previous general election in 1910. 
They had lost sixty-eight of the seventy-four seats they had won back in 1910.
19
 The I.P.P. 
ran candidates in opposition to Sinn Féin candidates in thirty-seven constituencies. They lost 
in all but two of them with only Captain William Archer Redmond in the Waterford City 
constituency and Joe Devlin in the Belfast Falls constituency triumphing over Sinn Féin 
candidates.
20
 There was now no doubt whatsoever as to which party was the dominant force 
in Irish nationalist politics. The I.P.P. had been virtually wiped out by the emergence of Sinn 
Féin and the party was more or less defunct as a result of the 1918 election. 
The bare figures of the results do not tell the whole story of the election, though. The 
election was as much about the collapse of the I.P.P. as it was about the rise of Sinn Féin. The 
I.P.P. did not run candidates in twenty-five constituencies where they had won seats 
previously in 1910. In seventeen out of the twenty-four Munster constituencies, Sinn Féin 
candidates were elected unopposed because the I.P.P. did not run candidates against them. It 
was only in the Ulster constituencies that the I.P.P. managed to match Sinn Féin and in some 
areas outpoll them. The reasons for these discrepancies in the voting patterns are 
straightforward. Throughout their existence the I.P.P. had successfully ran candidates in most 
constituencies across the country but in the majority of cases they were faced with little, if 
any, opposition.
21
 Owing to unchallenged electoral dominance throughout most of Ireland, 
the I.P.P. had grown complacent, and they could not reinvigorate their dishevelled 
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organisation when faced with the rise of Sinn Féin post 1916. The party managed to hold 
onto their support in Ulster because it was the one region in which they were properly 
organised because of the competition they habitually faced from unionists. This was not the 
case in most parts of Munster, for instance, where they had faced no opposition for decades 
and they were not in a position to resist the rise of Sinn Féin in counties like Cork, Limerick, 
Clare and Kerry with their strong volunteer and republican traditions. It must also be 
remembered that a significant proportion of I.P.P. voters in previous elections were absent in 
December 1918. Many I.P.P. supporters would have been amongst the thousands of Irishmen 
who joined the war effort. When examined in the context of the I.P.P.’s collapse, Sinn Féin’s 
electoral performance might not seem as impressive as at first glance. However, winning 
forty-eight out of the eighty seats they contested was still a very commendable outcome 
especially considering the disorganised state of the party prior to 1917. 
Among the successful Sinn Féin candidates in the 1918 election were Éamon de 
Valera, Arthur Griffith, Joseph McGuinness and Count Plunkett. De Valera and Griffith, 
along with Eoin MacNeill and Liam Mellows were elected for two constituencies, so the 
actual number of Sinn Féin M.P.s was sixty-nine. With thirty-five of those sixty-nine still 
imprisoned at the time of their election, it was important that the remaining elected 
candidates did not rest on their laurels.
22
 There was a collective determination to seize the 
moment and to try and capitalise on the public’s frustration and impatience with the British 
administration at Dublin Castle. It was clear from the outset that the successful Sinn Féin 
candidates would have nothing to do with the Westminster parliament. Their manifesto was 
clear that abstention from Westminster was central to the party’s policy. The manifesto also 
stated that they would form their own constituent assembly in Dublin to represent the Irish 
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people.
23
 Despite the obvious drawback that this would leave Irish nationalists 
underrepresented in Westminster, Sinn Féin pressed ahead with their plans. The I.P.P. had 
been a significant presence in the parliament for decades but they had failed to achieve self-
government for Ireland, so Sinn Féin deemed that the potential benefits of abstaining from 
Westminster outweighed the negatives. As far as the leadership were concerned, they had 
received an endorsement of their manifesto from the Irish electorate at the polls. 
The decision to form their own assembly in Dublin was taken by the Sinn Féin 
leadership before the election results were even known. The executive of the party had 
decided on 19 December 1918 that it would ‘convoke Dáil Éireann’ early in the new year.24 
The idea of establishing a revolutionary government had first been mooted at the party’s ard-
fheis [party conference] the previous October. Planning for the establishment of Dáil Éireann 
commenced immediately after the election results were known. The Sinn Féin members who 
were not still imprisoned met on 14 January 1919 to discuss the establishment of the Dáil. It 
was agreed that the new assembly would have its first meeting on 21 January. Further 
meetings were held on 17 and 19 January to discuss the itinerary of the first Dáil session.
25
 
There were dissenting voices within the movement who wanted to delay the first session until 
the German Plot internees were released. However, these voices were largely ignored because 
the general consensus among Sinn Féin members was that the timing was ideal. They were 
buoyant in the aftermath of their fine electoral performance, and the post-war rhetoric of the 
victorious Allies was music to their ears. Sinn Féin believed that the international 
establishment might be sympathetic to Irish demands for self-determination at this time.   
Preparatory meetings were still being held right up until the morning of 21 January 
when the first session of Dáil Éireann was scheduled to commence. The inaugural meeting 
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took place in the Mansion House in Dublin at 3 o’clock. The meeting lasted just under two 
hours and passed without major incident. Approximately seventy foreign journalists gathered 
on the public gallery to witness the event.
26
 Cathal Brugha was elected as Ceann Comhairle 
[Chairman] by those present. His first duty was to read out a number of documents that had 
been prepared for the inaugural meeting. These included the Declaration of Independence 
which was essentially an adaptation of the Proclamation from Easter 1916. A Message to the 
Free Nations of the World was also issued. It requested other nations to recognise Ireland’s 
independence from British rule. This document was a clear attempt by Sinn Féin to capitalise 
on the immediate post-war sentiments concerning the rights of small nations. With this in 
mind, the Dáil also appointed three envoys to the upcoming post-war Peace Conference – 
Griffith, de Valera and Plunkett.
27
 The other documents adopted were the Dáil Constitution 
and the Democratic Programme. These documents outlined the principles of the government 
and the social and economic plans that it hoped to implement. All of these documents were 
ratified by the twenty-seven members present. 
Press reaction to the establishment of Dáil Éireann was mixed. Dublin Castle ensured 
that a strict censorship regime was in operation so the newspapers were limited in what they 
could print. Neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Democratic Programme 
appeared in the newspapers on 22 January. The two main nationalist dailies expressed similar 
sentiments towards the Dáil in their editorials. The Irish Independent described the decision 
to convene Dáil Éireann as ‘a bold move and a novel one’. Their editorial praised the 
patriotism of Sinn Féin but also expressed grave doubts as to whether the establishment of the 
Dáil was a wise move: ‘The highest interests of our country may be imperilled by a false step 
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taken at this critical time in the history of the world’.28  The editorial in the Freeman’s 
Journal was strikingly similar to that of its nationalist counterpart. The patriotism of Sinn 
Féin could not be questioned but it feared that Dáil Éireann would cause international 
embarrassment to Ireland unless it reconsidered some of its proposals. If Sinn Féin were 
serious about declaring an Irish republic and forming their own state administration in Ireland 
‘we are on the eve of one of the most tragic chapters in the history of Ireland’.29 The main 
unionist daily, the Irish Times, was scathing in its criticism of Sinn Féin and Dáil Éireann. 
‘These men are today the elected representatives of three-fourths of the Irish people, and the 
more quickly Ireland becomes convinced of the folly that elected them the sooner her sanity 
will return’. The Irish Times also examined the link between the Dáil and international 
socialism. Much of Sinn Féin’s literature and propaganda was explicitly left-wing and the 
Irish Times editorial articulated its fear that Ireland was charting a similar course to what 
occurred in Russia two years previously, ‘to apply the principles of Lenin and Trotsky to Irish 
affairs. It is working for the disintegration of society and the confiscation of all property, 
public and private’.30 The Cork Examiner was far more supportive of Dáil Éireann than the 
other newspapers. It described the opening session as an ‘event of the first importance’, and 
that ‘The Irish historian of the future will no doubt regard 21 January 1919, as a date that 
marked a turning point in the political history of this country – a new departure that 
influenced Ireland’s future and helped to mould her fate.’31 Overseas journalists also reported 
on the event with several of the London dailies detailing the day’s events. The Daily News 
commented on the potential support for Dáil Éireann: ‘No one who is not determined to deny 
patent facts can refuse to acknowledge that behind the Declaration of Independence at Dublin 
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yesterday fiercely in earnest is the solid mass of almost all Irish opinion outside Ulster.’32 The 
Morning Post described Sinn Féiners as ‘dangerous persons’. Both the Westminster Gazette 
and Pall Mall Gazette took similar positions imploring the British government to take action 
before the situation in Ireland deteriorated.
33
 The New York Times carried the story on its 
front page on 22 January. The article details how the members assembled in a ‘dingy meeting 
place’. The journalist also writes that ‘Ireland is a country of the unexpected, but no one 
predicts any trouble or disorder.’34 The presence of overseas journalists at the opening of the 
Dáil underlines the significance with which the event was viewed beyond Ireland. Cultivating 
a positive relationship with the foreign press was one of Dáil Éireann’s most effective tactics. 
The Teachta Dála [Dáil deputy] for Kerry East, Piaras Béaslaí, remarked that the public 
gallery of the Mansion House was ‘packed with spectators’ a sizeable proportion of which 
were foreign pressmen.
35
 It was essential that the members of the Dáil sustained this overseas 
interest in Irish events because it was one of the only ways that they could press for the 
international recognition that they craved. 
The newspaper coverage of the first public session of Dáil Éireann indicates that not 
many took the establishment of the parliament that seriously. The general opinion amongst 
the press was that the project was overly ambitious, ill advised and was ultimately doomed to 
failure. It was important, therefore, that the Dáil put concrete plans in place straight away so 
it would not fade into obscurity. The Declaration of Independence made on 21 January would 
be meaningless unless Dáil Éireann acted upon it and created their own state administration 
that would serve to undermine the existing British government at Dublin Castle. With this in 
mind, the appointment of a cabinet was a priority, even though most of the key figures in the 
republican movement were still in prison. The Dáil reconvened in the Mansion House on 22 
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January for a private meeting. The main business undertaken at this meeting was the 
appointment of a cabinet in accordance with the constitution. Cathal Brugha was appointed as 
Príomh Aire [President] in a temporary capacity while Éamon de Valera was still 
incarcerated in Lincoln Jail. Brugha would lead a cabinet of five ministers. These were 
Richard Mulcahy as Minister for Defence, Count Plunkett as Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Michael Collins as Minister for Home Affairs, and Eoin MacNeill as Minister for Finance.
36
 
This would only be an interim cabinet until the German Plot internees were released. Dáil 
Éireann would have to appropriate proper working departments under these ministries in 
order to make them viable in the long term. The general aims of the Dáil were twofold – to 
gain formal recognition abroad from other governments, and to disrupt and undermine the 
existing system of government under the British administration at Dublin Castle. To achieve 
this second aim, the members of the Dáil would have to establish at least some of the various 
elements and institutions of a sovereign state in direct opposition to the existing institutions 
run from Dublin Castle. The first step in creating what the historian Charles Townshend has 
labelled the ‘counter-state’ was the appointment of this first cabinet.  
 
Fig II: Members of the first Dáil Éireann 
(Source: Irish Times) 
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Progress in developing the counter-state further in the immediate period after the 
opening meetings of Dáil Éireann was slow. After the private meeting on 22 January 1919, 
the second parliamentary session of Dáil Éireann did not take place until the start of April. 
There were a number of reasons for this long gap. The first session of the Dáil was merely 
symbolic to a large extent. Very little business was discussed or debated and no plans or 
strategies were put into place. There was a reluctance amongst the members of the temporary 
cabinet to make any concrete policy decisions before the German Plot internees were released. 
However, the Inspector General of the R.I.C. reported in March that the whole Sinn Féin 
organisation was now under the control of Dáil Éireann.
37
 The cabinet would meet informally 
throughout February and March, and the consensus among them was that they should wait 
until the likes of de Valera had returned to Ireland before making any decisions as to the path 
that Dáil Éireann would take. They hoped that the symbolism of the documents presented on 
21 January, and the cabinet appointed on 22 January, would keep Dáil Éireann in the public 
consciousness until the Sinn Féin leaders were released, and the work of building up the 
counter state could begin. 
Plans were afoot to engineer an escape for de Valera from Lincoln Jail before the first 
session of the Dáil took place in January. Two Dáil deputies, Michael Collins and Harry 
Boland, were absent from the first meeting at the Mansion House because they were in 
England working on de Valera’s escape. De Valera had managed to secure an impression of 
the chaplain’s master key and the dimensions of the key were relayed back to Ireland by a 
drawing on the back of a Christmas card. Three replica keys were produced. Boland kept one 
for himself while the other two were smuggled into the prison hidden in a cake. The escape 
took place on the night of 3 February.
38
 De Valera escaped along with two other republican 
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internees, Seán Milroy and Seán McGarry. He was smuggled back to Dublin on 20 February 
where he went into hiding until the British government released the remaining German Plot 
detainees on 6 March.
39
 Many of the elected Sinn Féin T.D.s returned to Ireland in the 
following days and weeks. Preparations could now be made for the second session of Dáil 
Éireann, and the planning for the creation of a skeletal republican state administration could 
begin in earnest. 
The second session of Dáil Éireann commenced on 1 April 1919 with a total of fifty-
two deputies in attendance for the private meeting at the Mansion House. This was the 
highest number to attend any one session of the first Dáil. The most important item on the 
agenda was the resignation of Cathal Brugha as Príomh Aire and his temporary ministry. 
Brugha then proposed a motion that de Valera should succeed him. The motion was seconded 
by Pádraic Ó Máille and proceedings were concluded until the following day.
 40
 De Valera’s 
first act as Príomh Aire was to appoint a new cabinet, and this process took place on 2 April. 
This new cabinet was expanded from five ministers to a total of nine. The new cabinet was 
Éamon de Valera as Príomh Aire, Arthur Griffith as Minister for Home Affairs, Count 
Plunkett as Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cathal Brugha as Minister for Defence, Countess 
Markiewicz as Minister for Labour, W. T. Cosgrave as Minister for Local Government, Seán 
T. O’Kelly as Minister for the Irish Language, Eoin MacNeill as Minister for Industries, and 
Michael Collins as Minister for Finance.
41
 An additional four external ministers were 
appointed but they were not members of the cabinet. These were Robert Barton as Minister 
for Agriculture, Seán Etchingham as Minister for Fisheries, Ernest Blythe as Minister for 
Trade and Commerce, and Laurence Ginnell as Minister for Propaganda.
42
 The majority of 
this ministry were greatly lacking in any political experience but they were well educated, 
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young and enthusiastic. Now that a permanent cabinet had been put into place, departments 
needed to be developed under these ministries in order for Dáil Éireann to undermine and 
disrupt the existing British administration in Ireland. Clearly, the finance ministry and 
department were going to be of principal importance in this regard. 
De Valera had chosen the T.D. for South Cork, Michael Collins, as the Dáil’s finance 
minister. Collins was born in 1890, the son of a tenant farmer from Clonakilty. He left school 
at the age of fifteen and emigrated to London where he secured employment as a clerk in the 
West Kensington post office savings bank. He remained in this post until 1910 when he left 
to work at a stockbrokers in the city. He was later employed by the Board of Trade and in a 
trust company after 1914.
43
 It was during his time in London that Collins became actively 
involved in nationalist organisations like the Gaelic Athletic Association and the Gaelic 
League. His participation in these groups brought him into contact with republicans who 
persuaded him to join the Irish Volunteers and the I.R.B. He was later appointed treasurer of 
the I.R.B. for southern England and began to make a name for himself in republican circles in 
London. In January 1916, Collins moved to Dublin. He made the decision to return to Ireland 
for two reasons. By leaving England he would evade conscription but the I.R.B. plan for a 
future rebellion was foremost in his thoughts. He became a financial advisor to Count 
Plunkett upon his return. Collins was stationed in the General Post Office during the Easter 
Rising as an aide-de-camp to his son, Joseph Mary Plunkett.
44
 Collins was only a very minor 
figure in the rebellion but he began to rise to prominence during his period of internment in 
Frongoch. He possessed a confidence and a powerful, if at times overbearing, personality, 
that enabled him to become a leader amongst the prisoners. Collins led the internees in group 
discussions of Irish history and military strategy. He also organised Irish language classes and 
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Gaelic football matches, and led a campaign for better conditions at the camp for the 
internees.
45
 The leadership skills he honed in Frongoch as well as the impression he had left 
on his fellow republican prisoners would stand him in good stead on his release and return to 
Ireland at Christmas 1916. 
Upon his return to Ireland, Collins was approached by Kathleen Clarke, the widow of 
Tom Clarke who was executed after the 1916 rising, to take over as secretary of the Irish 
National Aid and Volunteer’s Dependents Fund. This fund was set up by Kathleen Clarke, in 
the aftermath of the rebellion, to distribute assistance to the families of the men and women 
who had been killed, executed or interned.
46
 Collins’s work as secretary of the fund brought 
him to all corners of the country and allowed him to build up significant contacts with 
prominent republicans in each locality. This extensive network of contacts and knowledge 
that he acquired when administering the fund made him an obvious choice to help in the 
selection of Sinn Féin candidates for the by-elections held throughout 1917. He was elected 
to the Sinn Féin executive in October 1917. This promotion came less than a month after he 
had delivered a stirring graveside oration at the funeral of Thomas Ashe, a founding member 
of the Irish Volunteers. Ashe had been arrested for a seditious speech he had delivered in 
August 1917 and he was imprisoned in Mountjoy. He demanded prisoner-of-war status and 
began a hunger strike but he died on 25 September after being force-fed by the prison 
guards.
47
 Collins’s oration at Ashe’s funeral had a similar affect on Collins’s standing within 
republicanism, as Pádraig Pearse’s oration at O’Donovan Rossa’s graveside had in 1915. 
Collins rose rapidly through the ranks of the republican movement, and in the absence of the 
likes of de Valera and Griffith; he became one of the most prominent members of Sinn Féin. 
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Given his swift rise to prominence within Sinn Féin after 1917, it was no surprise that 
Collins was allocated the finance ministerial portfolio in the first Dáil. Finance was 
undoubtedly the most important ministry and Collins and de Valera entrusted him to 
effectively manage the financial affairs of the counter-state. Collins had shown an aptitude 
for the position in his work after the 1916 rising. He possessed excellent organisational and 
administrative skills which he had displayed in the distribution of the Irish National Aid and 
Volunteer’s Dependents Funds and in the reorganisation of Sinn Féin prior to the 1918 
election. He also had the greatest financial expertise of any of the Dáil Éireann T.D.s owing 
to the work he undertook in various jobs during his time in London. It was evident from the 
Dáil’s proceedings on 2 April that de Valera and the rest of the Sinn Féin leadership had a 
great deal of trust in Collins’s skills. It was agreed that Collins as finance minister ‘is hereby 
authorised without reference to Dáil, to apply monies to such specific objects as the Ministry 
(when not reduced below five in number) shall unanimously approve.’ 48  This motion 
indicated that Collins would have exceptional powers as Minister for Finance and it clearly 
shows the faith that the rest of the cabinet had in his ability. 
The problem with the above motion though was that there was little or no money for 
Collins to work with initially. The R.I.C. Inspector General reported in May 1919 that Dáil 
Éireann was dependent on affiliation fees paid by Sinn Féin clubs as well as the receipts from 
the concerts, lectures and sporting events which were organised throughout the country.
49
 
Initially, Sinn Féin provided a loan of £1,300 to cover the expenses involved in launching the 
Dáil. Anna O’Rahilly, whose brother had been killed during the Easter Rising, loaned a total 
of £2,000 to the revolutionary government, while O’Rahilly’s niece, Sheila Humphreys, a 
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prominent member of Cumann na mBan, provided the Dáil with a £1,000 loan.
50
 This money 
would never suffice for the Dáil’s ambitious plans though. One possible source of finance 
was the money that had been raised during the anti-conscription campaign of 1918. Over a 
quarter of a million pounds had been raised during the campaign and it was hoped that a 
sizeable proportion of that money would be turned over to Dáil Éireann. The custodian of the 
money, the Mansion House Committee, announced that local meetings of subscribers would 
take place across the country to decide on the distribution of the fund which would happen in 
the spring of 1919.
51
 Both Sinn Féin and the Catholic Church made their pleas for a share of 
the money. When the exact breakdown of the division of the fund became apparent, it was 
clear that the church had received far more money than Dáil Éireann. Most local meetings 
gave little or nothing to Dáil Éireann. Parish priests had been hugely active during the 
collection of the fund and most of the local trustees were parish priests. It was only natural 
then that so many people were keen to see their money go to the church rather than to Dáil 
Éireann. The R.I.C. Inspector General provided the breakdown of the Anti-Conscription Fund 
in his monthly report for May 1919. He reported that £164,000 was returned to subscribers or 
‘applied to ecclesiastical charities’, £50,000 was unclaimed, £21,000 was retained by the 
Mansion House Committee, and only £17,000 went to Sinn Féin.
52
 It is worth remembering 
that the meetings of the subscribers to decide on the division of the fund only took place 
shortly after the opening session of the Dáil had taken place. It is possible that many people 
believed at that time that Dáil Éireann would never be able to implement its ambitious plan 
for the creation of a republican state, and they did not wish to see their money go to waste. 
Nevertheless, the distribution of the vast majority of the fund to the church meant that Collins 
would have to explore other avenues in terms of sourcing finance for the Dáil. 
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Dáil Éireann had mounting financial commitments from January 1919 onwards and it 
was imperative that fresh finance was raised promptly. The R.I.C. Inspector General’s report 
for February stated that the financial situation was causing considerable anxiety for Dáil 
Éireann.
53
 These financial concerns persisted in the months that followed as the scale of the 
finance needed to establish a functioning counter-state became clear. It was agreed during the 
2 April meeting that all ministers would be paid an annual salary of £350 each and the 
Príomh Aire would receive £500.
54
 Dáil deputies were not paid a salary but they did receive 
travel and accommodation expenses. Other initial expenditure included securing several 
properties around Dublin for Dáil business and printing costs for propaganda purposes. Faced 
with mounting financial commitments, the feasibility of various finance raising plans were 
explored. The idea that Dáil Éireann could set up their own taxation system was examined 
but it was quickly ruled out.
55
 It simply was not feasible to impose an income tax and any 
excise taxes or duties would have more of a negative impact on Irish producers than it would 
on the British exchequer. It became apparent that Dáil Éireann would have to rely heavily on 
the goodwill and generosity of the Irish people to fund their skeletal administration. The sale 
of bonds directly to the public was decided upon as the best means of raising a significant 
amount of funds for the Dáil’s proposed ventures. The proposal was first raised during the 
Dáil’s second session in April 1919, but it is likely that it was under consideration for some 
time beforehand, with the R.I.C. reporting back in January 1919 that Dáil Éireann was 
planning on issuing 500,000 £1 bonds.
56
 Planning for the bond issue commenced 
immediately because the need for funds was so urgent. The historian Arthur Mitchell in his 
Revolutionary Government in Ireland estimated that Dáil Éireann would need £25,000 
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annually in order to finance its operations as they existed in early 1919.
57
 If they had serious 
ambitions of expanding and thus fulfilling their Democratic Programme, they would require 
not tens of thousands, but hundreds of thousands of pounds. The urgent requirement for fresh 
income became the principal concern of the cabinet. Failure to raise significant money 
quickly would have put the new counter-state in jeopardy. Without money there could be no 
government functions, and without government functions Dáil Éireann would lose all 
credibility. The electorate would have quickly grown disillusioned with Sinn Féin, and the 
whole republican movement would have been in danger of a collapse similar to that of the 
home rule movement post 1916. For this reason alone, the success of the bond issue was 
critical to the success or otherwise of the first Dáil Éireann. 
Due to the critical importance of the bond issue, the planning process was set in 
motion in the spring of 1919 with Collins and de Valera meeting regularly to formulate plans. 
De Valera addressed the Dáil on 10 April and announced that the Minister of Finance was 
preparing a loan prospectus for the issue of £500,000 worth of bonds for public subscription. 
Half of the loan would be raised at home with the other £250,000 being raised abroad. De 
Valera was keen to stress that bonds of small amounts would be sold ‘to meet the needs of the 
small subscriber’.58 The exact details of the loan were finalised in the months that followed. 
Collins was able to take personal direction
  
for the organisation of the domestic half of the 
loan because of de Valera’s decision to travel to the United States in June 1919. He took this 
decision because he feared he would be rearrested if he remained in Ireland. De Valera was 
also of the belief that an American campaign could reap huge benefits for Dáil Éireann. The 
failure of the Dáil’s delegation to the Paris Peace Conference to make any progress only 
hardened de Valera’s desire to gain recognition for the Irish Republic abroad. By mobilising 
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the extensive Irish-American community and lobbying President Woodrow Wilson he 
believed he could secure the support of the American people. By travelling to America he 
could also promote and oversee the bond issue over there. 
The domestic half of the loan was the priority at this moment in time though, owing to 
the inevitable delays that would occur in receiving the overseas money. They had to figure 
out a way around the American laws to launch the scheme and there was the obvious obstacle 
of having to transfer the money across the Atlantic Ocean. Indeed it was 1921 before most of 
the loan funds from the United States arrived in Ireland, so any of the Dáil’s early plans were 
dependent on the subscriptions raised in Ireland.
59
 The details of the ‘National Loan’ were 
first disclosed on 19 June 1919 to the T.D.s present during a private sitting of Dáil Éireann at 
Flemings Hotel in Dublin. Bonds were to be sold in sums of £1, £5, £10, £20, £50 and £100. 
Those purchasing bonds were required to pay fifty per cent on application, and the remainder 
in two equal instalments. The bonds would bear interest at five per cent per annum. This 
interest was to be calculated from the date on which the final payment was made. It was 
announced that ‘The first dividend will consist of interest calculated from the date upon 
which the final payment is made, but will not be payable until a date six months after the 
Irish Republic has received international recognition, and the English have evacuated Ireland. 
Thenceforward, payment will be made half-yearly on 1 January and 1 July.’60 The bonds 
were to be redeemable within twenty years of the international recognition of the Irish 
Republic. 
Three trustees of Dáil Éireann funds were also elected during the private session on 
19 June. Any money subscribed to the loan was to be made payable to these three trustees – 
Éamon de Valera, James O’Mara, and the Most Reverend Dr Michael Fogarty. In his position 
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as Príomh Aire, de Valera was an obvious choice to act as a trustee. O’Mara was a Limerick 
businessman who had been elected as T.D. for Kilkenny South. He had held the positions of 
Director of Finance and Director of Elections for the Sinn Féin party since 1919 and de 
Valera had chosen him to accompany him to America to help organise and administer the 
loan there.
61
 Fogarty had been appointed Bishop of Killaloe in 1904 and was widely known 
to be sympathetic to Sinn Féin. He had shared a podium with de Valera, and had spoken out 
against the threat of conscription during the East Clare by-election campaign in 1918.
 62
 The 
duties of the trustees were outlined by Arthur Griffith who was now Acting President of Dáil 
Éireann with de Valera now in the United States. Their duties were twofold – safekeeping 
and disbursement. They had the power to ‘lodge in any bank or society in their own names or 
in any other names, or invest or keep in bulk the whole or any portion of the funds in their 
keeping.’63 With regard to disbursement, the trustees were to disburse the funds only in 
accordance with a vote or resolution of the Dáil. In the exceptional event that the Dáil was 
unable to form a quorum, the trustees were then authorised to withdraw money ‘in 
accordance with their own judgement.’64 The trustees’ initial appointment was to last for a 
twelve month period before they were to be eligible for re-election but they could be 
superseded or changed at any time if Dáil Éireann passed a simple resolution indicating its 
wish to do so. Each trustee had to nominate one substitute who could act with full power on 
their behalf and they were required to compile an annual report accounting for their funds. 
They were also authorised to employ a secretary or secretaries to assist them in their work as 
trustees. 
With the three trustees now in place, the Dáil’s sixteen member Finance Committee 
set about finalising preparations for the public launch of the National Loan. This work mainly 
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involved finalising of the various documents like the prospectus, application forms, receipts 
and collections cards that would be necessary in the administration of the loan. The T.D. for 
North Wexford, Roger Sweetman, addressed a crowd of 5,000 people in Gorey and told them 
that they would soon be called upon to subscribe to a loan of a quarter of a million pounds ‘in 
order to put the country on its legs once more.’65 By mid-August, this domestic loan was 
ready for its public launch. The Ard-Chomhairle [National Executive] of Sinn Féin convened 
at the Mansion House on 15 August 1919 and the details of the National Loan were made 
public. The details that were agreed to by the Dáil on 19 June were those that were unveiled 
to the public. There was one change made from the June session and that was the extension of 
the American loan. De Valera had asked permission to increase the target to $5,000,000 and 
his proposal was agreed to.
66
 The terms of the internal loan remained unaltered. Copies of the 
loan prospectus were distributed to those present. The prospectus outlined the conditions of 
the bond issue.  It stated that: ‘After the withdrawal of the English Military Forces, this Loan 
becomes the first charge on the Revenues of the Irish Republic.’67 Subscribers would have to 
pay fifty per cent on application with two further twenty-five per cent instalments due on 1 
December 1919 and 1 February 1920. The prospectus also detailed the procedure that took 
place after subscriptions were received. Applicants were to be supplied with a receipt at the 
time of payment. This receipt included the amount of bonds purchased and the amount that 
was paid upon application. The registered bond certificates would then be prepared by the 
Department of Finance and be issued in exchange for the receipt when complete. The final 
section of the prospectus instructed potential subscribers that copies of the prospectus as well 
as printed application forms could be obtained from the following people: ‘the Minister of 
Finance, Dáil Éireann; the Honorary Treasurers of Sinn Féin; and the Secretary of any Sinn 
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Féin Club in Ireland.’68 The prospectus was undersigned by de Valera as Príomh Aire of Dáil 
Éireann and Michael Collins as Minister of Finance.  
Other documents were also distributed to coincide with the public launch of the loan. 
One such document listed the objectives of the loan. This was essentially a rehash of the 
Democratic Programme that had been drawn up the previous January. The money would be 
used to ‘propagate the Irish case all over the world.’ It would contribute to the establishment 
of an Irish consular service, a national civil service, national arbitration courts and a Land 
Bank. It would also help to promote Irish trade and commerce, to develop the fisheries, 
forestry and industrial sectors. It was specified that the money could also be used ‘generally 
for National Purposes as directed by Dáil Éireann.’69 This was an important statement as it 
afforded Dáil Éireann a degree of flexibility as regards their intentions for the funds. Dáil 
Éireann would have the freedom to alter their plans for the money should circumstances 
change in Ireland or overseas. The names of the three trustees of the National Loan appeared 
prominently on all the promotional material that was distributed at the meeting. A letter 
signed by Collins as Minister of Finance and Arthur Griffith as Acting-President of Dáil 
Éireann was circulated alongside the loan prospectus. The letter was laced with republican 
propaganda clearly designed to entice people to purchase bonds. It proclaimed that: ‘After 
centuries of repression the Irish Nation has burst from the dungeon in which it had been 
hidden away from the knowledge and conscience of mankind.’ 70  Dáil Éireann was the 
manifestation of this new Irish freedom and the National Loan would be used exclusively in 
the promotion of Ireland, ‘an indivisible entity.’ ‘All who lend to Dáil Éireann today, lend to 
ensure the dignity, the prosperity, and the independence of the Irish Nation.’71 While not 
exactly a call to arms, the use of such evocative rhetoric was a clear rallying call to the Irish 
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people to give Dáil Éireann the same support in their fundraising drive that they had given to 
Sinn Féin at the polls in 1918. 
Reports of the events at the Mansion House on 15 August reached de Valera in 
America and he quickly identified a problem with the documentation that had been released. 
He wrote to Collins on 16 September: ‘I see from printed prospectus to hand that you are 
undertaking the obligation of paying interest from the present time on till the evacuation and 
recognition. I am sorry it is so, but I suppose it is too late to change it. It must not be so in any 
foreign subscription.’72 Collins replied on 6 October that he was fully aware of the interest 
terms, as was Griffith, and the matter would be discussed among the Dáil ministry at their 
next meeting.
73
 In his next letter Collins reported to de Valera on the cabinet meeting: ‘The 
entire position with regard to the Interest Payments was reviewed, and all present – Arthur 
Griffith, Cathal Brugha, W. T. Cosgrave, and Count Plunkett – were all agreed that the 
statement on the Prospectus accepting liability for interest from the time full payment is made, 
was what was meant.’74 It is clear from this exchange of letters that it was Collins and not de 
Valera who called the shots when it came to the organisation and administration of the 
National Loan. Collins was well aware of the liability the Dáil would incur by paying interest 
from the time a certificate was fully paid, but he knew that this would enhance the 
attractiveness of the loan to potential subscribers. He believed that any future financial 
burden could be offset by the attraction of more subscribers. It was evident from this time on, 
that de Valera would have little input into the raising of the internal loan. 
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The establishment of Dáil Éireann in January 1919 marked a major milestone in Irish 
history. A chain of events in the years prior to 1919 hastened its creation. The outbreak of 
war on the continent in August 1914 presented radical nationalists with an opportunity for 
rebellion and this opportunity was seized in Easter 1916. Although the 1916 rising failed, its 
legacy was the rise of Sinn Féin in the years that followed. The whole Sinn Féin local 
organisation was built up nationwide between 1916 and 1918. Electoral success followed in 
December 1918, when they usurped the I.P.P. as the dominant party in Irish nationalist 
politics. The successful Sinn Féin candidates agreed to convoke Dáil Éireann in January 1919. 
Their aim was to develop an alternative government administration to the British one based at 
Dublin Castle, but even the most skeletal of administrations would need significant funding. 
The problem of finance was arguably the greatest challenge that Dáil Éireann faced and the 
man tasked with finding a solution to the fundraising issue was the finance minister, Michael 
Collins. It was agreed that the sale of government bonds was the best option to raise the funds 
needed. The National Loan was launched in August 1919 with bonds being issued both at 
home and abroad. The internal loan was prioritised because it would take longer for the 
external loan to get up and running and the Dáil needed funds immediately. The task of 
organising such a loan was a massive undertaking, and the success of the Dáil Loan was 
simply critical for the credibility and viability of the revolutionary government. Similar to the 
election campaign in the winter of 1918, the success of the loan would be heavily reliant on 
the strength of the Sinn Féin organisation at a local level. The various Sinn Féin clubs across 
the country would have to work tirelessly and efficiently to ensure the undertaking was a 
success. Therefore, the effective promotion of the loan would be as important as its 
organisation. However, the efforts to promote interest in the loan would be set against a 
background of increasing British suspicion of Dáil Éireann’s activities.  
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Chapter II – The raising of the first internal Dáil Éireann Loan 
The urgent need for funds quickly became the greatest challenge facing the Dáil Éireann 
revolutionary government in the months after its establishment in January 1919. Dáil 
Éireann’s objective of superseding the existing British administration at Dublin Castle was 
dependent on their ability to raise the necessary funds to finance a republican administration. 
Various fundraising plans were discussed but it was clear that the sale of government bonds 
directly to the public was their only option to generate finance promptly. Éamon de Valera 
announced to the Dáil on 10 April 1919 that the finance minister was preparing a loan 
prospectus for the issue of £500,000 worth of bonds for public subscription – half of which 
was to be offered at home with the other £250,000 being offered abroad. During this 
announcement, de Valera was keen to stress that bonds of small amounts were to be sold to 
cater for small subscribers. The domestic half of this loan quickly became the priority for the 
Dáil’s finance department and its minister Michael Collins, at home with the departure of de 
Valera to the United States in June 1919 to oversee the external loan there. The details of the 
internal loan were eventually made public at a meeting of the Sinn Féin leadership at the 
Mansion House on 15 August 1919. The bonds would bear interest at five per cent per annum 
and they were to be sold in sums of £1, £5, £10, £20, £50 and £100. This was a highly 
ambitious plan. Sinn Féin had successfully secured the electoral support of a large proportion 
of the Irish people, but, persuading them to also provide their financial support was going to 
prove challenging. The majority of the population did not have a large income, and many of 
them would surely have doubted that these bonds would ever yield a dividend. Nevertheless, 
Dáil Éireann had to rely on the financial support of the Irish people. They were their only 
option owing to the legal and logistical problems that were delaying the progress of the 
external loan. The success of the loan was entirely dependent on the support of the people, 
and the feasibility of the Dáil Éireann counter-state hinged on the Dáil Loan. Therefore, it 
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was imperative that the loan was well organised, and effectively promoted, to provide it with 
every chance of success. The responsibility to ensure its organisation and promotion laid not 
only with Collins and his finance department, but with the many members of the various Sinn 
Féin clubs nationwide. This chapter explores the organisation and promotion of the internal 
Dáil Éireann Loan. The course of the loan is analysed, emphasising the progress of the loan at 
a local level using relevant examples from different constituencies. Finally, the success and 
the impact of the loan is evaluated. 
 With the details of the internal loan finalised in August 1919, the organisation of the 
loan campaign began in earnest. Collins quickly switched his attentions to the huge logistical 
operation of putting an effective structure in place nationwide for the collection of loan 
subscriptions. It was agreed that the loan would be organised in accordance with the electoral 
constituencies. Sinn Féin had an elected member of Dáil Éireann for seventy-three of the 105 
constituencies. Each T.D. had the responsibility to take the lead in both the organisation and 
promotion of the loan in their respective constituencies. However, many T.D.s were either 
imprisoned or on the run so alternative arrangements had to be made in their constituencies. 
Four organisers were appointed for each province. They were: Éamonn Fleming, for Leinster; 
Edward Donnelly, for Ulster; P. Ryan, for Connacht; and P. C. O’Mahony, for Munster.1 
They were empowered to appoint organisers in any constituencies which were without an 
elected member of Dáil Éireann. Those Dáil members who were at liberty were each 
requested to sell a certain quota of bonds in their respective constituencies. Collins had 
informed the T.D.s on 5 August 1919 that: ‘The work must go ahead rapidly. It will be 
essential to get on with a rush.’ He also asked for ‘increased individual effort on the part of 
all members of the Dáil’.2 T.D.s were issued with instructions to convene a meeting of 
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prominent supporters in their constituency. This conference though, was not to be confined to 
members of the various Sinn Féin clubs. It was hoped that the support of individuals outside 
of the Sinn Féin organisation could be secured, and it was stressed that ‘this particular point 
should not be overlooked.’3 If the Dáil Loan were to succeed, Sinn Féin had to persuade 
people from outside of the organisation to purchase bonds. 
 Eager to set a good example for his fellow T.D.s, Michael Collins addressed a 
conference of some thirty delegates in his South Cork constituency at Dunmanway on 17 
August. He outlined the significance of the loan and revealed his preference that Dáil Éireann 
sold 250,000 subscriptions of £1 each, instead of 25,000 subscriptions of £10 each.
4
 It was 
clear that Dáil Éireann hoped that a wide cross-section of society would subscribe to the loan 
rather than a smaller number of wealthier individuals. Collins himself purchased £25 worth of 
bonds at the meeting, and £400 was subscribed in total by those present.
5
  Other T.D.s held 
similar meetings in their own constituencies across Ireland throughout August and September 
1919. Joseph McGuinness, the Dáil deputy for Longford, addressed a meeting at Dromard at 
the start of August. McGuinness spoke passionately about the aims of Dáil Éireann, and 
outlined his hope that the people of Ireland would not ‘leave all to America to do’ in 
financially supporting the counter-state.
6
 Peter Paul Galligan, the T.D. for the constituency of 
West Cavan, appealed for support for the Dáil Loan at a meeting on 14 September, while on 
the same day, a meeting for Mid Cork was addressed by Terence MacSwiney, the Dáil 
deputy for the constituency, at Macroom.
7
 Several of the prominent Dáil members travelled 
around to different constituencies to assist in the launch of the loan in the various areas. The 
R.I.C. county inspector for Waterford reported that Count Plunkett had been in the county 
                                                          
3
 Béaslaí, Michael Collins, i, p. 348. 
4
 Irish Independent, 18 Aug. 1919. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Anglo-Celt, 2 Aug. 1919. 
7
 Irish Times, 20 Sept. 1919. 
43 
 
since 23 September helping in the organisation of the loan there.
8
 Plunkett had been elected 
for the constituency of North Roscommon in the 1918 election, but he was one of the most 
familiar members of Dáil Éireann. His presence in Waterford at the time when the loan was 
getting off the ground is explained by the fact that the constituency of Waterford City had no 
T.D. having returned Captain William Archer Redmond of the I.P.P. in the 1918 election. 
Plunkett and other eminent Dáil members like Arthur Griffith, who visited Monaghan in 
November to hold meetings in Ballybay and Clones to promote the bond drive, travelled 
around to a number of different constituencies to help launch the loan.
9
 The constituencies 
that were visited by the likes of Griffith and Plunkett had either elected no Dáil deputy in 
December 1918, or their T.D. was imprisoned or on the run. 
 
Fig III: Michael Collins addressing a public meeting 
(Source: Irish Times) 
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 T.D.s were also required to communicate the Department of Finance’s instructions to 
the Sinn Féin clubs in their constituencies. A central committee was formed for each 
constituency at the meeting of prominent supporters that Collins had instructed each deputy 
to convene in their constituency. The constituency T.D. presided over this committee. The 
first business of the central committee was to divide up each constituency into several 
different areas for the purposes of the loan. In most cases, the constituencies were divided 
into three or four areas but in some of the larger constituencies it was necessary to have five 
separate areas. In Mid Cork, the constituency was split into five different areas – Macroom, 
Millstreet, Kilnamartrya, Donoughmore and Crookstown.
10
 The central committee then 
proceeded on Collins’s instructions to create a ‘collecting and advertising committee’ in each 
parish, or in some cases, in each half parish. These local committees consisted of: ‘the most 
active and influential members of the Sinn Féin club and from supporters who do not belong 
to Sinn Féin’.11 Once the members of these parish committees were finalised, their names 
along with a report of the business carried out at the meeting, were forwarded to Collins and 
his finance committee in Dublin. It is clear that it was intended to attract prominent 
individuals who were not affiliated to Sinn Féin or Dáil Éireann to serve on these committees. 
Given the wide ranging demands that were already on their time, it was unreasonable 
and impractical to expect the T.D.s to carry out all the administrative work involved in the 
Dáil Loan. Their responsibility was to act as a figurehead in their own constituency, but the 
day to day running of the loan on the ground was solely down to the members of the local 
collecting and advertising committees. Once the members of the various committees had 
been appointed during August and early September, T.D.s issued instructions to them in the 
weeks that followed.  The Dáil deputy for South Mayo, William Sears, sent a letter to the 
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secretary of each Sinn Féin club in South Mayo on 22 August. He called on ‘The most active 
and sustained cooperation of all Sinn Féin forces in the country is needed’, in order to ensure 
the internal loan was successful. He wrote that he would be in South Mayo for the following 
three or four weeks to assist in launching the loan. Sears signed off with his hope that every 
member of the Sinn Féin clubs would cooperate with the central committee for the 
constituency in making the Dáil Loan a success.
12
 Other T.D.s circulated similar letters to 
their Sinn Féin constituents. Richard Mulcahy, who was elected for the Clontarf constituency 
in December 1918, wrote a circular in early October 1919 calling on the loan agents to make 
a personal call on all householders in the constituency for the purpose of distributing 
application forms and arranging for the collection of any subscriptions that may have been 
forthcoming.
13
 It is clear from these letters that the success of the loan at a local level would 
be dependent on the competence and commitment of the individual clubs and their members.  
 Sinn Féin’s success in the 1918 election was largely attributed to their effective local 
organisation which had been built up during 1917. Similar to the election campaign, the Dáil 
Loan would also be reliant on the strength of the local organisation nationwide. There were 
1,420 Sinn Féin clubs established across Ireland by August 1919 and they were to be of 
critical importance to the effective organisation of the loan campaign.
14
 Although it had been 
hoped to attract individuals with no affiliation to Sinn Féin to serve on the local loan 
committees, the majority of those who worked on the loan were drawn from the local club. 
The local committees were responsible for organising and promoting the loan in their parish 
or half parish. The success of the loan in a particular area was largely dependent on the ability 
of the local committee members. Their duties involved ensuring local awareness of the loan 
through effective promotion and arranging for the collection of subscriptions. They were also 
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responsible for ensuring that the funds subscribed to the loan were forwarded on to the 
Department of Finance in Dublin. They were also required to submit detailed weekly reports 
to Michael Collins outlining the progress of the loan in their region.
15
 The work was time 
consuming and had to be carried out at a time when the British administration in Ireland were 
attempting to suppress Dáil Éireann. The loan workers were only paid modest expenses for 
their work.
16
 It must be remembered though that these individuals were generally ordinary 
citizens who had to undertake the loan work while also holding down their own jobs. 
A brief study of the Dáil Loan workers produces some interesting results. A list of 
documents and correspondence seized by the British authorities during a raid on Dáil Éireann 
offices at 5 Mespil Road provides an insight into the type of individuals that worked as loan 
agents and collectors. While it is by no means a definitive account of those who worked on 
the loan, the content of the document is worthy of examination nonetheless. The list shows 
the varying type of occupations which loan workers had. Most of the correspondence seized 
were letters either to or from Michael Collins. Correspondents included publicans, hoteliers, 
shopkeepers, doctors, grocers, drapers and builders.
17
 In the list for County Kerry, Peter Scott, 
a Killarney publican, was listed as a local agent. Two grocers from County Louth, Phil Daly 
from Dundalk and Joseph Dolan from Ardee were suspected of being loan workers. There 
was correspondence from a Mr W. Mansfield of the Mullinahone creamery in Tipperary. 
There were also records of correspondence between Collins and a J. Lalor who was the 
manager of a cinema in Kilkenny. In the records for County Tyrone, correspondents included 
a boot merchant and a tobacconist from Cookstown, and a wine and spirit merchant from 
Strabane.
18
 A sizeable proportion of correspondents were solicitors. It is unlikely that these 
                                                          
15
 Béaslaí, Michael Collins, i, pp 354-350. 
16
 C. M. Byrne expenses in connection with Dáil Éireann (N.A.I., Dáil Éireann Secretariat files, 1919–1922, DÉ 
2/337). 
17
 Epitome of documents seized at 5 Mespil Road Dublin (T.N.A., Dublin Castle papers, CO 904/24/3). 
18
 Ibid. 
47 
 
solicitors were loan agents, although one or two were enquiring with regard to their own 
personal subscriptions. Most of the solicitors were acting on behalf of individual clients who 
had subscribed to the loan. While not all of the individuals listed in this document may have 
worked on the loan directly, these lists highlight the wide cross section of society from which 
the loan workers were drawn.  
Interestingly, there is a large volume of correspondence from parish priests and 
curates both to, and from, Michael Collins, in the list of documents seized from 5 Mespil 
Road. These included five priests from County Mayo – Fr O’Malley from Castlebar, Fr 
Conroy from Kilmeena, Fr M. O’Mara from Kiltimagh, Fr Dennis Gildea from Foxford, and 
Fr P. J. Mulligan from Carracastle.  Meanwhile in Cork there were letters from Fr Hurley, a 
curate in Bantry; Rev Edward Fitzgerald, the curate in Kinsale; and Rev Fr Crowley in Cork 
city.
19
 These examples from these two counties are typical of the number of correspondents 
that were either the local parish priest or curate. Letters from Bishop Fogarty are included in 
the list for County Clare, while the list for Tipperary shows that Archbishop John Harty of 
Cashel received a letter from Collins in April 1920 accompanied by a receipt for the 
application that he had forwarded to Éamon de Valera in the United States.
20
 In most cases 
these priests were forwarding on significant amounts of money that had been subscribed to 
the loan in their parish, while other letters to priests were attached to receipts acknowledging 
subscriptions that had been forwarded to Dublin. For example, a letter dated 6 July 1920 from 
Michael Collins to Rev Fr P. C. O’Farrell of Dunshaughlin County Meath, enclosed a receipt 
in respect of £6 worth of gold that had been subscribed. In Roscommon, Fr M. J. Kearns of 
Cloonyquinn received a receipt of £329 on 14 July for loan subscriptions that had been 
forwarded, while Rev J. Donnellan of Castlerea received a receipt for £133 on 30 July.
21
 It is 
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probable that these acted as local trustees for the funds collected in their respective parishes. 
Potential subscribers may have viewed the scheme more favourably in the knowledge that the 
money they subscribed was being entrusted to a local cleric. Also, from Dáil Éireann’s point 
of view, a priest was far less likely to come under the suspicion of the authorities than a 
layperson. 
The evolution of the relationship of the Catholic Church and the Dáil Loan is worthy 
of further study. The Catholic Church was the most powerful organisation in Ireland. The 
hold which the church had over the majority of the Irish people far exceeded that of Sinn Féin 
or Dáil Éireann.
22
 Sir Horace Plunkett wrote in 1904 that the Irish Catholic clergy exercised 
‘an influence over their flocks not merely in religious matters, but in almost every phase of 
their lives and conduct’.23 Conscious of the esteem with which the Catholic Church was held 
by a large swathe of the population, Sinn Féin were always cautious never to alienate the 
clergy because such a scenario had the potential to severely damage their support base. Sinn 
Féin and the church hierarchy had been united in their opposition to conscription in 1918. 
However, the church leadership remained silent during the election campaign and they made 
no official acknowledgement of the establishment of Dáil Éireann in early 1919. Arthur 
Mitchell writes that the Dáil government, throughout its existence, avoided all possible 
controversy with the Catholic hierarchy.
24
 Dáil Éireann never created an education ministry 
for instance. This was clearly a decision taken as to not antagonise the church leadership or 
the clergy. The Catholic Church monopolised the Irish education system, and education was 
not a high priority for Dáil Éireann as a consequence. The Dáil leadership seemed happy to 
maintain the status quo as far as the church was concerned. They did not push for official 
recognition from the hierarchy because, firstly, they were well aware that it was unlikely to 
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be forthcoming, and also because they knew they could rely on support from some individual 
bishops and members of the clergy. 
One such bishop upon whom Dáil Éireann could rely on for support was the Most 
Reverend Dr Michael Fogarty, the Bishop of Killaloe. When the Dáil Loan was formally 
launched in August 1919, Fogarty was announced as a trustee along with de Valera and 
James O’Mara. Fogarty was known to be sympathetic to the republican movement. He had 
been vocal throughout 1918 in decrying the threat of conscription in Ireland and he was well 
known among the Dáil leadership as a result. There was an obvious value in getting a 
prominent bishop like Fogarty to publicly back the loan, and it was a significant coup for Dáil 
Éireann when he agreed to act as a trustee. Fogarty himself applied directly to Michael 
Collins on 11 September 1919 for £100 worth of Dáil bonds. He wrote of the loan that: 
‘Every certificate taken will be a stone in that grand edifice which honest men all over the 
world desire to see created. It should be the pride of every Irishman to hold one of these 
certificates and leave it as a second heirloom to his family.’ 25  The presence of Bishop 
Fogarty’s name on internal Dáil Loan literature appeared to be something of a rallying point 
for the venture. He was referenced in many of the circulars that were issued to the local loan 
committees during 1919 and 1920. In one particular circular that Collins issued on 6 March 
1920, Fogarty was quoted as saying that: ‘We must not in this great National enterprise fall 
behind our American friends. It will be a shame to do so.’26 Fogarty’s support as a trustee 
was an undoubted shot in the arm for the loan campaign. The presence of his name on the 
loan prospectus may have encouraged many lukewarm republicans to subscribe to the loan. 
Fogarty’s contribution to the loan campaign was clearly important because Collins also 
attempted to get other prominent bishops to endorse the bond drive. When writing to J. W. 
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Ryan, the president of the Irish Ireland League in Australia on 24 September 1919, Collins 
encouraged that the support of the Cork born Dr Mannix, the Archbishop of Melbourne, be 
sought for the loan appeal there.
27
 Collins name checked Fogarty in his letter as he obviously 
believed that Mannix could act in a similar capacity in Australia. Fogarty’s support as a 
trustee did not go unnoticed elsewhere either. There were calls from unionist M.P.s in 
Westminster in June 1920 for his arrest because of the presence of his name on the Dáil Loan 
prospectus.
28
 Fogarty’s value to the loan campaign was evidently apparent to more than just 
the republican movement. 
Although Bishop Fogarty undoubtedly made the greatest contribution of those in the 
Catholic hierarchy to the loan campaign, he was not alone in publicly backing the venture. 
Archbishop William J. Walsh of Dublin was another who openly supported the loan. He 
wrote to Cardinal William O’Connell, the Archbishop of Boston, on 10 November 1919 
asking him to help publicise the fact that he had contributed £105 to the internal loan. He 
believed that ‘as far as our people of Irish race are concerned, their knowledge of the fact that 
I had subscribed to the Fund would be of at least as much help as any mere money 
contribution of mine to it could be.’29 This was not the first time that Archbishop Walsh had 
assisted with republican fundraising attempts. Seized telegrams from 1917 indicate that he 
had acted as a trustee for the Irish National Aid and Volunteer’s Dependents Fund.30 Another 
prelate who actively supported the campaign was Archbishop John Harty of Cashel. However, 
not all the Catholic bishops were as supportive as the likes of Fogarty, Walsh and Harty. The 
Most Reverend Daniel Cohalan, the Bishop of Cork, was certainly not as forthcoming in 
lending his backing to the loan campaign. Michael Collins had seen the beneficial impact that 
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the likes of Fogarty, Walsh and Harty had contributed and he was keen to also gain the 
support of Cohalan. He wrote to Terence MacSwiney, the T.D. for Mid Cork, and urged him 
to set up a meeting with Bishop Cohalan. On 29 March 1920 Collins wrote that: ‘the moral 
value we may get from the same is becoming more and more obvious as the days go on.’31 
Cohalan had appeared to have been sympathetic to Sinn Féin during the 1918 election 
campaign but his mindset had obviously changed in the interim because he frequently 
ignored MacSwiney’s representations. Collins continued to urge MacSwiney to again seek an 
engagement with the bishop. Cohalan did eventually consent to meet formally with 
MacSwiney on 13 April 1920, but in a letter written to Collins, MacSwiney described the 
meeting as ‘very unsatisfactory’.32 Cohalan did not appear to be particularly enthusiastic 
towards the Dáil Éireann counter-state but he did promise MacSwiney that he would make a 
subscription to the Dáil Loan. However, Cohalan’s apathetic attitude towards the Dáil Loan 
was evident by the fact that his subscription had still not been forthcoming almost three 
months after his meeting with MacSwiney. In a letter dated 21 July, MacSwiney informed 
him that the loan was about to close, and he still had not received the subscription that had 
been promised previously.
33
 MacSwiney evidently received a prompt reply to his letter 
because he wrote again to Cohalan on 23 July thanking him for an invitation to meet on the 
following Sunday.
34
 Although Bishop Cohalan did eventually consent to subscribe to the Dáil 
Loan, he certainly appeared reluctant to do so, and he never endorsed the Dáil Éireann 
counter-state to anywhere near the extent that the likes of Bishop Fogarty had. 
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Some individuals within the Catholic Church clearly could not lend their support to 
Dáil Éireann because of the concurrent rise in violent hostilities during 1919 and 1920. There 
were many individuals, like Michael Collins himself, who were central to both the attempted 
political revolution and the guerrilla conflict. Cohalan was outspoken in his condemnation of 
the rising violence, and in expressing his abhorrence of I.R.A. atrocities in Cork. The 
escalating violence clearly influenced his position regarding Dáil Éireann. Bishop Fogarty, on 
the other hand, held a different position. He was a staunch supporter of Dáil Éireann and he 
clarified his position in his witness statement to the Bureau of Military History in 1949. He 
outlined how some older members of the hierarchy were troubled by the violence but that he 
was willing to ‘stand over the guerrilla struggle’, with the proviso that ‘it was carried through 
by authorisation of at least de facto government.’35 The endorsement that Sinn Féin had 
received from the electorate in 1918 was enough for Fogarty to give his wholehearted support 
for the Dáil Loan despite the increasing violence around the country. 
The ordinary Catholic clergy nationwide faced a similar dilemma as to whether to 
endorse the Dáil Loan despite the guerrilla campaign. Like the bishops, some refused to lend 
their support to the loan but there were many who did. Obtaining the endorsement of a local 
cleric for the loan was at least equally as important as receiving the support of the bishops 
because they had the ears of the local people in every parish in Ireland. It is apparent from the 
list of documents seized from 5 Mespil Road that the parish priest in many areas was acting 
in a capacity as a sort of local trustee for the Dáil Loan funds. Many priests purchased bonds 
themselves and also encouraged their parishioners to follow suit. Fr P. H. Delahunty, a 
Catholic curate in Callan, County Kilkenny, was found to have documents referring to the 
Dáil Loan in his possession, as well as correspondence with the Dáil finance department 
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regarding loan business.
36
 The documents found in Fr Delahunty’s possession urged generous 
contributions to the loan. Clerics from further afield heeded these urgings. Records show of 
two Yorkshire clerics, Rev George Paul Richardson of Leeds and Fr Peter Blessing of 
Bradford, both forwarding subscriptions to the internal loan.
37
 There are also records that 
show the role played by many individual priests in the organisation and promotion of the loan. 
Several priests in the East Galway constituency played a central role in the preparation of the 
loan campaign there. The R.I.C. inspector for the east-riding of County Galway reported on a 
meeting of the Sinn Féin central committee for the constituency at Ballinasloe on 7 
September 1919. Forty delegates attended the meeting including three priests. One of those 
priests was Fr Brennan, a Catholic curate from Caltra, who presided over proceedings.
38
 
There was more activity in East Galway in the months that followed. In October, a large 
public meeting in Ballinasloe had been secretly arranged by Rev J. J. Madden. He addressed 
the meeting alongside Seán Milroy and urged those present to support the Dáil Loan.
39
 
Another meeting of the East Galway central committee took place on 9 November at 
Ballinasloe. The county inspector reported that about thirty-five delegates were present. 
Among these delegates were Rev J. J. Madden of Ballinasloe, Rev J. M. Naughton of 
Ballinasloe, Rev P. J. O’Loughlin of Gurteen, Rev M. Cogavin of Creagh College, and Rev 
M. Broderick of Kilconnell. Rev Malachy Brennan of Caltra, the president of the executive, 
presided over the meeting and the floatation of the loan was the principal matter discussed.
40
 
While the support of high profile bishops like Archbishops Fogarty, Walsh and Harty was 
greatly beneficial to the loan campaign, the work done by certain parish priests and curates 
like those in the East Galway constituency, was vital in promoting the venture locally around 
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the country. Taking all this evidence into account, it is clear that there were many individuals 
within the Catholic Church who made key contributions to the internal Dáil Loan campaign. 
The organisation of the internal loan was made easier by the fact that the Sinn Féin 
club system had been so well established in the lead up to the general election campaign in 
1918. The effective promotion of the loan would be challenging, because this time the people 
were not being asked simply for their vote, they were being encouraged to invest their money 
in the republican government. Aside from the meetings that were taking place in every 
constituency to make arrangements for the organisation of the campaign, public meetings 
were also taking place to promote and raise awareness of the loan. Most of these public 
meetings took place during the months of October and particularly November. Once the local 
organisational arrangements had been finalised in August and September, the promotion of 
the loan became the priority. The R.I.C. Inspector General stated in his report for October 
1919 that ‘several impromptu gatherings were held at which speakers urged the people to 
subscribe to the Loan.’41 These impromptu gatherings took place in counties across the island 
in October. Public meetings took place in County Donegal at Malin Head on Sunday 5 
October, at Kilcar on Sunday 12 October, and at Carndonagh on Sunday 19 October. In 
Galway, small meetings were convened on 12 October after mass, at both Clontuskert and 
Eyrecourt.
42
 Many more public meetings encouraging subscriptions to the Dáil Loan took 
place throughout the following month. Arthur Griffith travelled to Monaghan in the middle of 
November to address public meetings there. Éamonn Duggan, the T.D. for South Meath 
addressed a meeting at Duleek on Sunday 23 November to promote the loan campaign in the 
constituency.
43
 It is noteworthy that the majority of these meetings occurred on Sundays. 
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They seemed to occur spontaneously after church services where the majority of the parish 
would be in attendance.  
The R.I.C. reports for these months also show that the country was flooded with loan 
literature and promotional material. The prospectus of the internal loan outlined the terms of 
the bond issue and included a statement from the trustees outlining why people should 
subscribe and how their funds would be used. Collins reported that 500,000 copies of this 
prospectus were distributed to the local loan committees around the country.
44
 He also 
reported that 2,000,000 promotional leaflets had been sent out throughout the length and 
breadth of Ireland. These leaflets were sent to the loan committees in every locality and it 
was then the responsibility of the loan workers to ensure they were distributed among the 
public. The types of leaflet ranged from pamphlets detailing how the Dáil Loan funds would 
be used, to documents outlining the reasons why people should subscribe. One such 
document issued on 2 October 1919 entitled ‘Why you should subscribe’ listed ten reasons 
why the loan should be supported. Among the ten reasons given were that the people could 
‘not afford to forfeit the fruit of all the work and sacrifice since the proclamation of the 
Republic in 1916.’ The leaflet also stated that: ‘Your money will come back to you in the 
increased prosperity of Ireland.’45 This sort of leaflet was typical of the propaganda that Dáil 
Éireann dispersed to promote the loan. Most of their promotional literature followed a similar 
pattern – references to iconic republican events of the past, like the 1916 proclamation, and 
then declarations of how Ireland would face the brighter future under the governance of Dáil 
Éireann rather than Dublin Castle. Promotional material like this permeated every parish as 
October progressed. The Inspector General of the R.I.C. stated in his report for October that 
republican activities were mainly concerned with the promotion of the Dáil Éireann Loan and 
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that: ‘The country was flooded with Loan literature’.46 A number of the county inspectors 
mention the distribution of loan literature in their reports for October. The county inspector 
for Waterford reported that leaflets had been posted around the county in the early hours of 
Sunday 12 October. He also stated his belief that the leaflets had been brought down to 
Waterford from Dublin by P. C. O’Mahony, the provincial organiser for Munster.47 The 
inspector for the east-riding of Cork reported that leaflets had been extensively distributed 
around Mallow on the night of 9 October and around Ballincollig on the night of 18 October 
by unknown cyclists.
48
 These leaflets advocating subscription to the loan were pushed under 
people’s doors and through letterboxes. The posting of promotional leaflets directly to 
individual houses was an effective strategy, but it was not without its difficulties.  
 Dáil Éireann wanted to publicise the loan as widely as possible, but getting enough 
promotional literature proved somewhat problematic. Any printer found producing loan 
literature would be shut down and have his printing machinery dismantled by the authorities. 
Piaras Béaslaí wrote that most of the printing of loan material was done within a few hundred 
yards of Dublin Castle at Dollard’s printing-house. Patrick Mahon, of Yarnhall Street on the 
northside of Dublin, was also responsible for printing a large quantity of loan related 
material.
49
 The Dáil’s cabinet minutes show that on 12 September over £500 was paid to 
these two printers towards the printing of the prospectus.
50
 The problem with a handful of 
printers producing promotional literature in such large volumes was that they ran the risk of 
being suppressed by the authorities at any time, and then Dáil Éireann would have to secure 
new printers. Collins had decided to submit a full page advertisement of the prospectus of the 
loan to various newspapers around the country. The advertisement entitled ‘Dáil Éireann 
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Loan’ encouraged readers to ‘subscribe today’ as they could ‘restore Ireland’s strength, her 
health, her beauty and her wealth.’51  It was submitted to the newspapers concerned for 
publication on 12 September 1919. The Irish Independent and the Freeman’s Journal 
declined to print the notice but a number of the smaller republican journals and provincial 
newspapers did publish it. These newspapers, including the Cork Examiner, were 
immediately suppressed by the authorities.
52
 This promotional strategy of printing 
advertisements in newspapers was both an effective and relatively risk free approach from the 
Dáil’s point of view. They were guaranteed to generate publicity for the Dáil Loan regardless 
of whether the newspapers were suppressed or not. The suppressions that took place only had 
a negative impact on the newspapers concerned and not on Dáil Éireann. 
 Owing to the difficulties that emerged in having a large volume of material printed in 
Dublin, other methods of advertising had to be considered. Collins wrote to the local 
committees that: ‘The action of the English Government in preventing the newspapers from 
advertising the Dáil Éireann Loan compels us to adopt some other means of advertising.’53 
He enclosed twenty sample loan advertisements which could be circulated by handbill. He 
wrote that: ‘We can supply you with 5,000 copies of each of the enclosed handbills if 
necessary, but it would be better if you could have them printed locally.’ 54  Like other 
promotional material for the loan, these sample advertisements followed a similar pattern. 
Many referred to iconic republican figures or events of the past while others emphasised the 
future benefits that Dáil Éireann would bring. Examples of these sample advertisements 
included: ‘Pearse gave all. Won’t you give a little? Buy Dáil Éireann Bonds today.’ ‘Ireland 
has been SOLD often enough. Subscribe to the Dáil Éireann Loan and help to BUY Ireland 
for the Irish. Act today.’ ‘Leave Ireland better than you found it. Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN 
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BONDS Today.’ ‘Won’t it be Grand – the day we see them clearing out, Bag and Baggage? 
You can hasten the day. Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS and lose no time about it.’ 55 
Handbills like these had a significant advantage over the other loan literature that was 
produced en masse in Dublin.  They could be printed and distributed locally rather than the 
other literature which had to printed and then transported from Dublin. This was risky 
because there was always a chance that the literature could be seized whilst in transit. 
Matthew Doyle of the Killarney Printing Works was approached to print loan advertisements 
for the Mid Cork constituency. He wrote to Terence MacSwiney on 30 September 1919 
pledging to: ‘give you all assistance I can in working of the movement at all times.’56 Local 
printers like Doyle were recruited nationwide to produce promotional material. 
 The local collecting and advertising committees were also encouraged to employ a 
tactic that had been used to great effect during the election campaign less than a year 
previously. Collins informed the committees that it was ‘urgent that you should get the 
painting squads, who did such services during the General Election, at work immediately on 
advertisements for the Loan.’ They were instructed to paint slogans such as: ‘’England fears 
the loan,’ and ‘Put your money on Ireland,’ on walls around their parishes.57 It is clear from 
both the press and the police reports that this strategy was widely carried out across the 
country. An Irish Times article stated that loan advertisements were being stencilled on 
footpaths and being painted on lampposts and letterboxes.
58
 During October 1919, the county 
inspector for Westmeath reported that notices had been posted up in Mullingar on 12 October. 
His counterpart in Roscommon reported that notices advocating the loan were found posted 
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up at chapel gates on Sunday 19 October.
59
 The Inspector General of the R.I.C. noted that the 
practice continued in the months that followed. It was reported that on 2 November in 
Dungloe, County Donegal, handbills were distributed to the congregation after they emerged 
from the local service. In West Cork, there were instances of posters advocating subscriptions 
to the loan in memory of the ‘Fenian Dead’ posted up on Sunday morning 23 November in 
Bandon, Bantry, Clonakilty, Dunmanway and Skibbereen.
60
 There were still reports of these 
promotional activities taking place into 1920. In February, the county inspector for Mayo 
reported that handbills regarding the loan were being posted under doors in parts of the 
county.
61
 It is evident from these R.I.C. reports that most advertising for the loan coincided 
with Sunday mornings. Sundays were the only day of the week that the vast majority of 
people were not working and the distribution of leaflets or the posting of notices on walls 
were evidently targeted at Sunday morning mass goers.  
 Another novel promotional method used was that of a film advertising the Dáil Loan. 
A short propaganda film was produced by John MacDonagh, a brother of Thomas 
MacDonagh, one of the leaders of the Easter Rising, at a cost of £600.
62
 The film was shot 
outside St Enda’s, the school established by Pádraig Pearse, and it featured Michael Collins 
and Diarmuid O’Hegarty signing bond certificates to twenty-nine prominent subscribers. 
Among these were Kathleen Clarke, Thomas Clarke’s widow; Nora Connolly, William 
Connolly’s daughter; Margaret Pearse, Pádraig Pearse’s mother; and Arthur Griffith.63 The 
symbolism of the film, such as the fact that the block which Collins used as a table was the 
block on which Robert Emmet was beheaded, was highly evocative. So much so that copies 
of the film were sent to America and Australia. Harry Boland, upon seeing the film in 
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America, wrote to Collins: ‘That film of yourself and Hegarty selling Bonds brought tears to 
my eyes. Gee Boy! You are some movie actor. Nobody could resist buying a bond and we 
having such a handsome minister of finance.’64 The film was lost until November 1965 when 
a copy was found in a room in St Enda’s College, Rathfarnam. Reporting on the film’s 
discovery, George Morrison, the film director whose works include Mise Éire, Saoirse, and 
Rebellion, was quoted that ‘forceful young men’ made sure that the film was shown in 
cinemas around the country before the authorities could be notified.
65
 This novel approach to 
the promotion of the loan shows the lengths to which Dáil Éireann were willing to go to 
ensure the success of the campaign.  
 
Fig IV: The Dáil Bonds film, 1919 
(Source: Irish Independent) 
 
 All of these various promotional activities did not have the desired effect immediately 
though, because the initial progress of the loan was slow. In a letter written to de Valera on 
15 December 1919, Collins said that the total net amount of money subscribed to the loan at 
that time was approximately £30,000, with applications of about £35,000. He described these 
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figures as ‘not very satisfactory’.66 There were a few reasons for this slow progress. There 
were varying degrees of competency in terms of the organisation and promotion of the loan 
across the different constituencies. The areas where the existing Sinn Féin organisation was 
strong were quick to get the loan campaign up and running, but there were a number of 
constituencies where Sinn Féin did not have a strong presence. In these constituencies, the 
organisation and promotion of the loan was more troublesome. Most of the organisational and 
promotional work had been done during the latter months of 1919 and it was only really from 
January of 1920 onwards that Dáil Éireann began to see the fruits of this labour.  
 A number of different methods were employed in actually soliciting subscriptions 
from the public. Correspondence between Terence MacSwiney and Collins show that the 
loan workers in the Mid Cork constituency carried out a door-to-door canvass in order to 
solicit subscriptions. MacSwiney had large numbers of circulars printed locally, and 
distributed them to homes around his constituency before the door-to-door canvassing 
commenced. His thinking behind this was that if people were well versed with the objects of 
the Dáil Loan prior to being canvassed, they would be inclined to subscribe more. He wrote 
to Collins on 19 October 1919 asking him to forward 5,000 copies of the prospectus ‘as we 
are about to begin the house-to-house canvass.’67 Other means of soliciting loan subscriptions 
were used to compliment door-to-door canvassing. Collins instructed all the T.D.s on 30 
September 1919 to send to him a list of a hundred or so likely subscribers in each 
constituency so that he could forward on a copy of the prospectus to each of them 
personally.
68
 It is likely that the wealthier individuals in each constituency were targeted in 
this way in order to ensure that they were not missed out by the loan workers. It was also 
thought that they would be more likely to subscribe generously if they were contacted 
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directly by Collins. An example of a circular that was issued to individuals in the Pembroke 
constituency in Dublin stated that: ‘The Committee earnestly request you to read the enclosed 
carefully and decide as soon as possible on the amount of your Subscription.’69 Recipients of 
this circular were also informed that they would be visited by a representative of the local 
loan committee within the next week to receive their application and to issue a temporary 
receipt for the amount paid. It also appears to have been possible to purchase Dáil bonds by 
subscribing directly to the Department of Finance in Dublin. The newspaper article printed on 
12 September 1919 stated that people could send their subscription directly to: ‘Trustees, Dáil 
Éireann Loan, 6 Harcourt Street, Dublin.’70 Alternatively they could hand it to their local Dáil 
member or their representative in the parish. It was hoped that these different ways of 
soliciting funds would be sufficient to raise the £250,000 that was needed by Dáil Éireann to 
implement the Democratic Programme that it had set out in January 1919. 
 It was twelve months later, in January 1920, that the progress of the Dáil Loan started 
to pick up and people began to use the different means of subscribing in significant numbers. 
The need to attract the assistance of small subscribers had been stressed by de Valera and 
Collins in the lead up to the launch of the loan in the summer of 1919. Apart from a pocket in 
the north-east of the island, Ireland had no real industry to speak of, and consequently, the 
majority of the population were not especially wealthy. Subsistence agriculture was a way of 
life for nearly everyone in rural parts, while most of the wealth was concentrated in the hands 
of the minority landowning classes. It is evident from the lists of seized documents that the 
ambition of attracting the support of small subscribers was being achieved. There were 
significant numbers of farmers contributing to the loan. Ensuring that there were large 
numbers of smaller subscribers was just as important as drawing the support of wealthier 
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individuals. Sustaining the support of the lower classes, who had backed Sinn Féin in such 
large numbers in December 1918, was critical to the long term viability of Dáil Éireann. 
Smaller subscribers could purchase bonds for as little as £1. There were plenty who did just 
that. For example, Collins wrote to MacSwiney on 21 July 1920 enclosing a list of 
subscribers from the Ballyvourney parish. There were nine names listed, and each of them 
had subscribed the total of £1.
71
 There were also procedures in place for individuals who 
could not afford to pay such amounts up front. Collins had explained how this could be done 
when addressing his meeting at Dunmanway. He outlined how a group of twenty individuals 
could group together and pay one shilling each per week which would purchase one bond 
certificate.
72
 This method of purchasing bonds was also used widely among clubs, workers 
and other such groups. A file in the Dáil Éireann papers shows how employees of Kapp & 
Peterson pipe-makers in Dublin had contributed to the loan. Six employees had subscribed 
fifteen shillings each, making a total of £4 10d. However, according to the file, the loan 
worker, a Mr Howard Hudson, was believed to have absconded with the money he had 
collected from the employees.
73
 This misappropriation of funds appears to be an isolated 
incident though, and there were undoubtedly many more groups of small subscribers who 
purchased Dáil bonds in a similar manner to the Kapp & Peterson employees. The backing of 
smaller subscribers like these examples was essential to the internal Dáil Loan campaign. If 
Dáil Éireann was to be representative of the population as a whole, it needed the financial 
support of a wide cross section of society rather than from just a handful of wealthy 
republican sympathisers. 
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 There were also a small number of what could be termed as ‘unexpected subscribers’ 
to the Dáil Loan. Piaras Béaslaí wrote that subscriptions arrived from all over the globe. He 
told of how, among the subscribers, were the names of British Army officers who were 
stationed on the Rhine.
74
 Béaslaí also wrote that the authorities were, on occasion, taken 
aback to discover the names of certain subscribers that they came across in seized documents: 
‘After a raid by English forces, in which some of the names of subscribers to the Loan were 
captured, it was learned that the Dublin Castle authorities were amazed to find among them 
names of men whom they had looked upon as their most loyal supporters.’75 Sir Ormonde 
Winter, the Castle’s Director of Intelligence, corroborated this statement in his memoirs when 
he wrote that ‘Loyalists’ were ‘forced to contribute to the Irish Republican loan in order to 
secure immunity.’ If they did not subscribe Winter claimed that they risked being shot or 
being burned out of their homes. He also wrote that upon reading a captured list of loan 
subscribers, he was surprised ‘to see the price that had been paid for immunity; and I may say 
that on the list I discovered the names of several of my personal friends.’76 It is also plausible 
that individuals may have been loyal to the Dublin Castle administration and they were 
subscribing to the Dáil Loan as a sort of insurance policy for fear that the Dáil’s ambitions of 
an Irish Republic be realised. Several of the R.I.C. county inspectors also reported that there 
were instances of individuals being intimidated into subscribing. The inspector for county 
Kerry wrote in his report for September 1919, that there was a fear among people that they 
would be intimidated into subscribing. In November, the inspector for the west-riding of 
Cork reported that the actions of the R.I.C. had: ‘upset plans for getting subscriptions to the 
Republican Loan to which many people would subscribe through absolute fear.’77 The county 
inspector for Mayo reported in December that: ‘Subscriptions to Dáil Éireann Loan were 
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coming out by fear and intimidation rather than from love and devotion’.78 There were more 
reports of people being coerced into supporting the loan into 1920. The inspector for the 
west-riding of Cork wrote that Sinn Féin was carrying on its propaganda by intimidation.
79
 
There is certainly enough evidence to suggest that there were cases where people were 
intimidated into subscribing. How widespread the practice was is difficult to evaluate. 
However, it is noteworthy that the names of those who refused to contribute were listed on 
the same paper as those who subscribed. T. Dolan, the district inspector for the R.I.C. 
submitted a report on a meeting of the local loan committee in Macroom on 6 October 1919. 
He stated that: ‘It will be noted on same paper that refusals will be noted as well as 
subscriptions.’80 It is possible that refusals were noted, so that the individuals concerned 
could be visited again and put under pressure to contribute.  
It should also be noted that there were people who did not fit the profile of a typical 
Sinn Féin sympathiser who purchased Dáil bonds. These individuals seemingly supported the 
loan campaign out of genuine sympathy to the cause of Dáil Éireann. One well known 
supporter of the loan was Thomas Spring Rice, a prominent unionist landowner otherwise 
known as Lord Monteagle of Brandon. Batt O’Connor wrote in his memoir that he believed 
that Monteagle was one of many trustees of the funds.
81
 O’Connor, a close friend of Michael 
Collins and a builder by trade, fulfilled an important role in the loan campaign. His 
occupation as a builder enabled him to secure properties for Dáil Éireann’s use without 
suspicion. He also modified these buildings to incorporate escape passages and secret 
compartments where important documents could be stored in case of raids. O’Connor wrote 
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how he had encountered a ‘well-to-do’ Presbyterian man from the north of Ireland during his 
work as a loan collector. He told of how this man ‘had suffered for his faith.’ O’Connor 
estimated that he must have subscribed around £650 in funds over the frequent meeting he 
had with this man.
82
 He clearly left an indelible impression on O’Connor because he wrote 
how it was with great regret that he learned of the man’s passing before he could introduce 
him to Collins.  
Batt O’Connor was also entrusted with the gold that had been subscribed for the loan. 
Collins had requested the various organisers nationwide to try and get all the gold that they 
could so he could set up a gold reserve in Dublin. He issued a circular on 6 March 1920 
urging the loan committees to secure as much gold as possible because: ‘It is once and a half 
as useful to us as English paper currency. When dealing with such a country as America, the 
British one Pound Note is worth only about 13/-. But the Gold is as valuable as it was 
formerly.’83 O’Connor wrote that approximately £25,000 was subscribed to the Dáil Loan in 
gold. It was entrusted to him when the loan was closed in July 1920. He buried the gold, 
which was packed in four boxes and a baby’s coffin, under the floorboards of his house in 
Donnybrook.
84
 Another reason why gold deposits were more preferable than currency was 
because it was quite problematic both to transfer and safeguard the funds.   
Transferring the funds collected around the country to Dublin was fraught with danger. 
The loan committees were warned to take precautions when using postal communications. A 
circular from Collins advised that correspondence should not be addressed to Dáil Éireann 
directly. He suggested that an inner envelope should be sent to a ‘trusted friend’ in Dublin 
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who could then deliver it by hand to 6 Harcourt Street.
85
 Richard Mulcahy issued a similar 
warning to loan committees in his Clontarf constituency. He warned against the use of the 
postal service and the making of payments to unfamiliar persons. He directed that, if possible, 
applications should be made in person or by messenger to him at 76 Harcourt Street.
86
 The 
threat of post being intercepted by the authorities meant that other ways of transferring the 
loan funds to Dublin were preferred. In regions where the local bank manager was 
cooperative, the loan money was deposited and then forwarded by the bank to their Dublin 
offices where it was collected and delivered to the Dáil Department of Finance on Harcourt 
Street.
87
 However, there were many areas where the bank managers were unwilling to 
cooperate. Some banks refused to cash cheques made out to Dáil Éireann and in these cases 
the money had to be first lodged in the banks in the name of a reputable local individual. 
Messengers and couriers were also used to bring large sums of cash to Dublin. This too was 
not without its risks as commuters were subject to frequent searches at railway stations and, 
on occasion, sums of thousands of pounds were being transported by individual messengers.
88
 
The two couriers in Dublin were Dáithí Ó Donnchadha, who was also the Dáil secretary, and 
Seán McGrath. They often carried thousands of pounds around the city between bank 
branches and Dáil offices. However, neither man was ever accosted by the authorities while 
carrying out their duties.
89
 Once the funds reached Dublin, they had to be deposited in bank 
accounts for safekeeping. A large number of ordinary deposit accounts were opened in a 
variety of bank branches around Dublin for this purpose. Although some were opened using 
fictitious names, most were under the names of republican sympathisers. This was not a 
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particularly wise strategy because it clearly left the funds vulnerable to seizure if the 
authorities decided to investigate the banks concerned. 
The rate of subscriptions to the Dáil Loan grew steadily in the early months of 1920 
but there were still parts of the country where progress was slow. Given how reliant the loan 
campaign was on the local committees and organisers, there were many individuals in areas 
nationwide who frustrated Collins greatly. He demanded that local organisers showed the 
same levels of organisation and efficiency as himself but this was not always the case. In a 
letter to Harry Boland, he wrote: ‘This enterprise will certainly break my heart if anything 
ever will. I never imagined there was so much cowardice, dishonesty, hedging, insincerity 
and meanness in the world, as my experience of this work has revealed.’ 90  Collins was 
meticulously thorough in his work and consequently he found dealing with those who did not 
have the same capacity for thoroughness, particularly irksome. Collins’s diligence was 
illustrated in his need to receive all loan applications as swiftly as possible because he liked 
to personally issue the official receipts without delay, as he maintained that it created a good 
impression.
91
 However, not all of his organisers in the various constituencies adhered to this 
request. Despite the many areas that were not reaching their anticipated quotas, there were 
large parts of the country where the loan was making excellent progress, particularly in 
southern and western constituencies. Given this good progress, it was decided on 17 January 
1920, to announce the extension of the loan. In a circular issued on 6 March 1920, Collins 
issued a last rallying cry to loan workers to redouble their efforts and collect as many 
subscriptions as possible. He mentioned several of the constituencies where the campaign had 
made good progress and stated that: ‘these amounts were not realised by magic formulae, 
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they are the results of hard work and ceaseless endeavour.’92 There appears to have been a 
conscious effort across the country to in the final few months of the campaign to eke out any 
further funds that people were willing to contribute to the loan. Collins wrote to Seán Nunan 
on 29 April informing him that the internal loan was about to close and that ‘the result is 
hopeful enough.’93 Dáil Éireann agreed to a motion on 17 July that the internal loan was to be 
finally closed at the end of the month. Collins did not wish for the loan to continue 
indefinitely and it was thought that announcing the official closure of the bond issue would 
act as a reminder to individuals who had pledged subscriptions that had not yet been received.   
 The first internal Dáil Éireann Loan was wound up on 31 July 1920. The 
subscriptions were calculated during August and the final figures were available in 
September. The loan was oversubscribed to tune of £121,849 with a total of £371,849 being 
raised overall. The breakdown of this figure was as follows: Munster (£172,533 2d. 6p.), 
Leinster (£87,499 2d. 6p.), Connacht (£57,977), Ulster (£41,319 4d. 2p.). £11,719 worth of 
internal loan bonds were sold to British and French subscribers and £801 were sold to 
Cumann na mBan.
94
 The biggest contributions were made in the south and west of the 
country. The largest amount raised in a single constituency was in the East Limerick 
constituency where £32,285 was raised. An assurance made by Dáil Éireann to reopen the 
recently closed Limerick Technical Schools, is likely to have helped boost the figure for East 
Limerick.
95
 Subscriptions were lowest in areas of unionist domination in Ulster and they were 
also below average in areas where the Irish Parliamentary Party remained strong – only £636 
was raised in Waterford City and £819 was raised in East Wicklow. Not one of the eleven 
constituencies in Dublin contributed funds that exceeded the national average of £3,629. 
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PROVINCE POUNDS SHILLINGS PENCE 
    
Connacht £57,977 0 0 
Leinster £87,499 2 6 
Munster £172,533 6 4 
Ulster £41,319 4 2 
Cumann Na mBan £801 0 0 
Britain & France £11,719 8 0 
    
TOTAL £371,849 1 0 
 
Fig V: Internal Dáil Éireann Loan – 27 Sept. 1920 
(Source: National Library of Ireland, ILB 300 P2) 
 
The generosity of the Irish people to the loan campaign was considerable, albeit 
uneven. Arthur Mitchell estimated that in the region of 150,000 individuals subscribed to the 
loan. This represented roughly fifteen per cent of the approximately one million households 
in the country.
96
 The loan figures illustrate a strong endorsement of Dáil Éireann in Munster 
and Connacht. However, the figures for Leinster were somewhat disappointing while the 
response in Ulster was perhaps unsurprisingly quite poor. The results correspond to the 
election results of December 1918, where support for Sinn Féin was strongest in the south 
and west. In constituencies where there was no Dáil representative, and where the local 
republican organisation was not extensive, the loan contributions tended to be quite poor. The 
success of the campaign was largely dependent on the competency of the local organisers and 
nowhere was that more evident than in County Cork. Terence MacSwiney, was frequently 
praised by Collins for his work for the loan in his Mid Cork constituency. However, the T.D. 
for the constituency of Cork City, Liam de Róiste, came in for constant criticism of his efforts.  
Collins requested that MacSwiney should assist de Róiste in organising the loan in the city. 
MacSwiney obliged but he was frustrated by de Róiste’s lack of commitment whereas de 
Róiste claimed that the subscriptions for the constituency were slow because he was not 
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willing to threaten people.
97
 When the figures were totalled after the loan had closed, Mid 
Cork had raised £7,237 2d. 6p. and £12,067 had been subscribed for the constituency of Cork 
City. Taking into account the respective populations of both constituencies, the figure for the 
constituency of Cork City was underwhelming, while Mid Cork was one of the best 
performing constituencies in the country.  
It is evident from the figures that there is a clear divide between urban and rural 
constituencies. Overall, rural constituencies outperformed urban areas. The figures for the 
cities of Dublin, Cork and Belfast were disappointing. The larger contributions tended to 
come from the rural constituencies in the south and west. There are many possible 
explanations for this. Sinn Féin had a stronger local organisation in rural areas where they 
received most support. In urban areas, the I.P.P. still received considerable support up to the 
1918 election. As a result, Sinn Féin did not have as strong a presence in these areas and it 
was harder to organise the loan. There was a greater police presence in the cities and garrison 
towns around the country and this fact made it more difficult to promote the loan in urban 
areas. It would have also been not as easy to intimidate individuals into subscribing under the 
noses of the police. The constructive work of Dáil Éireann was also more rural orientated. 
Farmers would benefit from the creation of the National Land Bank and the Dáil Courts, 
owing to the amount of disputes over land ownership. Those in rural areas may also have 
been more vulnerable to any possible intimidation that took place. Another reason for this 
urban/rural divide was the burgeoning parish rivalries that had been emerging since the 
establishment of the Gaelic Athletic Association in 1884. In rural parts, there was an element 
of individuals not wanting to be outdone by the next parish over. This sort of local parish 
rivalry was not as prevalent in urban areas.   
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Considering the rather poor economic situation in Ireland at the time, the fact that the 
internal Dáil Loan had exceeded its targets was a highly significant achievement. Arthur 
Griffith commended Collins for his work in June 1920: ‘The Minister of Finance had 
accomplished one of the most extraordinary feats in the country’s history in connection with 
the bond issue’.98 Collins deserved great praise for his organisational capacity but it was the 
work done by the local committees that contributed to the success of the loan. Their work in 
both organising and promoting the loan locally, determined how successful the campaign was 
in their parish. They were aided in these processes by members of the Catholic Church who 
were of valuable assistance in many areas. The church’s influence on the loan undoubtedly 
contributed to the decision of many moderates to back the venture. Other factors also assisted 
in the success of the Dáil Loan. There was evidence that there were instances of individuals 
being coerced into subscribing. Liam de Róiste’s admission that he was not willing to 
threaten people, certainly adds weight to the claims that people were being intimidated in 
some areas. It is possible that de Róiste’s remarks referred to those working on the loan in his 
constituency but it also may be that he was unwilling to pressurise individuals who did not 
wish to subscribe. The timing of the loan was also important. The campaign lasted from 
August 1919 until July 1920. During this time period, political violence in Ireland was on the 
rise. However, it was only after the loan had been completed that the political situation in 
Ireland spiralled out of control with the mass arrival of British troops. It would have been far 
more problematic to solicit subscriptions after July 1920 given the volatile environment 
around the country. Dáil Éireann relied on the internal loan funds to finance its activities 
during 1919 and 1920 due to the delay in securing the overseas loan funds. The internal loan 
enabled the setting up of institutions like the National Land Bank and the Dáil Courts. These 
functioning institutions enabled Dáil Éireann to retain its position as a viable state for a large 
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proportion of the population. Dáil Éireann was never short of funds because of the internal 
loan. However, the campaign was not an unqualified success. Many constituencies, 
particularly in the north and east of the country, performed poorly. The measures taken to 
safeguard the money in Dublin banks also left a lot to be desired. The accounts were 
vulnerable to any attempts by the authorities to seize the funds. Nevertheless, the internal 
Dáil Loan was arguably the greatest achievement of the first Dáil Éireann, but is only when 
the attempts made to suppress the loan are considered that a true evaluation of the campaign’s 
success can be made. 
 
74 
 
Chapter III – The reaction and response of the British administration to the Dáil 
Éireann Loan 
The decision to form Dáil Éireann in 1919 was in clear defiance of the existing British 
administration in Ireland. Ever since the Act of Union of 1801, Ireland’s elected 
representatives had attended the Westminster parliament. Ireland was governed by authorities 
appointed in Britain. The Lord Lieutenant, appointed by the British monarch, and the Chief 
Secretary, appointed by the cabinet, led the British administration in Ireland which operated 
from Dublin Castle. This administration was responsible for some twenty-nine government 
departments, as well as policing and the courts.
1
 Dublin Castle was answerable to the British 
cabinet but it was the responsibility of the Castle government to administer British rule in 
Ireland. The establishment of Dáil Éireann in the aftermath of the 1918 election was a clear 
statement by republicans that their intention was to usurp the Dublin Castle administration. 
Their plans to build up a counter-state were largely dependent on the funds raised during the 
internal Dáil Loan campaign. This chapter analyses the reaction of the British administration 
to the formation of Dáil Éireann. Their response to the internal loan campaign is also be 
examined and evaluated.  
 Late 1918 was a hugely significant time in British history. The Great War had ended 
on 11 November when an armistice was signed between the Allies and Germany in a railway 
carriage in the Compiegne Forest in Northern France. Following on from the Allied success 
on the Western Front, Lloyd George dissolved parliament and called an election. The 1918 
election, which confirmed Sinn Féin as the largest party in Ireland, returned a coalition of the 
Conservatives under Bonar Law and Lloyd George’s wing of the Liberals in Britain.2 Lloyd 
George was retained as Prime Minister and his power had been ratified overwhelmingly by 
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the British electorate. His main focus now would be on negotiating the best settlement 
possible for Britain at the post-war Paris Peace Conference, and ensuring a successful 
transition from wartime to peace. Owing to the fact that the British government were 
preoccupied with both the domestic and the international issues that arose in the immediate 
post-war period, they largely ignored the events that were taking place in Ireland.
3
 Indeed, 
they were well aware of Sinn Féin’s plans to abstain from the Westminster parliament and 
form Dáil Éireann in Dublin. On the night of 11 January, the Dublin Metropolitan Police. 
raided Sinn Féin headquarters and seized drafts of documents that were being prepared for 
the opening session of Dáil Éireann.
4
 This gave the British administration, both in Dublin and 
London, a clear indication of Sinn Féin’s intentions to develop their own state administration.  
Sir Nevil Macready, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Ireland from 
March 1920 onwards, wrote that political abstention from Westminster was fundamental to 
the original policy of Sinn Féin and that the movement’s policy did not contemplate resorting 
to force or violence.
5
 This view may explain why there seemed to be no immediate panic in 
British political circles to Sinn Féin’s electoral successes. There were certainly few 
indications at this stage that the situation in Ireland could descend into violence. As far as the 
British were concerned, moderates like Arthur Griffith controlled Sinn Féin and they were 
not a significant threat to British rule in Ireland.  
 The reaction to Sinn Féin’s electoral success in Britain was muted. Perhaps the 
apathetic reaction in Britain was best expressed in the press. The Dublin correspondent of 
The Times, writing on 15 January 1919, conceded that Sinn Féin had the support of a large 
proportion of the Irish population, but that: ‘Six months hence all the material interests in the 
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country will be hostile to it.’6 Meanwhile, The Spectator argued that the abstention of Sinn 
Féin from the Westminster parliament ‘may indeed be regarded as a blessing’.7 This was a 
view that was probably shared by many Westminster deputies who were secretly pleased that 
Sinn Féin had taken over from the I.P.P. as the main force within Irish politics. Throughout 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the I.P.P. played a prominent role in the 
business of the House of Commons. They held the balance of power within Westminster on 
several occasions and as a result the Irish question dominated much of the parliament’s time. 
The obstructionist tactics employed by the likes of Charles Stewart Parnell frustrated 
countless British M.P.s who viewed Ireland as little more than an inconvenience. Now that 
Sinn Féin were to abstain from taking up their seats in London, it allowed the parliament to 
get back to the business of running the empire. The commencement of the Paris Peace 
Conference on 18 January 1919, three days before the opening session of Dáil Éireann, was 
of far more immediate concern to Britain than the Irish question at this time.
8
 Negotiating a 
treaty for the future of Europe was deemed far more urgent by the British government than 
keeping disenchanted republicans in Ireland under control. Lloyd George was prepared to let 
the Dublin Castle administration manage their affairs in Ireland without interference for the 
time being.  
 The first formal meeting of Dáil Éireann took place at the Mansion House in Dublin 
on 21 January. Colonel Wedgeworth Johnstone, the Chief Commissioner of the D.M.P., and 
Sir Joseph Byrne, the Inspector General of the R.I.C., observed and monitored the scene from 
a building on the opposite side of Dawson Street, but there was never any attempt made to 
either prevent or break up the meeting.
9
 The British newspapers reporting of the first meeting 
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of the Dáil illustrated how little a threat that Sinn Féin’s plans were perceived to pose to the 
British administration in Ireland. The Manchester Guardian dismissed the event as merely 
‘Republican theatricalism,’ and predicted that Dáil Éireann would not be taken seriously in 
Ireland.
10
 The Times expressed a similar opinion concluding that the event was just a ‘stage 
play at the Mansion House.’11 These views were shared by the British government who 
largely ignored the establishment of Dáil Éireann. The prevailing opinion among the British 
cabinet was that the parliament would never last, because the republic which it declared, did 
not exist and therefore could not be governed from Dublin. Dáil Éireann was simply another 
case of republican posturing and idealism. The historian Peter Hart surmises the outlook of 
the British government regarding Dáil Éireann as ‘just so much hot air.’12 Sir Joseph Byrne 
wrote in his report for January 1919 that the establishment of the Dáil had ‘evoked little or no 
enthusiasm – by the majority of people apparently it is not taken seriously.’13 The view that 
Dáil Éireann was doomed to failure and that it could never garner the allegiance of the people 
of Ireland was widely expressed by members of the British administrations, both in Dublin 
and London, throughout the early months of 1919. 
 Due to the fact that most British administrators saw little in the way of a threat from 
the Sinn Féin parliament, Dáil Éireann was allowed to continue its business uninterrupted for 
the early months of 1919. Bonar Law was questioned in the House of Commons as to 
whether the absent members of the house would be forced to attend, but the government 
chose to ignore the gap in the parliament.
14
 There was no attempt made by the government to 
adjust their Irish policy in response to the establishment of the Dáil. The historian Eunan 
O’Halpin writes that they regarded Sinn Féin as: ‘a temporary phenomenon which would 
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quickly lose support in the face of firm government.’15 John Charles Street, who acted as 
Information Officer for Dublin Castle wrote in his The administration of Ireland, 1920 that 
‘nations could not exist on sentiment alone’, and that the economic advantages that a link to 
the British Empire presented, would outweigh any desire for an independent republic 
amongst the Irish people.
16
 He believed that the novelty of the Irish people having their own 
representative parliament in Dublin would wear off when they realised that Sinn Féin were 
not capable of running their own administration. They would lose faith in Sinn Féin and 
conclude that they were better off being governed from London. This viewpoint seems to 
have been reinforced by the monthly R.I.C. reports for the first half of 1919. After the second 
session of Dáil Éireann in April 1919, Byrne wrote that the second session had not generated 
much interest around the country.
17
 Similar sentiments were evident in the reports for the 
months that followed. Sinn Féin was perceived to be on the wane and Dáil Éireann had 
achieved little, and had attracted little support. With reports like these emerging from Ireland, 
the British government saw little threat from Dáil Éireann and they were generally happy to 
ignore its existence. Sinn Féin were determined to make the Dáil work though, and their 
plans for a skeleton republican administration had begun to take shape upon Éamon De 
Valera’s return to Ireland. 
 Of more immediate concern to the British authorities during the early months of 1919 
were the rising levels of violence in Ireland. At the start of the year the British government 
had far more pressing concerns than the situation in Ireland, but they were to become 
increasingly concerned by the rising levels of violence throughout Ireland as the year 
progressed.  The first violent attack against the Crown forces in Ireland occurred ironically, 
on the same day that Dáil Éireann first met in the Mansion House, 21 January 1919. Two 
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R.I.C. men, constables McDonnell and O’Connell, were shot dead whilst escorting a quantity 
of gelignite to a quarry in Soloheadbeg, near Tipperary town.
18
 The ambush was carried out 
by a local Volunteer unit commanded by two well known extremists, Dan Breen and Seán 
Treacy. Although the Soloheadbeg ambush was undertaken without the authorisation of the 
Volunteer executive, it was a clear indication that there were militants out there who were 
dissatisfied with the direction that the wider republican movement was taking. The Daily 
News reported in England that the killings at Soloheadbeg were ‘a message deliberately sent 
by the new “invincibles” to the “talking shop” in the capital’.19 The Soloheadbeg ambush was 
widely condemned but it marked the beginning of a sporadic campaign against the R.I.C. 
This campaign sought to ostracise and isolate the police force, thus rendering it ineffective. 
The R.I.C. was widely disliked mainly as a legacy of the role they played in the forced 
evictions during the Land War. A peaceful boycott of the R.I.C. was supported by Dáil 
Éireann but the leadership did not condemn the actions of the Volunteers when the campaign 
frequently turned violent.
20
 Many rural barracks were burned down, while officers were 
physically attacked, and in some cases, killed. John Charles Street observed a vast increase in 
cases of murder and assault with intent to murder. There were twenty-six individual cases of 
the years of 1917 and 1918. He wrote that the figure for 1919 and the first six months of 1920 
numbered 208.
21
 It is clear from these figures that there was a significant increase in violence 
across Ireland from early 1919 onwards. The R.I.C. became increasingly isolated as 1919 
progressed as they retreated from rural barracks to the garrison towns. Many parts of the 
country were now left without a visible police presence as rural Ireland became progressively 
more violent and dangerous. Although these events in early 1919 would undoubtedly have 
                                                          
18
 Irish Independent, 22 Jan. 1919. 
19
 Mitchell, Dáil Éireann, p. 20. 
20
 Ibid., pp 68-9. 
21
 I. O., Administration of Ireland, p. 93. 
80 
 
concerned the British authorities, they had confidence in their intelligence system which had 
successfully crushed previous republican attempts to break the union with Britain. 
 Not alone was there a rising tide of violence against rural R.I.C. barracks in 1919, but 
there were also instances of more sinister planned killings in Dublin. High ranking detectives 
within the D.M.P. were systematically targeted and assassinated in an effort to destroy Dublin 
Castle’s intelligence network. These shootings were carried out by a group of men that had 
been personally selected by Michael Collins from the Dublin divisions of the Volunteers. 
Collins formed this ‘squad’ in July 1919.22 He combined his role as finance minister with 
coordinating this campaign against the intelligence system of the British authorities. Collins 
was of old I.R.B. stock and he clearly believed that an Irish republic could not be achieved by 
Dáil Éireann alone. He served as Director of Intelligence of the Volunteers and later the I.R.A. 
He indentified the detectives that he deemed to be a threat to the republican movement and 
had them shot. The first of these shootings took place on 30 July 1919 when Patrick ‘dog’ 
Smyth, a D.M.P. detective was shot on Drumcondra Bridge in Dublin.
23
 The thinking behind 
eliminating prominent detectives like Smyth was to effectively blind Dublin Castle’s 
intelligence network. The detectives could always be replaced but their deep knowledge of 
the republican organisations was lost forever. These killings were a statement of intent by 
militant republicans and they helped further enflame the already delicate political situation in 
Ireland. 
 The rising tide of violence in Ireland as 1919 progressed gradually forced the British 
government to take measures to tackle the situation in the country before it spiralled out of 
control. The establishment of Dáil Éireann had appeared to have evoked little reaction among 
the British government but the actions of militant republicans had put the Irish question 
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firmly back to the forefront of their agenda. However, the response of the British authorities 
drew no distinction between Dáil Éireann and the militants. There was an overlap between 
Dáil Éireann and the various militant organisations like the Volunteers, and later, the I.R.A. 
Several members of the Dáil cabinet were also prominent within the Volunteers such as 
Cathal Brugha, Richard Mulcahy, Collins and de Valera who was the president of the 
organisation.
24
 Nevertheless, there were many more Dáil members who had no connections 
whatsoever to the Volunteers. Charles Townshend in his The British campaign in Ireland 
states that ‘in 1919 the Republic served by the Volunteers was still a different thing from that 
represented by Dáil Éireann.’25  Dáil Éireann neither arranged nor supported a policy of 
physical force during 1919 or 1920 but they did tend to turn a blind eye to the activities of the 
Volunteers and the I.R.A. Cathal Brugha, as the Dáil’s defence minister, did succeed in 
getting the Volunteers to swear allegiance to Dáil Éireann in August 1919 but the 
revolutionary government did not take responsibility for the actions of the I.R.A. until 1921.
26
 
The British authorities failed to draw any distinction between the different organisations 
though. As far as they were concerned, Dáil Éireann and the Volunteers were two sides of the 
one coin. This is clear from the memoirs of John Charles Street who stated that Collins, as the 
‘chief of the Irish Republican Army’, and the Dáil Éireann Minister of Finance, was a 
‘definite link between An Dáil and the murder gangs.’27 He also maintained that it was 
impossible for Sinn Féin to disassociate itself from the militants because the men, who were 
responsible for the activities of the Volunteers and the I.R.A., were also elected 
representatives of Sinn Féin. He expressed his belief that: ‘The opposition of Dáil Éireann 
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could and would have terminated the murder campaign’. 28  Street’s insistence that Dáil 
Éireann and the militant republican organisations were one and the same was a view that was 
commonly held within Dublin Castle, and it would dictate the course of action that the 
authorities took to counteract the Dáil as 1919 progressed. 
 One thing that is clearly apparent from the police reports for the first half of 1919 was 
the belief that a lack of funds would ultimately scupper Dáil Éireann’s ambitions. One of the 
principal reasons why the British administration effectively ignored the establishment of the 
Dáil was the fact that the organisation had no financial reserves to implement its ambitious 
plans to usurp Dublin Castle. Writing in his Inspector General’s report for January 1919, 
Byrne reported that a Sinn Féin informant had expressed his belief that ‘the want of funds 
will kill Sinn Féin’.29  This view that the Dáil would fail due to a lack of finance was 
expressed again in the reports for the months that followed. In February, it was reported that a 
meeting of the local Sinn Féin club had been held at Silvermines in County Tipperary in 
response to a fundraising appeal for Dáil Éireann, but only twelve people had attended.
30
 In 
the report for May, Byrne wrote that the police in certain areas had ‘observed signs of waning 
interest in Sinn Féin,’ and that there was a general ‘reluctance to provide financial support.’31 
Dublin Castle were aware of Dáil Éireann’s plans to raise funds by selling bonds as far back 
as February 1919, but because they were receiving information of this nature, they had to be 
sceptical over whether any such scheme would be successful. Éamon de Valera had left for 
America in June 1919 to launch the Dáil Loan campaign there, and Byrne reported in July 
that informants had stated that floating the external loan was beset with difficulties.
32
 It was 
clearly anticipated that Collins would face a similarly difficult task in floating the internal 
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Dáil Loan. The Assistant-Commissioner at Scotland Yard, Basil Thomson, also reported in 
July that Sinn Féin’s ‘finances were running low because of an apathetic public response to 
its fundraising appeals’.33 The British government were obviously confident that the internal 
loan campaign would not succeed.  
 The Dáil Loan was launched in Ireland the following month in August 1919. Byrne 
reported on the details of the loan in his Inspector General’s report for September. The launch 
of the Dáil Loan was the first real signal of Dáil Éireann’s seriousness to realise their 
ambitions. Due to their lack of finance for the first half of 1919, the revolutionary 
government had to rely solely on the production of propaganda to retain its place in the 
public’s consciousness. The internal loan, if successful, would provide the funds to develop a 
functioning state administration in opposition to Dublin Castle. It was only at this stage that 
the British administration really began to sit up and take notice of Dáil Éireann. A 
functioning republican counter-state would help to give a legitimacy to the wider republican 
movement and their aims. Thomas Jones, the Deputy Secretary to the British cabinet wrote 
that gradually the ministers of Dáil Éireann were ‘beginning to appropriate real functions’.34 
Jones was evidently of the opinion that the British government had to act swiftly to prevent 
the Dáil from becoming the legitimate authority of government for a significant proportion of 
the Irish population. However, the press were generally of a different opinion. They reported 
that the launch of the loan had generated little excitement across the country. Few papers 
reported extensively on the loan launch; with those that did run reports merely outlining the 
conditions of the loan. The Manchester Guardian ran an article on 1 September listing the 
terms of the internal loan and that Desmond Fitzgerald had attended a series of meetings in 
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his Pembroke constituency to start the campaign in Dublin.
35
 The loan was a very ambitious 
scheme, and many clearly felt that its targets were unattainable.  
 Despite the difficulties that the loan campaign was expected to encounter, its launch 
had set alarm bells ringing in London. The idea of Sinn Féin setting up their own counter-
state no longer seemed absurd after their plans for the Dáil Loan were revealed. These funds 
would help fund the establishment and development of government departments and 
institutions like the Dáil Courts and the National Land Bank. Institutions like these would 
help give a legitimacy and a validity to the wider republican struggle. By September 1919, 
both the Dublin Castle administration and the British government in London were becoming 
increasingly concerned by developments in Ireland. On 11 September, prompted by a letter 
from King George V, Lloyd George and Bonar Law took the decision to declare Dáil Éireann 
illegal.
36
 The announcement was made in the Dublin Gazette, the official newspaper of the 
Dublin Castle executive, the following morning. It declared that ‘by this our order, prohibit 
and suppress within the several districts specified and named in the schedule the association 
known by the name of the Dáil Éireann’.37 The districts mentioned in the schedule were the 
thirty-two counties of Ireland and the cities of Dublin, Belfast, Cork, Limerick, Londonderry 
and Waterford. The intention of this proclamation was to limit the influence Dáil Éireann had 
over the Irish public by forcing it underground. 
 The launch of the internal Dáil Loan was one of the principal reasons that forced this 
course of action. Arthur Mitchell writes that the decision to declare Dáil Éireann an illegal 
organisation was ‘in response to the Dáil Loan campaign.’38 The flotation of the loan had 
convinced the British administration that ‘Dáil Éireann and its infant administration would 
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not disappear in a wave of Irish satire and cynicism; a new feeling was abroad.’39 There were 
other factors that lead to the Dáil being proclaimed, such as the implementation of an oath of 
allegiance to Dáil Éireann by I.R.A. members and the escalating instances of violent attacks 
throughout the country.
40
 However, the proximity of the announcement to the 
commencement of the nationwide loan campaign certainly suggests that the launch of the 
loan had hastened the decision. Without funds, Dáil Éireann was a pointless and ultimately 
hopeless enterprise that was doomed to failure. The funds that the Dáil Loan could potentially 
generate though, could effectively provide Dáil Éireann with the opportunity to render the 
Dublin Castle administration obsolete.  
 The first manifestation of the new suppressive policy towards Dáil Éireann occurred 
simultaneously to the proclamation of the counter-state. A raid was conducted on Dáil 
Éireann’s premises, including the finance department’s offices, at 6 Harcourt Street by the 
D.M.P. on 12 September.  The Cork Examiner reported that copies of the Dáil Loan 
prospectus were seized and two members of the Dáil, Ernest Blythe and Patrick O’Keeffe, 
were arrested after being found in the premises.
41
 Collins was also in the offices at the time of 
the raid but he made useful his escape along the rooftops. This sort of escapade would 
become a regular occurrence after Dáil Éireann had declared illegal. It would undoubtedly 
hinder the work of the revolutionary government but the suppression of the Dáil was met 
with a mixed response. A congress of the British Labour Party was taking place in Glasgow 
the day after the proclamation was made public. A motion was proposed by J. H. Thomas, an 
M.P. for Derby, to ‘substitute military rule in Ireland with self-determination’, he also 
expressed sympathy with ‘their Irish brothers in their hour of repression’.42 The resolution 
was passed comfortably by the delegates. Elsewhere, press reaction in the immediate 
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aftermath of the proclamation was largely welcoming. The Unionist papers were united in 
their approval, whereas the more liberal publications appealed to Lloyd George’s government 
to broker a solution with Sinn Féin. The Westminster Gazette wrote that ‘it is impossible to 
say that the authorities are not justified in any particular repressive step they take in Ireland.’ 
The Pall Mall Gazette praised the proclamation by saying that ‘the government has wisely 
struck at the headquarters of the cult which propagates disorder and terrorism’. The Globe 
also welcomed the proclamation but questioned whether the decisions taken ‘were 
inconceivably tardy’.43 Those with direct experience of the situation in Ireland were much 
more sceptical over whether suppressing the Dáil was the correct course of action to take. Sir 
Horace Plunkett, the Chairman of Lloyd George’s Irish Convention of 1917-18, had 
witnessed at first-hand how previous British policies of coercion in Ireland had failed. He 
expressed his misgivings in a letter written to The Times of London on 15 September 1919. 
He wrote that: ‘Dáil Éireann is the product of an election ordered and carried out by the 
British Parliament’, and that by declaring it illegal, the British government were endorsing 
the assumption that it was directly responsible for the rising levels of violence throughout 
Ireland. Plunkett stated that he knew ‘members of Dáil Éireann who, if there was any 
foundation for this suspicion, would have indignantly left it long ago’.44 In the days that 
followed, when the newspapers that published the Dáil Loan prospectus were suppressed by 
the British authorities, increasing numbers of people began to share Plunkett’s point of view. 
 Collins had submitted a full-page newspaper advertisement promoting the internal 
loan for publication on 12 September – the same day that Dublin Castle had proclaimed Dáil 
Éireann in response to the launch of the loan. This proclamation also specified that any 
persons or publications that were discovered to be printing Dáil literature or propaganda 
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would also be suppressed. The main national daily newspapers declined to print the notice, 
but a number of the smaller republican journals and provincial newspapers did publish it. It is 
claimed in a number of historical works that Collins made no explicit mention of Dáil 
Éireann in the advertisement, and these claims are probably based on Piaras Béaslaí’s 
assertion that: ‘This was done so as to not afford the English Government a pretext for acting 
against the papers that published the advertisement.’45 However, this was not the case if the 
advertisement published on page seven of the Cork Examiner on 12 September proves. This 
advertisement was preceded by the banner headline ‘DÁIL ÉIREANN LOAN’ and it made 
several references to the Dáil throughout.
46
 The premises of the Cork Examiner were raided 
at four o’clock in the morning of 17 September. Printing machinery was dismantled, and 
copies of the 12 September issue of the newspaper were seized.
47
 The Cork Examiner was the 
most prominent of all the various newspapers that were suppressed for publishing the 
advertisement. Other provincial newspapers like the Kilkenny Journal, the Dundalk Examiner, 
the Westmeath Independent, the Dublin Leader, the Midland Tribune, the Kerry News, the 
Kerry Weekly Reporter and the Killarney Echo were suppressed for publishing the loan 
advertisement. It was also reported that the only newspaper that was not suppressed in 
Limerick city was the Weekly Unionist Journal.
48
 The Sinn Féin journals in Dublin were also 
suppressed for the same reason. These included Arthur Griffith’s Nationality, Fáinne an Lae, 
The Voice of Labour, The Republic, The Leader, New Ireland and The Irish Word.
49
 These 
journals were permanently suppressed. The Cork Examiner was only allowed to resume 
publication on 22 September. The editor of the newspaper, George Crosbie, wrote an article 
which was published upon the newspaper’s return which stated that the advertisement would 
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not have been included in its 12 September edition, had Dublin Castle directed it not to.
50
 
However, all of the main newspapers were forwarded a copy of correspondence which was 
published on 22 September relating to the Dáil Loan advertisement. This showed how the 
Irish Independent had received a copy of the loan prospectus and had enquired to Dublin 
Castle on 6 September as to whether it could be published or not. The Chief Secretary replied 
on 11 September stating that publication of the prospectus was illegal and ‘that if published 
your company must take the consequences.’ 51  The Cork Examiner clearly did not seek 
guidance from Dublin Castle as to whether they were permitted to publish the advertisement, 
unlike the Irish Independent, because they did publish it and suffered the consequences. The 
suppression of these newspapers for assisting in the promotion of the loan did not have quite 
the desired effect though. By prohibiting people from either soliciting or paying subscriptions 
to the loan, and by suppressing any newspapers who published the prospectus, the British 
authorities had inadvertently provided widespread publicity for the loan campaign. 
 The consensus after what the Manchester Guardian had labelled ‘Suppression week 
in Ireland’, was that this firm course of action from Dublin Castle would ultimately prove 
counter-productive. The suppression of newspapers and the publicity generated as a result 
were a stimulus to the promotion of the loan campaign. The Dublin correspondent of the 
Manchester Guardian wrote on 22 September that the actions of Dublin Castle had ‘left 
moderate people in the country more puzzled than ever over the meaning and purpose of the 
present Irish Executive, if it has intelligence enough to possess a meaning and purpose.’ He 
concluded that Dublin Castle had ‘ensured a first-class subscription’ to the Dáil Loan due to 
their heavy handed reaction to the loan advertisement.
52
 The Times maintained a similar line 
in its edition on 27 September. An editorial in the paper was titled ‘The Dragooning of the 
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Irish Press’. This article claimed that many publications throughout Ireland had been 
suppressed by the government despite having never ‘borne the character of seditious 
publications’. The editorial stressed that the offence, although technically illegal, ‘did not 
appear to be inspired by any direct purpose of defying authority, or to be more heinous than a 
great deal of matter which has been published in Irish papers with impunity’. It concluded 
that it was ‘difficult to regard action which has entailed such circumstances, as either prudent 
or just in its conception’.53 It was generally agreed that Dublin Castle had overreacted, and 
that their actions would convince, rather than dissuade, individuals who were not overtly 
republican in their political outlook, to subscribe to the Dáil Loan. 
 Those closest to the political situation in Ireland tended to share this line of thinking. 
Darrell Figgis, who had recently been appointed to head the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Resources and Industries of Ireland, was quoted as saying that the suppression of newspapers 
was ‘good propaganda’ for Dáil Éireann and the loan campaign.54 The former Press Censor 
for Ireland, Bryan Cooper, submitted a letter to the editor of The Times which was published 
on 27 September. Cooper became the Press Censor for Ireland after returning from the Great 
War where he had served in Gallipoli. He no longer held the position by September 1919 but 
he felt compelled to protest against what he described as a ‘mistaken’ and ‘futile’ policy of 
suppression. He endorsed the suppression of Sinn Féin journals like Arthur Griffith’s 
Nationality, but he believed that the provincial press like the Cork Examiner should not have 
suffered a similar punishment. Having worked with the proprietors of these publications 
during his time as the censor, he believed that ‘any offence they may have committed was 
unintentional’. Cooper explained how he thought the policy of suppression would be counter-
productive in the long term. He wrote that the Dáil Loan prospectus ‘is doubtless by now 
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being passed from hand to hand all over Ireland’.55 By suppressing the freedom of the press, 
the government had given the loan the best advertisement possible. Also, men and women 
who may have been apathetic towards Sinn Féin would have been irritated by being unable to 
purchase their regular provincial newspaper. Cooper had first-hand experience of the 
situation in Ireland and he was of the belief that the outright suppression of the Dáil, and all 
of its programmes and institutions, was the wrong course of action to take. A policy of 
suppression would only be beneficial for the loan campaign, and the pursuance of such a 
policy was probably welcomed by Michael Collins and his colleagues. Doubtless however, 
the British administration felt that the suppression was entirely justified given the escalating 
violence in Ireland and the links between Dáil Éireann and militant republicanism. 
 
Fig VI: The Sinn Féin Bank, 6 Harcourt Street, after a raid 
(Source: National Library of Ireland) 
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The prevention of promotion through the press was only the tip of the iceberg as far as 
Dublin Castle’s attempts to crush the Dáil Loan were concerned. The R.I.C. and the D.M.P. 
were directed to lead a nationwide assault against the loan campaign. Any subscriber to the 
loan risked imprisonment and the authorities went as far as to threaten with arrest those who 
were found to be in possession of the prospectus. The first action taken by the various Sinn 
Féin clubs in their attempts to launch the loan was to hold a meeting in their own local area to 
arrange for the organisation of the loan. These meetings took place mainly during September 
and October 1919. In areas where the authorities received intelligence that these meetings 
were going ahead, they were broken up, and anyone found with documents relating to the 
loan in their possession was arrested. It was rare that the police succeeded in raiding a 
meeting of this nature because they frequently took place without their knowledge, but the 
R.I.C. in County Cork did manage to break up a Sinn Fein meeting held in Macroom on 5 
October. The meeting concerned the raising of the Dáil Loan in Mid Cork and was attended 
by Terence MacSwiney, the Dáil deputy for the constituency, and eight other local Sinn Féin 
men. The meeting was broken up by a number of R.I.C. officers. They arrested the nine men 
present and seized all the documentation they could find. These included copies of the loan 
prospectus, correspondence between Michael Collins and Terence MacSwiney concerning 
the loan, and a notebook belonging to MacSwiney. The district R.I.C. inspector, T. Dolan, 
submitted the reports of the officers who had carried out the raid. He wrote that the meeting 
was held to organise the loan campaign in Mid Cork. From the papers seized, he noted that 
the names of individuals who refused to contribute to the loan would be recorded as well as 
those who subscribed. He concluded that: ‘It is a good thing that the papers captured give us 
an outline of the scheme as proposed to be carried out so that we now know!’56 Acting on the 
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intelligence they received as a result of this and similar raids, the R.I.C. were able to plan 
their strategy with the goal of ensuring the loan campaign was a failure. 
In addition to the meetings that were taking place in every constituency to make 
arrangements for the organisation of the campaign, public meetings were also taking place to 
promote and raise awareness of the loan among the population. Many of these meetings were 
impromptu in an attempt to evade the notice of the authorities, but some were arranged and 
publicised in advance. Piaras Béaslaí told of a public meeting that had been arranged for the 
town hall in Mullingar but the R.I.C. learned of the meeting and surrounded the building. 
Béaslaí described how a crowd of people endeavoured to create a diversion by attempting to 
enter the courthouse in the town, thus distracting the police. With the R.I.C.’s attention 
elsewhere, a ‘very successful meeting’ took place in a local churchyard with £300 being 
raised for the loan.
57
 Byrne reported in his monthly reports for September and October 1919, 
that public meetings were taking place all over the country and that where subscriptions were 
being solicited, prosecutions were ordered.
58
 A meeting to promote the Dáil Loan was held at 
Tynan, County Armagh, on 19 October. Some 200 people assembled outside the local 
Catholic Church and heard speeches from William O’Brien, a professor at University College 
Galway and a previous Sinn Féin candidate for the Mid Armagh constituency; Edward 
Donnelly, the provincial loan organiser for Ulster; and Edward Hughes, an elderly local 
farmer. The three men were arrested and charged after the meeting. They appeared before 
Armagh District Court on 20 November with both O’Brien and Donnelly receiving sentences 
of three months imprisonment each. Hughes refused the bail that was offered to him and went 
to prison for two months.
59
 Presumably the authorities thought that by taking this course of 
action, they would greatly hinder the progress of the loan campaign. Yet they appeared to 
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only be generating more publicity and support for the Dáil Loan. Indeed, O’Brien, Donnelly 
and Hughes were cheered by a large crowd that had gathered outside the courthouse before 
they were conveyed to prison in Belfast.   
These counter-productive attempts to halt the progress of the Dáil Loan occurred all 
over the country. The R.I.C. county inspector for the east riding of Galway reported that a 
meeting at Ballinasloe to promote the loan on 11 October was dispersed by baton charge. At 
a meeting of the East Galway Sinn Féin executive held the following month, Fr Malachy 
Brennan referred to the suppression of the Ballinasloe meeting. He described the baton 
charge as ‘brutal’ and stated that the incident showed ‘the lengths the British government 
would go’, to stifle the loan.60 Fr Brennan’s comments highlight how the coercive response of 
the Dublin Castle’s forces to the Dáil Loan would provide it with the best promotion possible. 
By using aggressive force to break up a meeting with individuals who had no affiliation to 
Sinn Féin undoubtedly in attendance, the authorities were providing Dáil Éireann with ample 
propaganda to further their cause. The imprisonment of several members of Dáil Éireann for 
addressing such meetings was yet more ‘good propaganda’ as far as the loan campaign was 
concerned. Alexander McCabe, the T.D. for the constituency of South Sligo, was the first to 
be imprisoned for unlawful assembly and soliciting subscriptions to the loan. McCabe was 
arrested on 28 September 1919 after addressing a gathering at Enniscrone. He was sentenced 
to nine months hard labour at Sligo courthouse on 23 October.
61
 James Dolan, the Dáil 
deputy for Leitrim, was sentenced to two months imprisonment for unlawful assembly and 
soliciting Dáil Loan subscriptions at Mullaghgarve, Drumshanbo, on 5 October. Dolan was 
found guilty on 21 November at Drumshanbo courthouse. The Leitrim Observer reported that 
as he was being escorted to the court, he was cheered by a large crowd that had assembled 
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and ‘there was a renewal by the crowded Court who shouted “Up Dolan,” etc.’ During the 
court sitting the crowd outside sang the Soldiers Song.
62
 The behaviour of the crowd outside 
the courthouse when James Dolan was sentenced again highlight the short-sightedness of 
Dublin Castle’s policy towards the Dáil Loan. By imprisoning individuals who had been 
democratically elected by the public less than a year earlier, was only going to whip up 
nationalist fervour even further and convince people to purchase Dáil bonds.  
Another of the T.D.s that was imprisoned for advocating subscription to the Dáil Loan 
was Joseph O’Doherty who had been elected for the North Donegal constituency in the 1918 
election. O’Doherty addressed a meeting at Carndonagh during October at which £40 was 
raised for the loan. A round-up of republicans in the region took place on 12 December 1919 
for offences relating to the Dáil Loan but O’Doherty managed to escape when the R.I.C. 
came to his house to arrest him. The Irish Times reported that five policemen entered the 
house at Clarendon Street, Londonderry, shortly after nine o’clock while he was having his 
breakfast in his bedroom. He appeared at the top of the stairs and was read the warrant for his 
arrest by one of the detectives who were in the hallway. O’Doherty then conversed with his 
servant in Irish who told the policemen that she would get him some heavier clothing while 
he finished his breakfast. The policemen waited while O’Doherty ‘proceeded ostensibly to 
finish his breakfast.’ However, O’Doherty had escaped out of his bedroom window while 
they waited and ‘thus succeeded in clambering over some roofs to safety.’63  He subsequently 
went on the run. Three other individuals were arrested on the same day for addressing loan 
promotion meetings in Donegal. These were Patrick Porter, the brother of a magistrate from 
Buncrana; Edward McDermott, the president of the Derry Sinn Féin club; and Dr J. P. 
McGinley, a medical officer from Letterkenny. They appeared before a special crimes court 
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sitting at Burnfoot on 26 December and were each sentenced to two months in prison with an 
additional three months in default of bail. McGinley said if it was a crime to subscribe to the 
loan ‘then Archbishop Walsh was a criminal and under such circumstances the prisoner said 
he was proud to be a criminal.’64 This sort of comment would clearly resonate with many 
people around Ireland and again highlighted the fallacy of imprisoning individuals like Dr 
McGinley, who advocated subscription to the Dáil Loan. Meanwhile, Joseph O’Doherty 
remained at large until he was rearrested in Belfast in July 1920. He was eventually 
incarcerated in Londonderry Jail for his part in the Donegal meetings.
65
 O’Doherty’s 
escapade had generated much publicity and the police pursuit of him helped to keep the loan 
campaign in the press spotlight. 
Alexander McCabe, James Dolan and Joseph O’Doherty were the three highest 
profile men to be imprisoned for their advocacy of the Dáil Loan, but there were many more 
individuals who were not members of Dáil Éireann who were sent to jail for offences relating 
to the loan. Many of these individuals would have had, at best, tenuous links to republicanism. 
Therefore, their imprisonment and the effects these cases had on their local communities, 
helped to generate more public sympathy towards Dáil Éireann. These individuals were often 
of a very reputable background and they held important positions within their respective 
localities. For example, Conor Maguire, a solicitor from Claremorris who would later hold 
the position of Attorney General during de Valera led Fianna Fáil government of the 1930s 
and subsequently became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was sentenced to a month in 
jail along with Harry Burke, P. R. Hughes and Martin Nally, for soliciting subscriptions to 
the loan at a public meeting in Mayo.
66
 The penalties for being in possession of promotional 
material were rigorously enforced. W. M. Swanton, a chemist from Castletownbere, was 
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given a prison sentence of five months in total at Bandon courthouse on 23 October 1919. He 
received two months for publishing on 20 September, and three months for publishing two 
days later, a Dáil Loan prospectus and an article cutting from the 6 September edition of 
Nationality, which advocated subscription to the loan.
67
 The R.I.C. raided the premises of W. 
O’Grady, a hairdresser from Wicklow, and defaced it with their penknives after he displayed 
a Dáil Loan advertisement on his shop window.
68
 John McKeon, from Ballinalee, County 
Longford, received a two month sentence at Longford courthouse for posting up Dáil Éireann 
Loan notices on trees. McKeon refused to recognise the court and he wore a hat and smoked 
a cigarette during his hearing.
69
 Timothy Connors received a one month sentence for 
distributing copies of the prospectus at Soloheadbeg on 28 October and Thomas Reilly, from 
Kilcogy County Cavan, received a two month sentence for posting up loan notices on 28 
November.
70
 These names are just some of those who were imprisoned for offences relating 
to the Dáil Loan, but there were undoubtedly many more instances around the country where 
the authorities failed to apprehend individuals who were soliciting subscriptions or posting up 
notices. 
The violence across the island reached a peak during the latter half of 1920 after the 
British government had sent two military forces, the Auxiliaries and the Black and Tans, to 
Ireland, in an attempt to restore law and order on the island. Owing to the volatile atmosphere 
that prevailed across the country, the sanctions for offences relating to the Dáil Loan became 
even more severe in 1920. On 22 October 1920, William J. Walsh of Bandon was charged 
before a District Court-martial held at Cork. Walsh was found guilty of possessing seditious 
documents including ones relating to the Dáil Loan. A raid that was carried out on the offices 
of O’Hea solicitors, where Walsh was employed as a clerk, on 26 March had uncovered 
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documents relating to the loan within his desk. A further raid was carried out in September 
1920 on Walsh’s house at Gaggin where more documents were found, including his 
subscription card for the Dáil Loan. Walsh was sentenced to two years imprisonment.
71
 A 
similar case was presented at Kilmainham on 9 December 1920. Joseph Lynch of Bray, 
County Wicklow, was charged with having in his possession several documents relating to 
Dáil Éireann. These included correspondence between Lynch and Michael Collins referring 
to Dáil Loan business.
72
 Lynch remained in Kilmainham Jail for the duration of the Anglo-
Irish War. Three days after Joseph Lynch was charged, Jas. Leonard of Tullow Street, Carlow, 
received a six month prison sentence for being in possession of various documents including 
an internal loan prospectus.
73
 Similarly, Michael J. Kennedy of Castlepollard, County 
Westmeath, was given a sentence of one year in prison for being in possession of seditious 
literature including a Dáil Loan prospectus.
74
 Given the volatile state of affairs in Ireland, 
anyone found in possession of loan related material was liable to face harsh penalties even 
though the internal loan issue was closed by the time these sentences were handed out. 
The severity of the sanctions received in the above cases pale into comparison with 
the sentence handed down to Patrick Ryan at Limerick on 3 January 1921. The Nenagh 
Guardian reported that Ryan was ‘found guilty of possession of An Dáil Éireann Loan 
Certificate and sentenced to two years imprisonment with hard labour.’75 However, eighteen 
months and the hard labour portion of the sentence were subsequently remitted. Another man 
who was in receipt of a two year sentence with hard labour was Fr P. H. Delahunty, a 
Catholic curate in Callan, County Kilkenny. Fr Delahunty was found guilty of having in his 
possession documentation relating to the Dáil Loan. Among the documents was written 
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correspondence with Michael Collins which indicated that Fr Delahunty was a loan organiser 
for South Kilkenny. Fr Delahunty was sentenced on 17 December 1920 in Waterford and was 
removed to prison in England.
76
 The imposition of such a harsh sentence on a priest was 
indicative of the lack of foresight in the response of the British administration to the Dáil 
Loan. Sending a priest to prison for two years with hard labour was bound to have elicited 
much outrage amongst the public given the high standing in which the Catholic Church was 
held. 
These examples also illustrate the futility of the British authorities’ attempts to crush 
the internal Dáil Loan. During the months after the launch of the loan, the monthly R.I.C. 
reports and the provincial newspapers were full of cases of meetings being broken up, notices 
being torn down, and individuals being prosecuted for offences relating to the loan. However, 
there was no case of actual loan funds being discovered and seized. For all the individual 
cases of meetings being suppressed, doubtless there were many more meetings that went 
ahead without the authorities’ knowledge. For the numerous cases reported monthly of loan 
posters and notices being removed, without question, there were countless other cases where 
advertising material went undetected. Even those posters and notices that were torn down by 
the police could have had their desired effect before they were removed. The R.I.C., and to a 
lesser extent the D.M.P., were fighting a losing battle from day one against the loan campaign. 
The sheer number of Sinn Féin members around the country dwarfed the R.I.C. Donal J. 
O’Sullivan estimates that by the end of 1918 there were around 1,200 R.I.C. barracks across 
Ireland manned by 10,000 officers, whereas the Castle’s files show that they believed there 
were 1,363 Sinn Féin clubs across the country with approximately 113,000 members in 
January 1919.
77
 It also must be remembered that concurrent to the loan drive was an 
                                                          
76
 Ibid., 8 Jan. 1921. 
77
 Donal J. O’Sullivan, The Irish Constabularies, 1822-1922: a century of policing in Ireland (Dingle, 1999), p. 
272; R.I.C. reports, Jan.-Apr. 1919 (T.N.A., Dublin Castle papers, CO 904/108). 
99 
 
escalating nationwide campaign of violence against police forces. In many areas, the R.I.C. 
were withdrawing from rural districts into the garrison towns. Consequently, the loan 
organisers and collectors could operate more effectively in these rural areas than they could 
in the towns where there was still a strong police presence. This fact goes a long way towards 
explaining why the Dáil Loan received larger total subscriptions from rural constituencies 
than urban ones. 
A major hindrance to the efforts of Dublin Castle to suppress the Dáil Loan was their 
difficulty in obtaining information. A recurring theme in the R.I.C. reports was the inability 
of the police to establish any accurate information regarding the loan campaign. In September 
1919, the county inspector for Wicklow reported that he did not think there were many 
contributors to the loan but that the police in the county ‘find it very difficult to get any 
information.’78 Sir Joseph Byrne stated in his Inspector General’s report for October that he 
had reason to believe that the response in many districts to the loan was disappointing. He 
was certainly arriving at this conclusion drawing on the information he was receiving from 
the provinces. The inspector for County Monaghan reported in November that money was 
subscribed in response to a direct appeal made by Arthur Griffith in the county but that it 
could not be established ‘as to the exact amount he got.’79  
Also in their reports for November, the county inspectors for Meath, Roscommon and 
Kerry stated that the subscriptions to the loan in their counties were not thought to have been 
‘numerous or large.’80 In December, the county inspector for Dublin reported that the loan 
campaign in the county was ‘apparently without success’, while in Waterford, the efforts of P. 
C. O’Mahony did not ‘appear to have been very successful.’81 Also in December, the county 
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inspector for Limerick reported that it was suspected that private collections were ongoing for 
the loan but there was ‘no evidence available.’ He also stated his belief that the amount 
collected was minimal.
82
 His counterpart in County Clare reported that: ‘Private collections 
are made for Dáil Éireann but no authoritative information can be got.’ 83  These reports 
continued into the early months of 1920. Byrne confirmed in January that money was still 
being subscribed all over the country but it was being collected ‘clandestinely and no reliable 
estimate of the amount can be formed.’84 In February, the inspector for the west riding of 
Cork reported that ‘There is reason to believe that collections for the Republican Loan have 
been made largely through the Riding during the month but evidence cannot be obtained.’85 It 
is clearly evident from these reports that the police found it almost impossible to establish 
any accurate information relating to the progress of the loan campaign. However, they also 
indicate that they may have been working on the misguided belief that the loan was not 
meeting its targets and their own campaign of suppression was proving successful. Several of 
the county inspectors indicated that they did not believe that the loan was making much 
progress but this is unlikely to have been the case considering the loan was oversubscribed 
when it was finally closed. 
The Dáil Loan campaign was at its peak during the last few months of 1919 and the 
British administration made a concerted effort during these months to halt its progress. 
Diarmuid O’Hegarty wrote to Seán T. O’Kelly on 9 October: ‘The British are out after the 
Loan – neck or nothing [...] They appear to have got into a blue funk about it.’86 It is clear 
that the authorities during this period did present a significant obstacle to the smooth progress 
of the loan campaign. However, their efforts were unsuccessful and in many cases backfired 
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spectacularly. The fact that there were no cases of any loan funds being uncovered and seized 
during these months, and that the total loan fund itself exceeded its final target, prove that the 
attempts to suppress the loan had failed. Indeed, many of the methods employed in an attempt 
to halt the progress of the campaign were counter-productive in the extreme. Even The Times 
of London had accepted that ‘the scheme of reconstruction for which the Irish National Loan 
is being raised is sober and attractive.’87 However, Dublin Castle still saw fit to suppress any 
newspaper that published a copy of its prospectus. This was met with widespread 
condemnation from republicans and moderates alike. Even individuals who were sympathetic 
to the Castle administration, like Sir Horace Plunkett and Bryan Cooper, spoke out against 
the suppression. Both men believed that suppressing newspapers that published the 
prospectus would only serve to generate more publicity for the loan. The harsh penalties that 
were received by individuals for loan related offences were also counter-productive. Three 
Dáil Éireann T.D.s, who had been elected less than a year previously, were sent to prison for 
their public advocacy of the loan. Their plight, along with the many others who were 
imprisoned for their work during the loan campaign, generated much sympathy and hardened 
the resolve of republicans to ensure the success of the internal Dáil Loan. Dublin Castle most 
likely believed that their policy was justified given the reports of individuals being coerced 
into contributing to the loan. In truth, their suppression probably persuaded many individuals 
of a more moderate political persuasion to subscribe and support Dáil Éireann. The reaction 
and response of the British administration to the Dáil Éireann Loan in the latter months of 
1919 ultimately helped accelerate the progress of the campaign.  
 
Dublin Castle had exhibited a rather apathetic reaction to the establishment of Dáil 
Éireann in January 1919, while the cabinet in London were preoccupied with more pressing 
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events on the continent. The approach adopted by the British administration was to ignore the 
rebel government in the belief that it would inevitably fail. However, an escalation of 
political violence forced them to tackle the Irish question and the decision was taken to 
declare Dáil Éireann illegal in the aftermath of the launch of the internal Dáil Loan. This 
approach was predicated on their failure to draw any distinction between Dáil Éireann and the 
various militant republican groups. This was a misguided approach to take because most 
republicans were still of the moderate variety and they had no appetite for violence and 
bloodshed. The suppression of the Dáil Loan underlines how mistaken Dublin Castle’s 
attempts to suppress Dáil Éireann were. By attempting to stop people subscribing to the loan, 
they only succeeded in hardening the resolve of republicans to ensure the venture was a 
success. The harsh sentences handed down to those found guilty of offences relating to the 
loan, including three individual Dáil deputies and many more members of the public, 
garnered widespread sympathy for the republican cause and generated extensive publicity for 
the loan campaign. Given the reports that there were cases where people were being coerced 
into subscribing, the British authorities doubtless felt that they were entirely justified in their 
attempts to suppress the Dáil Loan. However, these attempts did not achieve their objectives 
as the loan exceeded its targets and there were no recorded instances of any loan funds being 
recovered by either the R.I.C. or the D.M.P. Although the police reports suggest otherwise, it 
is likely that the British administration were beginning to come to the realisation as 1920 
commenced that they could not stop individuals from subscribing to the loan. Other methods 
would be required to crush the internal Dáil Loan, and by extension, Dáil Éireann. 
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Chapter IV – Alan Bell and the banks inquiry of March 1920 
The proscription of Dáil Éireann by the Dublin Castle authorities in September 1919 had 
failed to quell the progress of the internal Dáil Loan. The suppression of the Dáil Loan by the 
D.M.P. in Dublin and by the R.I.C. nationwide had inadvertently provided the loan with the 
best possible publicity. The collection of subscriptions continued apace as 1920 approached. 
It appears likely that Dublin Castle had arrived at the realisation that they could not stop 
individuals from purchasing bonds. They had to devise new methods in addition to 
suppression if they were to succeed in crushing the Dáil Loan. One new approach entailed 
investigating the eventual destination of the loan subscriptions. The attempts of the British 
authorities to stop the sale of subscriptions had all but failed but if they succeeded in locating 
the bank accounts within which the loan funds were deposited, they could seize the proceeds 
of the loan. By taking away the principal financial apparatus of Dáil Éireann, Dublin Castle 
could make it extremely difficult for institutions like the Dáil Courts and the National Land 
Bank to function effectively. Such institutions were the manifestation of the counter-state in 
action and they clearly undermined the authority of Dublin Castle. Seizing the Dáil’s funds 
would go a long way to securing British rule in Ireland. This chapter outlines the background 
and reactions to the other methods adopted by Dublin Castle to crush the Dáil Loan from the 
beginning of 1920 onwards. It also examines the course of these efforts to uncover the loan 
accounts and the outcomes of this strategy. 
 The concluding months of 1919 witnessed an intensification in the efforts of Dublin 
Castle to halt the progress of the Dáil Loan. Dáil Éireann had been proclaimed an illegal 
organisation on 12 September 1919. The authorities simultaneously commenced their 
suppression of the Dáil Loan. The police and military conducted a raid on the Dáil’s offices 
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at 6 Harcourt Street, where Michael Collins ran his Department of Finance.
1
 Collins evaded 
capture by escaping through a skylight but Ernest Blythe, the Minister for Trade and 
Commerce, was arrested by the raiding party. Police and military raids were not the only 
initial measures taken to suppress the Dáil Loan with posters being torn down, meetings 
broken up, and individuals advocating subscriptions arrested. Newspapers who published the 
loan prospectus were suppressed, some permanently. Despite many protesting voices that 
their policies would ultimately prove counter-productive, the authorities pressed ahead with 
the suppression of the loan. Collins wrote to de Valera on 10 February 1920: ‘The enemy 
Government quickly realised that the economic policy of the Dáil was as great a danger to 
them as its political policy [...] The enemy must therefore, at all costs prevent our getting the 
necessary funds. He attempted, certainly – and with a renewed determination and savagery 
[...] Yet all the attempts have signally failed’.2 In addition to this suppression, it was apparent 
that Dublin Castle would have to devise new strategies in order to stop the progress of the 
Dáil Loan and undermine the development of the counter-state. 
 The intensification of Dublin Castle’s efforts to suppress the Dáil Loan coincided with 
an upsurge in violence across Ireland. The frequent attacks on R.I.C. barracks throughout 
1919 resulted in the increasing isolation of the force across rural Ireland. The R.I.C. began to 
retreat back to the garrison towns when faced with the escalating violence and intimidation in 
the countryside.
3
 Meanwhile in Dublin, the I.R.A.’s systematic targeting of prominent 
detectives in Dublin was beginning to wreak havoc to the British intelligence system in 
Ireland. Michael Collins had managed to recruit a number of men within both the Dublin 
Castle administration and the D.M.P. to act as informers. Moles like Éamon ‘Ned’ Broy and 
David Neligan played an important role in rendering the British intelligence system 
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ineffective. They provided Collins with a wealth of information regarding the inner workings 
of the police forces. They also disclosed the identities of prominent informers and agents 
working against republicanism, who were then shot dead on Collins’s orders, if they were 
deemed to pose a significant threat to the advancement of republicanism in Ireland. This 
campaign not only served to disable British intelligence in Ireland, it also greatly undermined 
the morale of the police and military. Sir Nevil Macready, who was appointed General 
Officer Commanding-in-Ireland during the spring of 1920, wrote that the police had ‘become 
paralysed by the action of the gunmen,’ several prominent detectives had been shot and their 
replacements ‘realised that activity on their part would be their death warrant.’4 The D.M.P. 
had effectively been paralysed by the end of 1919. Three of the D.M.P.’s most prominent 
political detectives had been killed by the end of the year. Patrick ‘dog’ Smyth was shot on 
30 July and died of his wounds in the Mater Hospital on 8 September, Daniel Hoey was shot 
dead outside D.M.P. headquarters on Great Brunswick Street on 13 September, and John 
Barton was shot dead on College Street on 29 November.
5
 In December, Dublin Castle were 
forced to take action to address the near collapse of their intelligence system.
6
 The Viceroy, 
Lord French, prioritised the reorganisation of the intelligence structures and this was to have 
significant implications for Dáil Éireann and by extension, the Dáil Loan. 
 One of the first steps taken by Dublin Castle in the reorganisation of their intelligence 
structures was the appointment, by Lord French, of a secret committee tasked with 
considering ways of addressing the shortcomings in the intelligence system. This committee 
comprised of Colonel Walter Edgeworth-Johnstone, the chief commissioner of the D.M.P.; 
Sir Thomas J. Smith, the acting inspector-general of the R.I.C.; Sir John J. Taylor, the 
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assistant under-secretary at Dublin Castle; and a resident magistrate named Alan Bell.
7
 The 
latter named is of particular interest because he was also to be assigned with the task of 
conducting the investigation into the finances of Dáil Éireann. Alan Bell was born in King’s 
County [Offaly]. He was the son of the Rev James Bell, a Church of Ireland minister from 
Banagher. He joined the R.I.C. as an officer-cadet in September 1879, having attained the 
second highest results in the cadetship examinations.
8
 Bell steadily rose through the ranks of 
the R.I.C. and during the 1880s he investigated sources of Land League funds. He gained 
notoriety in 1882 when he arrested the American land reformer and journalist, Henry George, 
at Athenry.
9
 Bell became a resident magistrate in 1898 and he was to serve as in that role in 
counties Mayo, Down and Armagh. He was popular with the Unionist gentry and he was one 
of a number of local dignitaries who received the Prince of Wales at Ballinrobe railway 
station when the prince visited Lord Ardilaun at Ashford Castle in 1905.
10
 He possessed an 
evident dislike for republicanism which is clear from a report he submitted to Dublin Castle 
in early 1919. He wrote that the republican movement was ‘a menace to the maintenance of 
the peace; recruited from the rowdy element of the population and under no proper control’.11 
He also suggested in his report that martial law should be considered if disorder continued to 
escalate. Given Bell’s evident disdain for republicanism, it is somewhat ironic that his brother, 
who was a prison doctor, had probably saved the lives of many republican prisoners in 
Gloucester Jail when he ordered their evacuation during the influenza epidemic of 1919.
12
 
Despite his relatively innocent appearance as an elderly resident magistrate, Alan Bell would 
prove to be a major threat to the republican movement as 1920 approached. 
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 The Irish Times reported on 8 November 1919 that Alan Bell was departing from the 
resident magistry of County Armagh ‘having been called to a more important sphere of duty 
in the metropolis.’13 The secret committee that he had been appointed to by Lord French 
concluded their inquiries in January 1920. The committee reported that the I.R.A.’s campaign 
had rendered the police forces useless, particularly in Dublin. The D.M.P. had been 
successfully infiltrated by republicans and ‘even loyal and respectable people’ could no 
longer be relied upon to provide information. Their report concluded that an additional 
assistant commissioner, who would solely concentrate on political work, should be appointed 
to the D.M.P.; and that the ‘shooting of a few would-be assassins would have an excellent 
effect.’14 The recommendations of the committee’s report were considered immediately. An 
R.I.C. officer from Belfast, William Redmond, was appointed as an assistant-commissioner 
of the D.M.P. to focus on the reorganisation of G Division, the force’s political crime 
division.
15
 Several covert agents were also sent to Dublin in an attempt to regain the upper 
hand in the ongoing intelligence war. There is evidence to suggest that these agents reported 
to Alan Bell. In his report to Lord French dated January 1920, Bell wrote that: ‘in the course 
of their moving about my men have picked up a good deal of useful information which leads 
to raids’.16 However, this reorganisation of Dublin Castle’s intelligence structures had little 
immediate impact in halting the I.R.A.’s campaign. If anything, there was an escalation in 
violence as 1920 approached. A daring attempt was made to assassinate Lord French at 
Ashtown on 19 December. An attempt was made to ambush French at the railway station on 
his return from his estate in Roscommon. However, the ambush was unsuccessful and French 
escaped unharmed. William Redmond was not as fortunate though. He was shot dead on 
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Harcourt Street on 21 January 1920.
17
 Redmond’s demise was particularly unfortunate for 
Alan Bell’s intelligence work. Bell had been directing Redmond since his arrival in Dublin 
the previous month. He wrote in his report to French that Redmond had been particularly 
useful because through him Bell ‘was able to make inquiries which I should not care to 
entrust to the G Division’.18 Bell was subsequently personally appointed by Lord French to 
lead the investigations into both the Ashtown Ambush and the shooting of William 
Redmond.
19
 It appears as if Bell was acting as the unofficial head of intelligence for the 
Dublin Castle administration at this time. There is ample evidence in Bell’s report and 
notebook of clandestine intelligence activities. The inside cover of the notebook also contains 
the address of Sir Basil Thomson, the Director of Intelligence at Scotland Yard, written in 
Bell’s handwriting.20 It is clear from this evidence that Bell played a highly significant role in 
the British intelligence effort in Ireland. 
 Of all the various investigations and intelligence operations undertaken by Alan Bell, 
arguably his most notable assignment was the pursuit of Dáil Éireann’s finances. The 
attempts made to suppress the Dáil Loan in the wake of its launch in August 1919 had failed. 
Dublin Castle had come to the realisation that a new approach was needed to crush the Dáil 
Loan. This entailed locating and seizing the eventual destination of the loan subscriptions. 
Alan Bell was the ideal man to lead such an investigation owing to his work in the 1880s, 
when he investigated the finances of the Land League. This fact was obviously not lost on the 
Dublin Castle executive when they summoned Bell to Dublin to carry out intelligence work 
in November 1919. A series of raids that were carried out during January and February 1920 
facilitated the commencement of Bell’s investigation. These raids specifically targeted the ten 
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different locations used as offices by the Dáil Department of Finance and they yielded 
significant finds for the authorities. A number of cheques and receipts were seized during a 
raid on the Sinn Féin Bank on Harcourt Street.
21
 The authorities suspected that the Dáil funds 
had been deposited in various bank accounts across Dublin and they hoped that the seized 
cheques would lead them to these bank accounts.  
 
Fig VII: Alan Bell 
(Source: Irish Independent) 
 
 The Dáil Loan funds were transferred to a number of accounts set up in both the 
Munster & Leinster Bank and the Hibernian Bank across Dublin. These bank accounts had 
been set up after the launch of the internal Dáil Loan in August 1919. The accounts were 
mostly in the names of reputable republican sympathisers, while others were in the names of 
members of Dáil Éireann. Some were even held under fictitious names in order to put the 
authorities off the scent. However, the cheques seized during the raids on the Department of 
Finance’s offices during January and February could be traced back to different accounts in 
various bank branches across Dublin. Acting on this evidence, Alan Bell immediately 
commenced preparations for his investigation. The investigation would take the form of an 
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inquiry. Bank managers were to be summoned to appear before Bell at a star chamber and 
they were expected to produce evidence relating to any transactions that had taken place 
between their bank branch and Dáil Éireann or Sinn Féin. The summons that was issued to 
bank managers on 2 March 1920 specified that they should produce for examination: ‘any 
securities, telegrams, copies of telegrams, letters, copies of letters, all books of account, 
ledgers, vouchers, bills, cheques, orders, or drafts, records, memoranda or notes of telephone 
messages sent or received in all memoranda and other documents in any way relating to any 
details or transactions between your bank and the said organisations.’22 This summons was 
issued to ten bankers, five from the Hibernian Bank and five from the Munster & Leinster 
Bank on 2 March. The Hibernian Bank employees summoned were: H. J. Campbell from the 
College Green branch, C. Tierney from the Sackville Street branch, D. J. O’Rourke from the 
Dorset Street branch, T. F. Read from the Camden Street branch, and D. P. Carbury from the 
Thomas Street branch. Those summoned from the Munster & Leinster Bank were: J. F. 
Dawson who was manager of both the Dame Street and Upper Baggot Street branches, P. J. 
Stokes from the Sackville Street branch, D. Fuge from the Terenure Road branch in Rathgar, 
J. C. B. Coakley from the Phibsborough Road branch, and E. P. Julian from the Lower 
Baggot Street branch.
23
 In the event that these bankers did not attend or they failed to produce 
evidence, Bell’s papers specified that the Attorney-General should be consulted and it was 
possible that warrants could be issued for their arrest. 
 The inquiry opened on Monday, 8 March. The press reaction to the inquiry was mixed. 
The two nationalist dailies voiced their opposition to the inquiry’s establishment. The 
Freeman’s Journal were vehemently opposed to the inquiry. Its edition of 8 March described 
the inquiry as ‘political persecution which affects the whole commercial community.’24 The 
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paper’s editorial was scathing in its criticism of the inquiry calling it ‘one of the most 
sensational and far-reaching encroachments by the Irish executive on the traditional rights of 
citizens’. The Freeman’s Journal wrote that it was both unprecedented and unethical for the 
Dublin Castle administration to be authorising an investigation which would see bankers 
having to reveal information about their clients’ confidential accounts. ‘To destroy the 
confidence of the public in the safety and secrecy of bankers’ books is a matter which 
everyone, despite their political views must deeply deplore.’25 The following day’s edition of 
the same newspaper maintained this vocal stance in opposition to the inquiry. One particular 
article called Alan Bell’s legal training into question. The article claimed that Bell’s name did 
not appear in the legal directory as either a barrister or a solicitor and that ‘he is, therefore, a 
gentleman without legal training.’26 Consequently, the Freeman’s Journal concluded that 
Bell did not possess the power to compel a witness to answer.  
 The other nationalist daily, the Irish Independent, took a similar stance to that of the 
Freeman’s Journal with regard to the establishment of the banks inquiry. The Irish 
Independent of 9 March reported on ‘the strong resentment of the public’ to the inquiry’s 
establishment.
27
 An article claimed that those summoned to the inquiry strongly resented 
Dublin Castle’s actions and that one manager had said that ‘he did not believe that his bank 
would disclose any information except under compulsion.’ The article also claimed that Sinn 
Féin had learned of Dublin Castle’s intentions over a week before the inquiry’s establishment 
and they had been able to take steps to safeguard the funds.
28
 The Irish Independent also 
reported on the inquiry in its edition of 12 March. It detailed how bank staff had been 
instructed by their superiors to adopt a ‘stiff attitude’ with regard to the inquiry.29 The Irish 
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Independent was also informed by a prominent member of the Institute of Bankers in Ireland 
that they would not interfere with the inquiry and it was up to the various bank directors to 
act as they saw fit. The article continued to say that it was unknown as to whether further 
sittings of the inquiry would take place but that it was ‘believed in banking circles that the 
last has been heard of the investigation which, it would seem, has signally failed in its 
purpose.’30 It is probable that these views expressed by the two nationalist dailies were also 
held by a large proportion of the population. The banking and commercial community were 
evidently opposed to the inquiry and given the increasing level of coercion across Ireland, a 
large swathe of the public would have viewed the inquiry as further persecution imposed by 
the Dublin Castle administration. 
 The official publication of Dáil Éireann, the Irish Bulletin, was unsurprisingly blunt in 
their condemnation of Dublin Castle’s actions. The Irish Bulletin denounced Alan Bell in a 
series of articles. An article appeared on 9 March entitled ‘Who is Alan Bell?’ This article 
claimed that ‘Bell acted as agent-provocateur in the West of Ireland in the Land League 
times,’ and that he had played a role in the Pigott forgeries case of 1887.31 It also featured the 
claims that Bell had since ‘been used in many shady ways by the English Spy System in 
Ireland,’ and that he had recently been transferred to Dublin ‘to assist in the concoction of 
conspiracy charges against the Republican Leaders.’32 Bell’s papers seem to suggest that 
there was a degree of accuracy in these claims that he was deeply involved in the Castle’s 
intelligence organisation. The 10 March edition of the Irish Bulletin continued in a similar 
vein. In an article entitled ‘The latest blow at Ireland’s economic well-being’, it was written 
that the Dublin Castle executive were determined not only to crush nationalist sentiment in 
Ireland, but also to destroy the economy of the nation. The article referred to the raising of 
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the Dáil Loan, which it said had been raised ‘without British aid and in spite of the relentless 
opposition of every British Government.’33 Dublin Castle had coupled ‘political coercion 
with economic strangulation’ and the appointment of ‘a notorious English secret service 
Agent poorly disguised as a Magistrate,’ had the objective of destroying the economy of the 
republican state.
34
 This campaign against Alan Bell and his inquiry continued with another 
damning article in the 11 March edition of the Irish Bulletin. The article in question was 
entitled ‘A spy with greater powers than a judge’, and it refers to the article which had 
appeared in the Freeman’s Journal on 9 March which had called Bell’s legal training into 
question. It claimed that ‘Mr Bell who is an English Secret Service Agent is permitted to 
wield a judicial power which the highest law officers of the English Crown are expressly 
prohibited from wielding.’35 Although the Irish Bulletin was merely a useful propaganda tool 
for Dáil Éireann rather than a reputable newspaper, its articles published in opposition to 
Alan Bell and the inquiry, would undoubtedly have had an impact in convincing many people 
that the inquiry was unjust. 
 The unionist press predictably did not express any opposition to the establishment of 
the inquiry. The Irish Times only reported on the opening of the inquiry on 8 March. This 
was only a short article consisting of a few lines which simply outlined the objectives of the 
investigation.
36
 This was the only mention of the banks inquiry in the Irish Times while it was 
ongoing. The London edition of The Times also contained a report on the opening of the 
inquiry. This report from the Dublin correspondent of the newspaper, was more extensive 
than the report in the same day’s Irish Times. It outlined the objectives of the inquiry and it 
detailed the evidence that the bank managers summoned to appear before Bell were expected 
to produce. The article also reported on the reaction of the nationalist press to the inquiry. 
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The correspondent refuted the claims of the nationalist press that the inquiry was violation of 
banking confidentiality. He wrote that ‘this alarmist view is not taken by the commercial and 
trading community.’37 The contrast in the respective positions of the various newspapers in 
relation to the banks inquiry is clearly evident from these articles. 
 Amidst this blanket press coverage, the banks inquiry opened on 8 March 1920. Bell’s 
papers show that he had drafted a series of questions to ask each witness and that he had 
information relating to a number of specific clients’ bank accounts. His notes referred to the 
following names: Michael Collins, David O’Donoghue, Seán Power, George Nesbitt, 
Éamonn Duggan and Robert Barton.
38
  He listed trustees of the Dáil Loan – Archbishop 
Fogarty, Arthur Griffith and James O’Mara; and his notes also made specific reference to the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Resources of Ireland with Darrell Figgis as its secretary. Bell 
had obtained this information from the cheques and documents that had been seized by the 
police and military in the weeks and months leading up to the establishment of the inquiry.  
He had compiled a draft list of twenty-five questions for each witness with further follow up 
questions depending on their answers.  
 The first of these witnesses to appear before Alan Bell at the Dublin Police Courts on 
Inns Quay was Thomas Francis Read, Esq. Read was the manager of the Camden Street 
branch of the Hibernian Bank, a position he had held for fourteen years. Bell firstly queried 
as to whether Read had any accounts in his bank with any of the organisations known as Dáil 
Éireann, Sinn Féin or the Sinn Féin Bank. Read replied with a definite no to each 
organisation. Bell also asked if Read’s branch had any account with persons purporting to be 
trustees of Dáil Éireann, to which he replied: ‘Not officially – I mean to say I have no 
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knowledge of them – I could not answer the question more directly than that.’39 Read was 
then asked if he had any account in the names of Patrick Gleeson and Patrick Morgan. He 
stated that there was a joint deposit account in those names. He had a ledger which would 
have shown the particulars of the account but he did not have this, or any other 
documentation, with him at the inquiry. When quizzed as to why he did not have the 
documentation with him, Read said ‘How did I know that I would be asked that question?’40 
He proceeded to say that the documents that were referred to in the summons related to a 
number of organisations, namely Dáil Éireann and Sinn Féin. He maintained that he did not 
have any documents related to these organisations, so he did not feel it necessary to bring any 
documentation with him to the inquiry. Bell then asked Read if he could tell him how the 
joint deposit account in the names of Patrick Morgan and Patrick Gleeson stood. He 
answered that he could, but ‘for the moment I claim privilege as it is a private account and I 
am bound by an oath of secrecy.’ Bell quickly retorted ‘You know there is no such thing as 
privilege in a criminal proceeding?’41 Read replied that he was ‘not well up in the law.’ He 
did not recollect what sort of cheque was presented when the account was opened although 
he said that it might be possible to trace it up.  
 From this point onwards Bell’s line of questioning began to exhibit a degree of 
frustration when it was evident that Read was not exactly fully cooperating with the inquiry. 
He asked if Read had any account in the Camden Street branch in the names of any of 
Thomas Kelly, Arthur Griffith, Michael Collins, Robert Barton, Ernest Blythe or Darrell 
Figgis. Read answered that he did not have an account in any of those names, apart from a 
joint account held by Thomas Kelly with the aforementioned Patrick Gleeson.
42
 He did not 
know how that account stood for the same reason that he could say how the joint account of 
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Gleeson and Morgan stood previously. At this point, Bell remarked: ‘Of course on reference 
to your books you could tell me at once?’ to which Read simply replied: ‘Oh, yes.’43 Bell also 
asked Read if he remembered any lodgement of four thousand pounds, which he did not. 
Finally, Bell asked whether the Camden Street branch of the Hibernian Bank had been 
cashing cheques drawn on the Sinn Féin Bank. Read stated that he had no knowledge of such 
transactions taking place but that if a ‘good customer’ came into a bank with a cheque on the 
Sinn Féin Bank, they would cash it for that customer.
44
 It is apparent from this evidence that 
Thomas Francis Read was not entirely cooperative with the banks inquiry. He attempted to 
claim privilege when questioned as to how the account of Gleeson and Morgan stood. He 
answered all the questions thereafter when Bell informed him that he could not claim 
privilege but he was far from candid in the evidence he provided. He also did not have any 
documentation in his possession when he appeared before the inquiry. This is despite the fact 
that it was explicitly specified in the summons. Documentation like account books or ledgers 
could have provided invaluable evidence with regard to certain accounts. This apparent 
reluctance to provide information or evidence to the inquiry is not unique to Read though. In 
fact, it is a recurring theme throughout the transcripts of the banks inquiry. 
 One of Thomas Francis Read’s fellow Hibernian Bank employees, Christopher 
Tierney Esq., was next to appear as witness before Alan Bell at the banks inquiry. Tierney 
was manager of the Sackville Street branch of the bank and had been in that position for over 
thirty years. Like Read, Tierney was first asked by Bell as to whether his bank branch had 
any accounts with any of Dáil Éireann, the Sinn Féin organisation or the Sinn Féin bank. He 
answered that he did not. He proceeded to state that his branch had no accounts with any 
persons purporting to be trustees of any of the organisations listed above.
45
 Tierney also 
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maintained that his Sackville Street branch of the Hibernian Bank had never cashed any 
cheques drawn on the Sinn Féin bank. At this point in his questioning, Bell referred Tierney 
to cheque number 2080, which had been captured during the recent raids. Bell asked Tierney 
three times to identify the name of the drawer but Tierney could not. Bell then asked how the 
cheque came into the Sackville Street branch. Tierney responded that ‘May I say that I never 
saw this cheque before. This cheque was lodged to the credit of Andrew S. Clerkin, in the 
usual way, together with other cheques lodged in our bank.’46 He went onto say that Clerkin 
held an account with his branch and that the cheque in question was probably passed into his 
account along with other invoices on 17 February 1920. The cheque was then passed to the 
bank’s head office at College Green for clearance in due course. 
 Bell then questioned Tierney as to whether Michael Collins held an account in his 
branch. Tierney said that he did not remember but the name was not familiar to him. He 
asked if Bell could give him Collins’s address. Bell said that he would probably be found at 6 
Harcourt Street, at which point Tierney stated that he had no such account.
47
 Bell then asked 
whether Tierney had an account in the name of Darrell Figgis in his branch. He answered that 
he had no personal account in that name but he did have an account in which the name 
Darrell Figgis appeared along with two other names. This account belonged to The 
Commission of Inquiry into the Resources of Ireland, the body that was set up by Dáil 
Éireann to evaluate Ireland’s resources and to determine what areas needed investment with 
Dáil funding. Tierney said that he did not remember the other two names on this particular 
account. He also did not have with him the ledger within which the names could be identified. 
When asked why he did not bring the ledger with him, he replied: ‘I did not bring it; it is a 
very big book [...] I did not bring the ledger or any papers or documents, because I did not 
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connect any of the business or documents in my office with the scope of the enquiry.’48 
Tierney was finally asked if any of John O’Neill, George Nesbitt, Thomas Kelly, Robert 
Barton, Arthur Griffith or Ernest Blythe had held accounts with the Sackville Street branch of 
the Hibernian Bank. He responded with a definite no to each name apart with the exception 
of Robert Barton of whom he was unsure. Bell then asked Tierney if he would be able to say 
for certain if he had brought his ledger with him. He bluntly replied: ‘if I had the ledger I 
would tell you at once.’49 Christopher Tierney’s testimony is strikingly similar to that of his 
Hibernian Bank colleague, Thomas Francis Read. Like Read, Tierney flatly denied any 
knowledge of Dáil Éireann or Sinn Féin accounts in his bank branch. He also failed to 
produce any of the documentation specified in his summons, which would have provided Bell 
with important information relating to certain accounts. It seems as if the bank managers only 
revealed their knowledge of accounts when Bell presented them with concrete evidence, as 
Tierney was in the case of cheque number 2080 and the account of Andrew S. Clerkin. 
Although Tierney was probably not as cooperative with the inquiry as he could have been, he 
did provide important evidence relating to the account held in the name of The Commission 
of Inquiry into the Resources of Ireland. This commission had been established by Dáil 
Éireann in June 1919, with the mandate of not only investigating the existing resources in the 
country, but also reporting on how they might be further developed. One of the key 
objectives of the Dáil Loan was to examine and develop Ireland’s resources so this 
commission was an important part of the Dáil’s manifesto. It would have been a significant 
coup for Alan Bell if he had managed to uncover its accounts. Apart from this information 
relating to the commission’s account, most of Christopher Tierney’s evidence to the banks 
inquiry was fairly insignificant. 
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 Henry Joseph Campbell Esq. was another branch manager from the Hibernian Bank 
who was summoned to appear before Alan Bell. Campbell was manager of the branch at 27 
College Green and had been for over ten years. At first, Campbell requested if he could be 
represented by legal counsel. Bell refused the request by informing him that only three 
individuals were allowed to be in attendance in the courtroom – Bell himself, the witness, and 
the shorthand writer.
50
 Bell pursued the same line of questioning that he employed when 
examining both Thomas Francis Read and Christopher Tierney. Like his colleagues Read and 
Tierney, Campbell maintained that his branch had no accounts with Dáil Éireann, the Sinn 
Féin organisation or the Sinn Féin Bank. He also said that his branch had no accounts with 
persons purporting to be trustees of Dáil Éireann, the Sinn Féin organisation or the Sinn Féin 
Bank. Campbell was somewhat hesitant when Bell asked him if his bank had cashed any 
cheque drawn on the Sinn Féin Bank. He initially said that ‘it may have been done without 
my knowledge. I have no means now of knowing whether they did or not.’51 He then stated 
that in fact, he did not believe any such cheque was cashed. This statement contradicts the 
evidence of Thomas Francis Read who said that if a ‘good customer’ came into his branch of 
the Hibernian Bank with a cheque drawn on the Sinn Féin Bank, they would cash it for that 
customer. One of Campbell’s staff in the College Green branch may have cashed such 
cheques without his knowledge. 
 Campbell was then questioned as to whether he knew of any account in his branch in 
the name of Michael Collins. He answered that: ‘I would not like to say that from memory. I 
would have to go up and look it up [...] It would be too dangerous for me to speak from 
memory.’52 Campbell’s answer to this question is noteworthy, particularly the use of the 
phrase that it would be ‘too dangerous’ for him to speak from memory. When asked if he had 
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any documents in his possession that would confirm if such an account existed, Campbell 
replied that he had brought no documentation with him to the inquiry: ‘with regard to the 
summons I got, you mentioned four accounts; I have none of these accounts in the place, and 
therefore I brought down no books.’53 This appears to be the standard excuse that the bank 
managers offer for their failure to produce the evidence that was specified in the summons. 
They clearly did not anticipate that they would face any sanctions if they failed to produce 
any ledgers, books or memoranda relating to the accounts listed in their summonses.  
 At this point in proceedings, Bell presented to Campbell cheque number 2080 which 
had passed through the College Green branch. This was the same cheque that Bell had 
previously quizzed Christopher Tierney about. Campbell said that he did not know the 
signature of the drawer because the signature was in Irish and he did not know Irish. He said 
that the cheque was with the College Green branch on 18 February. The bank’s south runner 
had collected the amount of the cheque where it was drawn. Campbell claimed that he had 
never seen the cheque before. Bell asked him if the cheque was presented at the Sinn Féin 
Bank on Harcourt Street. Campbell answered: ‘Apparently.’54 However, he could not tell 
who the runner was on that particular day without consulting his books, which he did not 
have with him. Bell also presented to Campbell cheque number 1805 of 12 January 1920, 
cheque number 1650 of 23 December 1919, and cheque number 1954 of 2 February 1920. 
Campbell said that the same remarks that applied to cheque number 2080, applied to cheque 
numbers 1805 and 1650. He did not know the names appearing as drawers – R. Cotter or E. C. 
Fleming, and he could only ascertain who the runner was on those dates by referring to his 
books.
55
 Referring to cheque number 1954, Campbell stated that it appeared to have passed 
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through his books on 6 February and he had no doubt that it was collected in the ordinary 
manner. 
 Finally, Bell queried whether Darrell Figgis, Robert Barton or Thomas Kelly held 
accounts with the College Green branch of the Hibernian Bank. Campbell said that he could 
not possibly say whether Figgis or Barton held accounts without consulting the books, but he 
was aware of an account in the name of Thomas Kelly. However, he could not say whether 
he had cashed any cheques drawn by Kelly in the past. ‘I cash a great number of cheques 
without ever looking up things at all, if I think they are ordinary straight men – straight in 
commercial dealings.’56 The testimony of Henry Joseph Campbell is very similar to that of 
his Hibernian Bank colleagues. He was reluctant to provide detailed information and he failed 
to produce certain documentation that would have been invaluable to Bell’s inquiry. Like 
Read and Tierney, Campbell could hardly be described as cooperative during his appearance 
before the bank’s inquiry. 
 The three bank managers from the Hibernian Bank discussed previously all appeared 
to be quite hostile to Alan Bell’s line of questioning at the banks inquiry. This apparent 
hostility is also evident in the testimony of James Charles Lloyd Davidson Esq. He was a 
joint-accountant in the Dame Street branch of the Munster & Leinster Bank, the other joint-
accountant being Mr. A. B. Kerins. Davidson had worked at the Dame Street branch for 
about fifteen years. It is peculiar that it was one of the joint-accountants of the Dame Street 
branch that appeared before the inquiry rather than the branch manager. Davidson’s name did 
not appear in the original ten bank managers that were issued with a summons on 2 March. J. 
F. Dawson was named as manager of the Munster & Leinster Bank branch at Dame Street. 
Dawson was also named as manager of the Upper Baggot Street branch so it is plausible that 
he was scheduled to appear before Bell at a later date in his capacity as manager of that 
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branch. This may explain why a different member of staff was required to represent the Dame 
Street branch at the inquiry. 
 Davidson appeared before Bell on 11 March 1920. Before his session had commenced 
Davidson issued a protest at having to appear before the inquiry: ‘I am instructed by my 
directors to protest against being called upon to disclose any particulars about the affairs of 
the clients of the bank without the instruction of these clients.’ 57  It is interesting that 
Davidson, a Munster & Leinster Bank employee, was instructed by his superiors to issue a 
formal protest when none of the Hibernian Bank employees took this action. It is probable 
that the Munster & Leinster Bank employees were instructed to issue a formal protest at 
being summoned, whereas the Hibernian Bank directors instructed their staff to adopt a ‘stiff 
attitude’ under questioning as reported in the Irish Independent on 12 March. Despite issuing 
a formal protest, Davidson was probably the most cooperative and helpful of all the witnesses 
that appeared before Alan Bell. He provided information that would have been particularly 
helpful to the progress of the inquiry. 
 Bell firstly presented Davidson with cheque number 667. It was a cheque of £1,000 
that was endorsed by an E. Moloney, who was one of the runners in the Dame Street branch 
of the Munster & Leinster Bank. Davidson stated that he believed that the cheque had passed 
through his branch, and that he had looked up the bank’s records and found that a transaction 
for a similar amount had passed on the 28 May 1919. However, he had not been able to 
establish from the books where the cheque came from or who it was drawn by. The cheque 
was lodged to the deposit account of a client of the bank and the bank issued a deposit receipt 
on 28 May. Bell asked into whose account was the cheque deposited. Davidson replied that 
the account was in the name of Michael Collins.
58
 Bell then questioned him as to whether that 
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account still existed in the bank but Davidson could not without consulting the deposit receipt 
ledger.  
 After establishing that cheque number 667 was deposited into an account in the name 
of Michael Collins, Bell then questioned Davidson over an advance made in the days before 
cheque number 667 was passed. The advance in question was of £1,000 on 24 May. 
Davidson answered that he found no advance of that sum on that particular date.  Bell asked: 
‘Have you found anything at all in your bank which would explain a transaction of a 
thousand pounds having come from your bank, whose destination was Paris?’59 Davidson 
replied that there was no record of any such sum having been drawn on 24 May or having 
been paid out. ‘If a statement was made, that £1,000 was advanced by Munster & Leinster 
Head Office on 24 May 1919. I could not say whether it is true or false. If there was an 
advance from the Cork office it would not pass through our hands at all.’60 Davidson offered 
the explanation that an item of £1,000 was shown as passing through the Dame Street books 
on 24 May. This item was a draft drawn in favour of Art O’Brien, Dáil Éireann’s 
representative in London.
61
 The draft was issued on the bank’s agents in London, the 
National Provincial & Union Bank of England. The information that Davidson provided with 
regard to the transactions of Michael Collins and Art O’Brien were undoubtedly of great use 
to Alan Bell and his inquiries into the Dáil Loan. 
 Davidson also offered evidence regarding to other cheques which had been seized in 
the police raids. Cheque number 1027 for £2,000 came from a Limerick branch of the 
Munster & Leinster Bank in September 1919. Davidson said he did not know if the cheque 
had passed through his branch as it did not appear to have the stamp of the Dame Street 
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branch.
62
 Davidson also produced a signature note of draft on £1,000 payable in London in 
favour of Art O’Brien signed by David O’Donoghue of King Edward Terrace, Drumcondra, 
dated 24 May 1919. He stated that it would be inconvenient to part with this document.
63
 
Davidson also stated that his branch of the Munster & Leinster Bank at Dame Street cashed 
cheque number 1852 on 26 January 1920. This was a cheque for £1,000 in favour of Richard 
Mulcahy.
64
 This is where James Charles Lloyd Davidson’s evidence to the banks inquiry was 
concluded. It is fair to say that he was the most cooperative of all the bank employees 
summoned to appear before the inquiry. His evidence in relation to the account of Michael 
Collins, as well as the transactions linked to Art O’Brien and Richard Mulcahy, was clearly 
beneficial to Alan Bell’s investigations into finances of Dáil Éireann. 
 There are several common trends that emerge in the transcripts of the banks inquiry. 
The evidence of all four bank employees is fragmentary. They all appeared reluctant to reveal 
certain information and they did not produce documentation which could have proven 
invaluable in establishing the details of accounts suspected of containing the funds of Dáil 
Éireann. It appears from the transcripts, that the witnesses only revealed their full knowledge 
of certain accounts if Alan Bell presented them with concrete evidence such as cheques. 
Generally, if Bell asked them about any names, accounts or transactions without producing 
evidence, they would flatly deny any knowledge. Bank officials were required to be 
meticulously organised such was the nature of their position. It is curious then that a 
collective amnesia descended upon them when they appeared before Alan Bell. There are a 
number of factors that could explain this. The article that appeared in the Freeman’s Journal 
on 9 March 1920 calling Bell’s legal training into question is one possible explanation. The 
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article claimed that Bell did not have the authority to compel witnesses to answer.
65
 Although 
it was specified in the summons that the bankers were to produce for examination any papers 
or documentation relating to any transactions that took place between their banks and the 
organisations under investigation, they all failed to do this. They mostly cited that they did 
not think they had any such accounts in their banks, so they did not feel that they were 
required to produce any evidence for examination. It is stated in Bell’s papers that if those 
issued with a summons did not attend or failed to produce evidence, the Attorney-General 
was to be consulted before Bell could authorise any sanction to be taken.
66
 Perhaps the 
witnesses knew that Bell was relatively powerless to impose any sanctions on them so they 
believed that even if they were uncooperative, there would be no repercussions for them. The 
most cooperative of all the witnesses was James Charles Lloyd Davidson a joint-accountant 
in the Dame Street branch of the Munster & Leinster Bank. Davidson was the only witness 
from the Munster & Leinster Bank to appear in the transcripts of the inquiry and he was the 
only witness who was not a bank manager. It is possible that the republican accounts in the 
Munster & Leinster Bank were concealed less effectively than they had been in the various 
Hibernian Bank branches. This is quite likely to be the case because the Hibernian Bank was 
always the favoured bank of republicans.
67
 It is also possible that Davidson simply had a 
greater knowledge of the accounts and everyday transactions of his bank branch because he 
was a joint-accountant rather than a bank manager. 
 It is clear that the bank employees resented being called to appear before the inquiry 
and at having to reveal information about their clients’ confidential accounts. The articles that 
appeared in the nationalist press on 8 March and on the following day certainly support this 
suggestion. Thomas Francis Read attempted to claim privilege when quizzed about certain 
                                                          
65
 Freeman’s Journal, 9 Mar. 1920. 
66
 Crime: Enquiries of Mr. A. Bell (T.N.A., Dublin Castle papers, CO 904/177/1). 
67
 Hart, Michael Collins, p. 196. 
126 
 
accounts.
68
 Henry Joseph Campbell requested if he could be represented by legal counsel.
69
 
Even James Charles Lloyd Davidson issued a formal protest against being called upon to 
disclose information relating to his customers’ accounts.70 These actions certainly refute the 
assertion of the Dublin correspondent of The Times who stated on 9 March that the alarmist 
views of the nationalist press were not shared by the commercial and trading community.
71
 
Davidson was instructed by the directors of the Munster & Leinster Bank to protest at being 
summoned to appear. Meanwhile, the Hibernian Bank managers did not issue a formal 
protest, but they were probably advised by their superiors to adopt a ‘stiff attitude’ when 
under examination. 
 Despite the collective amnesia and the protests, the witnesses to the banks inquiry did 
provide some useful information which would undoubtedly have aided Alan Bell in his 
investigations. Christopher Tierney confirmed that his branch had an account belonging to 
the Commission of Inquiry into the Resources of Ireland. Henry Joseph Campbell more or 
less confirmed Bell’s suspicions that cheque number 2080 was presented by the south runner 
of the Hibernian Bank branch at College Green, at the Sinn Féin Bank on Harcourt Street. 
James Charles Lloyd Davidson provided many important pieces of evidence. Through his 
evidence, Bell was able to establish that there was an account in the name of Michael Collins 
in the Dame Street branch of the Munster & Leinster Bank. Davidson also provided 
information relating to the transactions of both Richard Mulcahy, who was Minister for 
Defence in the first Dáil Éireann cabinet; and Art O’Brien, who was the Dáil’s representative 
in London. That is essentially the sum extent of the useful information acquired by Alan Bell 
in the inquiry’s transcripts. 
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 There was another possible reason why the witnesses were unforthcoming. It is 
plausible that a reason for the reluctance of these bank employees to reveal information was 
the fear of what might happen to them if they revealed too much about certain accounts. They 
were all learned men and they were living in a city where violence and particularly murder 
had become an all too frequent occurrence. Although there were only three people present at 
any sitting of the inquiry and the proceedings were kept strictly private, Michael Collins had 
ways and means of gathering information. His intelligence network had successfully 
penetrated what were previously thought to be the most secure of structures. Thus, it is not 
impossible to think that the I.R.A. could have obtained the identities of these witnesses if they 
so wished. The evidence of Henry Joseph Campbell is revealing in this regard. When asked if 
there was any account in his bank in the name of Michael Collins, he replied that it would be 
‘too dangerous’ for him to speak from memory.72 The use of this phrase could be entirely 
innocent but it is also possible that it had a more loaded meaning. Campbell would have 
almost certainly been aware that Collins was wanted by the British authorities and that if he 
was too candid in his evidence, he could have been putting his own safety in danger. It is 
probable that the other witnesses felt exactly the same way. 
 The blunt reality of the threat to anyone interfering with the finances of Dáil Éireann 
became clear on 26 March 1920. While on his morning commute from his residence in 
Monkstown to the inquiry, Alan Bell was pulled off a tram and shot dead, only eighteen days 
after his inquiry had commenced. It is unclear as to when Collins issued the order to shoot 
Bell. David Neligan wrote that he had told Tim Kennedy of Bell’s activities and he had 
relayed the information to Collins.
73
 However, Neligan’s account is perceived to be 
unreliable. Ned Broy described him as ‘a low type and dangerous’, who frequently made up 
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stories of his exploits.
74
 Meanwhile, David Thornley, a former Labour party T.D., stated in an 
interview in 1976, that his father had always believed he was unintentionally responsible for 
identifying Alan Bell.
75
 Thornley’s father was a civil servant who was particularly friendly 
with Collins. Once Collins and I.R.A. intelligence became aware of Bell’s activities plans 
were put into place for his shooting. However, they had one major problem in that they did 
not know what the resident magistrate looked like. Collins had recruited an Irish Independent 
reporter called Mike Knightly to provide intelligence information and he managed to source a 
photograph of Bell which he passed on to the I.R.A.’s intelligence unit.76 The first attempt 
made to assassinate Bell occurred as he made his way down the quays to the Four Courts in 
the days before his shooting. Two members of Michael Collins’s squad, Vinnie Byrne and 
Mick McDonnell, were posted at the corner of Chancery Street and Ormonde Quay. 
McDonnell had a specially made grenade that he was to launch at Bell’s car. The car did not 
turn up Chancery Street as they had anticipated and the operation was postponed.
77
 Byrne and 
Jim Slattery scouted various positions frequented by Bell over the following days. They 
received information that Bell was living in Monkstown but they found that the area outside 
his house was well guarded by G-men. These G-men also met Bell every morning at the 
corner of Grafton Street when he disembarked from his tram. They realised that Bell was 
only vulnerable on his commute into the city so they devised a plan for his shooting 
accordingly.  
 On the morning of 26 March 1920, two members of Collins’s squad, Paddy Daly and 
Tom Keogh, cycled to Monkstown. Their instructions were to follow the tram that Alan Bell 
boarded.
78
 An I.R.A. unit that included Liam Tobin, Vinnie Byrne, Mick McDonnell, Jim 
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Slattery and Joe Dolan lay in wait at the corner of Ailesbury Road in Ballsbridge. They 
witnessed Tom Keogh cycling towards them and he signalled towards the tram that Bell was 
aboard. They signalled for the tram to stop and they boarded. Vinnie Byrne went upstairs 
while McDonnell and Tobin took a seat opposite Bell. McDonnell asked him: ‘Are you Mr 
Bell?’ and he replied that he was. 79 ‘Your time has come’, McDonnell grimly told him as he 
and Tobin bundled Bell off the tram. Vinnie Byrne pulled the tram’s trolley from its rope 
while McDonnell and Tobin drew their guns and proceeded to shoot Bell by the roadside. 
The bulk of the squad made their getaway up the Simmonscourt Road towards Donnybrook.
80
 
As Paddy Daly was cycling away from the scene he was stopped by a policeman who had 
heard the commotion and inquired what had happened. Daly told him that he noticed nothing 
while he was passing. The policeman then said that he had heard a shot ring out, ‘but if there 
is any shooting business there I am not going near it.’81 This highlights the level of fear that 
prevailed in Dublin at the time. Even though the squad were successful in assassinating Bell, 
the operation itself was not deemed to be a complete success by everyone. Jim Slattery said 
that the area chosen for the shooting of Bell was too sparsely populated and it greatly 
increased the chances of squad members getting caught. It was ‘a lesson we took deeply to 
heart and remembered for future occasions.’82For all that it may have been something of a 
botched job, the assassination of Bell was probably one of the squad’s most infamous 
operations. 
 The general reaction to Alan Bell’s shooting was one of revulsion. In the eyes of the 
public, Bell was a relatively harmless sixty-one year old civil servant. The Times described 
the shooting as ‘a cold blooded atrocity which had been seldom exceeded in the annals of 
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crime.’83 The Irish Times said of the assassination that it was ‘an even darker portent than 
were, in their day, the murders in the Phoenix Park.’84 The shooting was even reported as far 
afield as in the New York Times, which carried a fairly extensive report.
85
 Many individuals 
and organisations paid tribute to Bell including the R.I.C., the magistrates of Ireland, and the 
City of Dublin Unionists. Indeed, the esteem in which Bell was held by Dublin Castle was 
highlighted by the fact that it was the wife of the under-secretary, Lady Taylor, who broke the 
news to Bell’s wife upon her arrival at the hospital.86 An inquest into the shooting was held 
on 29 March and it was not long before a campaign was launched to capture the killers. A 
reward of £10,000 was offered for information leading to the capture of those responsible.
87
 
The Freeman’s Journal came under attack from numerous quarters in the aftermath of the 
killing. Sir Nevil Macready held the belief that the newspaper’s coverage of Bell was partly 
responsible for his death and Sir Edward Carson said that the Freeman’s Journal had 
‘hounded this man down’.88 It seems safe to assume that Michael Collins was aware of Alan 
Bell’s clandestine activities. He knew that Bell was not simply a relatively harmless civil 
servant. If the articles that appeared in the Irish Bulletin are anything to go by then it is 
certain that I.R.A. intelligence knew full well of Bell’s other investigations for Dublin Castle. 
However, it was his pursuit of the internal Dáil Loan funds that ultimately sealed his fate. All 
of the witness statements in the Bureau of Military History concerning Alan Bell mention his 
pursuit of the Dáil’s finances. None of them even hint at his other covert work for Dublin 
Castle. The opening of the banks inquiry effectively signed Bell’s death warrant because 
                                                          
83
 The Times, 7 Apr. 1920. 
84
 Irish Times, 27 Mar. 1920. [The Phoenix Park murders were the fatal stabbings of the Chief-Secretary, Lord 
Frederick Cavendish; and the under-secretary, Henry Burke; on 6 May 1882]. 
85
 New York Times, 27 Mar. 1920. 
86
 Penny Bonsall, The Irish R.M.s: the resident magistrates in the British administration of Ireland (Dublin, 
1997), p. 111. 
87
 Peter Hart (ed.), British intelligence in Ireland: the final reports (Cork, 2002), p. 73. 
88
 Macready, Annals, ii, pp 475-6; Irish Times, 23 July 1920. 
131 
 
Michael Collins was unlikely to stand idly by while the British authorities seized the loan that 
he had personally devoted so much time and effort into organising. 
 
Fig VIII: The tram on which Bell was travelling, 26 Mar. 1920 
(Source: Weekly Irish Times) 
 
 The banks inquiry of March 1920 showed that Dublin Castle were still intent on 
crushing the internal Dáil Loan. It was a deviation in policy from the suppression of the loan 
campaign that was at its peak during the latter months of 1919. However, there is no evidence 
to suggest that the police discontinued their attempts to suppress the loan campaign up until 
its closure in July 1920. The ultimate outcome of the banks inquiry was the assassination of 
Alan Bell, but the investigation had many other consequences. The raid that had taken place 
prior to the setting up of the banks inquiry had uncovered over £18,000 of the Dáil’s funds.89 
Bell had subsequently succeeded in uncovering several bank accounts containing Dáil funds 
from the evidence of only four bankers. He was scheduled to interview at least another seven 
– D. J. O’Rourke and D. P. Carbury from the Hibernian Bank; and J. F. Dawson, P. J. Stokes, 
D. Fuge, J. C. B. Coakley and E. P. Julian from the Munster & Leinster Bank. These men 
would surely have produced further leads and more of the Dáil Éireann funds would have 
been uncovered. This relative success of the banks inquiry is all the more meritorious because 
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none of the four bankers examined were particularly helpful. Some seemed to be deliberately 
uncooperative. They were reluctant to reveal certain information and all four failed to 
produce documentation which could have proven invaluable in establishing the details of the 
accounts suspected of containing the funds of the Dáil Loan. Bell’s achievements in such a 
relatively short period of time also highlight some shortcomings in the planning of Michael 
Collins and his Department of Finance. The fact that Bell was able to uncover such a 
substantial amount of money in just over a fortnight, suggests that Collins’s means of 
safeguarding the funds in private bank accounts was wholly inadequate. It is probable that 
Collins devised new ways of securing the loan funds in the wake of Bell’s investigation. He 
reported to the Dáil in June that the loan funds ‘are perfectly safe as the non-success of the 
bank inquiry will assure you all.’90 This would suggest that Collins had the funds moved from 
the banks that Alan Bell was investigating.   
 It is unclear as to whether the inquiry of Alan Bell was carried on but it appears 
unlikely as there was no further press coverage and there is no evidence in the Castle’s files 
indicating that the investigation was continued clandestinely. However, his death did not 
hasten the end of Dublin Castle’s pursuance of Dáil Éireann’s funds. The diaries of Mark 
Sturgis, an official within Dublin Castle, tell how Sir Ormonde Winter, the Castle’s Director 
of Intelligence, made a concerted effort to plunder republican funds during the latter half of 
1920. Sturgis wrote that Winter ‘had been pinching M. C.’s “war chest” from the Munster 
and Leinster Bank – quite illegally I expect – brought in about £4,000, £15,000 more to 
come.’91 The fact that Winter made no mention of this in his autobiography, Winter’s Tale, is 
illuminating. Clearly the methods he employed in seizing the funds were unlawful and the 
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money was returned with interest in 1922.
92
 Doubtless there were some other attempts made 
to uncover the loan funds as 1921 approached but given the way in which Alan Bell was 
‘dealt with’, it is likely that these attempts were undertaken covertly.  
 This chapter shows that the new strategy adopted by Dublin Castle in response to the 
Dáil Loan from the beginning of 1920 was not completely unsuccessful. Alan Bell succeeded 
in locating several accounts within which funds were deposited. He would undoubtedly have 
uncovered more had his work not been halted. The relative success of Bell’s inquiry in the 
short time it was operative, allied to Ormonde Winter’s achievement in uncovering £19,000,  
certainly begs the question as to why the British authorities did not attempt to track down the 
money sooner when their pre-1920 efforts to suppress the loan campaign were not bearing 
fruit. However, the thinking behind the banks inquiry, and this new approach as a whole, was 
still fundamentally flawed. Like the earlier attempts to suppress the raising of the loan, this 
new policy alienated the general public and was counter-productive. Newspaper reports and 
the actions of those who were called as witnesses to the inquiry indicate that there was a great 
deal of public resentment to the investigation. The confidentiality of banking business was 
being violated and this was likely to lead more moderate nationalists to become even more 
sympathetic to the republican cause. While this episode again shows the folly of the British 
administration’s attempts to destroy the internal Dáil Loan, it also highlights significant 
limitations in the operation of the Dáil Loan. Michael Collins had the funds deposited in 
private bank accounts with the belief that this would safeguard the money, but Bell and to a 
lesser extent Winter had exposed how deficient this plan was. The banks inquiry of March 
1920 also underlines the importance of the internal Dáil Loan. Dublin Castle held the firm 
belief that the capture of the loan funds would prove to be a critical blow to the Dáil Éireann 
counter-state. The actions of Collins give weight to this argument too. The fact that he was 
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prepared to employ such deadly force to secure the funds emphasises the importance of the 
Dáil Loan during this period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was to detail the raising of the first internal Dáil Éireann Loan and to 
examine the responses of the British administration in Ireland to its establishment and its 
progress. The internal loan is somewhat glossed over in the historiography of this period of 
great turmoil in Ireland, but without it, the Dáil Éireann counter-state could never have 
functioned in any meaningful way. Indeed, the internal loan is widely regarded as one of the 
greatest achievements of the revolutionary government. The success of raising a final total of 
£371,849 has to be assessed, given the concerted efforts of the British administration in 
Ireland to crush the loan campaign during 1919 and 1920. How was the success of the 
internal Dáil Loan ensured, and why did Dublin Castle’s attempts to suppress it fail? 
 Dáil Éireann was established in January 1919. The intention of its founders was to 
develop their own skeletal state administration to usurp the existing British administration run 
from Dublin Castle. Owing to a lack of funds to implement their plans, the members of the 
Dáil had to rely on propaganda for the first few months of its existence in order to retain its 
place in the public consciousness. A modest programme for action was being prepared during 
this time. The failure to obtain a large proportion of the Anti-Conscription Fund meant that 
Dáil Éireann had to come up with a strategy to generate their own funds. It was agreed that a 
bond drive, both at home and abroad, would be the best means of fundraising. Éamon de 
Valera prepared the ground for a loan campaign in America but the domestic campaign 
quickly became the Dáil’s priority because of the urgency of their need for funds. The 
external loan faced a number of legal and logistical obstacles which did not stand in the way 
of the internal loan. The challenge facing the Dáil and its Department of Finance was simple 
– ensure that the internal loan succeeded or face an uncertain future. If the internal loan did 
not succeed, the long-term viability of Dáil Éireann would be under threat. Token propaganda 
could only be effective for so long. 
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 The loan campaign, launched in August 1919, was hugely reliant on the local Sinn 
Féin organisation that had been built up before the general election during the previous year. 
Michael Collins, as Minister for Finance, coordinated the campaign nationally but the work 
on the ground was the responsibility of the Sinn Féin clubs. Dáil members oversaw the 
organisation of their own constituencies but the actual solicitation of funds and door-to-door 
campaigning was done by loan workers. They were mostly members of the local Sinn Féin 
clubs and they received modest expenses. Loan collectors and agents were drawn from a 
range of ordinary occupations like publicans, shopkeepers, doctors and builders. The loan 
campaign was truly a community effort. 
 The influence of the Catholic Church on the internal Dáil Loan played a large part in 
its success. Although the church never officially endorsed Dáil Éireann many of its members 
were central to the loan campaign. The Bishop of Killaloe was one of the loan’s trustees, 
while Archbishop William J. Walsh of Dublin and Archbishop John Harty of Cashel publicly 
backed the Dáil Loan. Many ordinary clerics also purchased bonds, organised promotional 
meetings and acted as trustees for their individual parishes. Meetings to publicise the loan 
were frequently held in churchyards after Sunday mass, and loan notices and advertisements 
were often posted up on a Saturday night or Sunday morning so as to attract the attention of 
morning mass goers. The work done by many members of the Catholic hierarchy likely 
swayed many individuals to subscribe to the loan, and was one of the principal reasons that 
the loan transcended traditional republicans. 
 The internal loan was not solely the reserve of Roman Catholics, with evidence 
showing the receipt of subscriptions from individuals of the Protestant faith. While many may 
have supported Dáil Éireann and the policies they espoused, there were several known 
unionists who purchased Dáil bonds. Their reasons for subscribing are unclear. It is possible 
that they purchased bonds as a sort of insurance policy for fear that the Dáil’s ambitions of an 
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Irish Republic be realised. The R.I.C. reports imply that many people were coerced into 
subscribing, and this is also suggested by Dublin Castle officials like Ormonde Winter. 
Seized Sinn Féin documents also indicated that the names of individuals who refused to 
subscribe were noted alongside those who consented. There is certainly enough evidence to 
suggest that there were instances around the country whereby people were intimidated or 
coerced into subscribing to the Dáil Loan. However, it is unclear as to how widespread these 
practices were. 
 These indications that there were cases of intimidation and coercion goes some way 
towards explaining why there was such a disparity between the amounts raised in rural and 
urban constituencies. The final total raised for the internal loan was £371,849. This was 
£121,849 more than the initial £250,000 target. It was the constituencies in the south and west 
of the country that contributed most, whereas the results in the more urban constituencies in 
the north and east were somewhat disappointing. It would have been easier to successfully 
intimidate individuals in rural areas, where the R.I.C. were being forced out of the 
countryside, than it would have been in the towns and cities. There were many other reasons 
why rural constituencies outperformed their urban counterparts. The Sinn Féin organisation 
was particularly strong in areas of Munster and Connacht. Parts of Leinster, particularly 
Dublin, and Ulster were generally less republican. The I.P.P. retained some support in these 
provinces and the Sinn Féin club system was not as strong. There was also a greater police 
presence in the cities and garrison towns around the country, and this fact made it more 
difficult to promote the loan in urban areas. Overall though, the internal Dáil Loan campaign 
was deemed to have been a considerable success. However, it is only when the attempts to 
suppress it are examined, that an accurate evaluation of its success can be made. 
 The establishment of Dáil Éireann was practically ignored by the British government 
who believed that it would inevitably fade away. The launch of the Dáil Loan was a clear 
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signal of Dáil Éireann’s intention to ensure the counter-state would succeed. It was quickly 
followed by the proclamation of the Dáil by the British authorities. Declaring the Dáil illegal 
did not result in its collapse though. If anything, it was the making of the revolutionary 
government. Dáil Éireann continued to operate underground and the authorities had now no 
indication of what the republicans were doing. This is evident from the police reports, and in 
the statements of a number of Castle officials. They were of the belief that the loan campaign 
was not making much progress, and that the measures taken to suppress the loan were 
succeeding. This mistaken belief was a result of their inability to gain any reliable 
intelligence on the loan’s progress. The British administration appear to have initially based 
their policy towards the loan on this inaccurate belief. 
 The initial attempts to suppress the loan were both relatively unsuccessful and 
counter-productive. Newspapers that published the loan prospectus were immediately 
suppressed, but this step only served to create huge publicity for the loan. Across the country, 
meetings were broken up, posters were torn down, and any individual found either soliciting 
or in possession of loan material were arrested and imprisoned. These measures were overly 
harsh, and they only succeeded in generating widespread sympathy towards Dáil Éireann. It 
is probable that the suppression of the Dáil Loan convinced many people of a more moderate 
political persuasion to support the venture. Breaking up public meetings that were held in 
churchyards, and imprisoning ordinary members of the community was certainly counter-
productive. The failure of the British administration to draw any distinction between Dáil 
Éireann and the militant republican organisations undoubtedly fuelled their desire to crush the 
loan. This is despite the fact the funds generated by the internal loan were not used to finance 
Volunteer or I.R.A.’s activities. By suppressing the loan campaign in such a coercive manner, 
the British authorities probably drove more people to support the militants’ guerrilla 
campaign. Not only were the initial measures to crush the loan counter-productive, they were 
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also wholly unsuccessful. For all the entries in the police reports detailing the suppression of 
the loan campaign, there is not a single case of actual money being seized by the authorities.  
 At the start of 1920, Dublin Castle stepped up their efforts to destroy the internal loan. 
Alan Bell was recruited to track down the bank accounts within which Michael Collins had 
salted the Dáil Loan funds. His banks inquiry generated much negative publicity in the press. 
Nonetheless, Bell evidently had some success in his investigation because he succeeded in 
uncovering several bank accounts containing Dáil funds working on the evidence of only four 
bank managers. This was clearly too much for Collins because he gave the order to his squad 
to have Bell killed. He was pulled off a tram and shot dead on 26 March 1920. He was clearly 
deemed to have posed a significant threat to the republican movement and it is likely that he 
would have uncovered more funds in the weeks and months that followed had he not been 
killed. He was scheduled to question seven more bank managers but it is unclear as to 
whether those banks were investigated after his shooting. The relative success of Bell’s 
inquiry for the short time in which it operated begs the question as to why the British 
authorities did not try to probe the eventual destination of the funds earlier. This is 
particularly puzzling considering the police had failed to make any headway against the loan 
campaign nationwide. The banks inquiry was not without its flaws either. It received much 
criticism in the press and this publicity possibly contributed to the decision to eliminate Bell. 
Had the inquiry been undertaken clandestinely and had escaped the glare of the press, it is 
probable that Bell would have made further progress especially if Collins had not been aware 
of his activities. There is no evidence to suggest that the investigation into these suspect bank 
accounts was continued covertly after Bell’s shooting, but Ormonde Winter did succeed in 
uncovering a further £19,000 of the Dáil’s funds in the autumn of 1920. This also indicates 
that the steps taken by Collins to safeguard the loan funds were inadequate, given the 
apparent ease with which both Bell and Winter had tracked down the money. 
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 The internal Dáil Loan is widely regarded as one of the greatest achievements of the 
first Dáil by historians of the period. However, the success of the loan was guaranteed in a 
large part by the misguided and counter-productive policy adopted by the British 
administration. Had they adopted a different policy from the outset in August 1919, the 
campaign would probably not have been as successful because most of the measures taken by 
the authorities inadvertently provided the loan with further positive publicity. The nationwide 
suppression of the loan campaign by the R.I.C. appears to have been overly harsh, but they 
would argue that the measures taken were justified given the reports of individuals being 
intimidated and coerced into subscribing. The policy adopted post-1920 to attempt to locate 
the bank accounts in which the funds were deposited was unquestionably more effective, and 
it highlighted a significant shortcoming on Michael Collins’s behalf. However, the downfall 
of Alan Bell’s inquiry was fact that it was publicised in the press. This presented Collins with 
the opportunity to ensure that the inquiry failed. This was an opportunity that was taken in the 
most ruthless fashion when Collins gave the order to have Bell eliminated. The shooting of 
Bell showed the lengths to which Collins was prepared to go to ensure the success of the Dáil 
Loan. It also shows that although Dáil Éireann and the I.R.A. operated independently of one 
another during this period, they essentially complimented each other in the fight for Irish 
independence. The story of the raising of the first internal Dáil Éireann Loan and the British 
responses to it, effectively illustrates the complexity and ambiguity of these seminal years in 
Irish history.   
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: 1918 General Election (Ireland) results: 
 
PARTY 
NUMBER 
OF SEATS 
PERCENTAGE 
OF SEATS 
NUMBER 
OF VOTES 
PERCENTAGE 
OF VOTES 
Sinn Féin 73* 69.5 476,087 46.9 
Unionist 22 20.9 257,314 25.3 
I.P.P. 6 5.7 220,837 21.7 
Labour Unionist 3 2.8 30,304 3 
Labour  0 0 12,164 1.2 
Independent Unionist 1 0.95 9,531 0.9 
Independent Nationalist 0 0 8,183 0.8 
Independent Labour 0 0 659 0.1 
Independent 0 0 436 0 
TOTAL 105   1,015,515   
 
*Twenty-five of these seventy-three Sinn Féin candidates were returned unopposed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: B. M. Walker (ed.), Parliamentary election results in Ireland, 1801-1922 (Dublin, 1978). 
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Appendix II: Issue of the internal Dáil Éireann Loan 
ISSUE OF £250,000 5% Registered Certificates 
 
Trustees:  
MOST REV DR. FOGARTY 
(Lord Bishop of Killaloe) 
ARTHUR GRIFFITH TD 
(For Éamon De Valera TD) 
JAMES O’MARA TD 
______________________________________ 
 
Bonds can be had at £1, £5, £10, £20, £50 and £100 
______________________________________ 
 
OBJECTS OF THE LOAN: 
To propagate the Irish case all over the world 
To establish an Irish consular service 
To promote Irish Trade & Commerce 
To develop and encourage Irish Sea Fisheries, Reafforestation, and Irish Industrial Effort 
To establish a National Civil Service and National Arbitration Courts 
To establish a Land Mortgage Bank with a view to the reoccupancy of untenanted lands 
And generally for National Purposes as directed be Dáil Éireann 
 
GET A COPY OF THE PROSPECTUS FROM YOUR MEMBER OF THE DÁIL OR HIS 
REPRESENTATIVE IN YOUR PARISH 
______________________________________ 
 
THE MILITARY FORCES OF ENGLAND HAVE SUPPRESSED ALL IRISH PAPERS 
PUBLISHING THE ADVERTISEMENT OF THE DÁIL ÉIREANN LOAN. 
 
ENGLAND DOES NOT WANT THE IRISH PEOPLE TO HEAR OF THE LOAN. 
 
WHY? BECAUSE SHE REALISES THAT THE WEAPON FORGED BY SINN FÉIN 
WILL BREAK IRELAND’S BONDS. 
 
THE ONLY ANSWER WORTHY OF IRISHMEN IS TO DOUBLE THE AMOUNT 
ASKED FOR 
 
THEREFORE, THINK OF THE AMOUNT YOU WERE GOING TO SUBSCRIBE AND 
DOUBLE IT. 
 
HAND YOUR SUBSCRIPTION TO YOUR MEMBER OF THE DÁIL OR HIS 
REPRESENTATIVE IN YOUR PARISH. 
 
Source: Issue of the internal Dáil Éireann Loan (N.L.I., ILB 300 P2). 
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Appendix III: Internal Loan application form and receipt 
THIS FORM TO BE RETAINED BY LOCAL COMMITTEE AND FORWARDED TO HQ WITH THE AMOUNT PAID  NO.............................. 
 
FORM OF APPLICATION       1919 ISSUE (INTERNAL) 
 
Government of the Irish Republic 
ISSUE OF 
£250,000 5% Registered Certificates 
 
Issued at per, and bearing Interest at £5 per cent per annum, payable half yearly on the 1
st
 January and 1
st
 July, 
subject to the reservations contained in the prospectus, but calculated from the date on which the final payment 
is made. 
REDEEMABLE within Twenty Years of the International Recognition of the Irish Republic, at 105 per cent. 
 
Date, .......................... , 1919. 
To the Minister of Finance, 
 In terms of the Prospectus, dated .................. , 1919. I/we hereby apply for .................... pounds (£......) 
of 5 p.c. Government of the Irish Republic Certificates, and tender herewith .................... pounds (£......) in 
payment, being Fifty Per Cent (50%) of the amount applied for. * 
 And I/we agree to pay the balance due from me/us by the instalments specified in the prospectus and as 
set out hereunder – 
25 percent on 1 December 1919 
25 percent on 1 February 1920 
 
...... Certificates of £1, £......     ...... Certificates of £20, £...... 
...... Certificates of £5, £......     ...... Certificates of £50, £...... £..... 
...... Certificates of £10, £......     ...... Certificates of £100, £...... 
 
      Ordinary Signature, ............................................................. 
      Name in Full, ....................................................................... 
        (state Mr, Mrs, Miss or other title) 
      Address, ............................................................................... 
      Occupation, ......................................................................... 
 
*Cheques, British PO, and Drafts should be crossed and made payable to the Trustees of Dáil Éireann. 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- 
DETATCH THIS PART AND RETURN TO SUBSCRIBER       NO .............................. 
 
  Government of the IRISH REPUBLIC 
  5 per cent Registered Certificates (1919) (internal) 
         Date, .............................. , 1919 
 
RECEIVED FROM ............................................................................................................... .................................... 
OF .......................................................................................................................... .................................................... 
THE SUM OF ...................... POUNDS .................... SHILLINGS, being the amount payable on application for: 
 
       MÍCHEÁL Ó COILEÁIN, Minister of Finance 
 
£ .........................  PER ........................................... 
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PRESERVE THIS RECEIPT CAREFULLY. IT WILL BE EXCHANGED IN DUE COURSE FOR THE DEFINITIVE CERTIFICATE 
 
 
ISSUE OF £250,000 5% 
Registered Certificates 
 
Interest calculated at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, from the date when certificates are fully paid, but not 
payable until a date Six Months after the Irish Republic has received International Recognition, and the English 
have evacuated Ireland. 
REDEEMABLE at a premium of 5 per cent within Twenty Years of Internal Recognition of the Irish Republic. 
 
NB This letter must be returned ENTIRE with the amount due. NO ............. 
 
To .................................. 
 .................................. 
 
A chara, 
 In accordance with the terms of your application for £............ in the above, dated .................................. , 
I have to inform you that the amount of £............ is now due. 
 Please send this amount to the following manner:- 
......................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................... 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
To Secretary of Finance, Dáil Éireann     
 Date, ............................................... 
 
 Enclosed please find the sum of £  : : , being the amount payable as above. 
 
Signed, ........................................... 
Address, ......................................... 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
NO.................................................. 
 
GOVERNMENT OF THE IRISH REPUBLIC 
5 per cent Registered Certificates (1919) (internal) 
 
PAYMENT OF FIRST INSTALMENT 
 
Date, .................................... 
RECEIVED from ........................................................................... the sum ..................... pounds ........................ 
shillings ........................... pence, being the First Instalment on application for £................ 
 
MÍCHEÁL Ó COILEÁIN, AA. 
£................  Per...................... 
 
Preserve this receipt carefully. It, together with receipt for application and receipt for final instalment will be exchanged in 
due course for the Definitive Certificate. 
 
Source: Internal loan application form and receipt (N.L.I., ILB 300 P2). 
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Appendix IV: Internal Loan promotional material 
DÁIL ÉIREANN 
 
A chara, 
 
 The action of the English Government in preventing the newspapers from advertising 
the Dáil Éireann Loan compels us to adopt some other means of advertising. Enclosed you 
will find a number of sample advertisements which should be circulated in your district by 
any and every means available – by handbills if possible, and otherwise by written or typed 
copies. We can supply you with 5,000 copies of each of the enclosed handbills if necessary, 
but it would be better if you could have them printed locally. 
 
 It is urgent that you should get the painting squads, who did such services during the 
General Election, at work immediately on advertisements for the Loan. The dead walls etc. 
should be covered with such inscriptions “England fears the loan”, “Buy Dáil Éireann Bonds”, 
“Put your money on Ireland”, etc. The work should be carried out as efficiently and 
expeditiously as possible in every town and parish in your district. England is putting every 
obstacle in our way and consequently the national effort to make the Loan a success should 
be all the greater. 
 
Do chara, 
 
MICHEAL O COILEAN, 
Minister of Finance. 
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On the Green fields of Ireland the Bullocks are grazing where 70 years ago the pleasant 
farmsteads stood. 
 
You can rebuild the Homesteads by buying Dáil Éireann Bonds. 
 
You can enable four Irishmen to live in Ireland for the one that exists today. 
 
_____ 
 
Pearse gave all. 
Won’t you give a little? 
Buy Dáil Éireann Bonds today. 
 
_____ 
 
For English purposes Ireland has been shorn of her timber. 
 
We have undertaken to undo this vile work by reafforesting the country. 
 
Take a hand in the work. 
 
BUY DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS and help Ireland to regain her Health, her Strength, her 
Beauty and her Wealth. 
 
_____ 
 
The Harvest of the Sea must be reaped for Ireland. Her Coastline is longer than that of 
England and Scotland. 
 
Yet while the English fisheries produce - £8,000,000 per annum 
And the Scotch fisheries - £3,000,000 per annum 
The Irish fisheries produce only - £350,000 per annum 
 
There is wealth lying waste in the Irish Seas. 
 
Subscribe to the Dáil Éireann Loan and help us to garner it. 
 
_____ 
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Do you believe that Irish Brains and muscle were made for the service of other lands? 
 
If not Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS and help to keep the people at home. 
 
Old Ireland needs their services more sorely than any other land. 
 
You can save them for Ireland. 
 
_____ 
 
Her Harbours are idle, her Sailors in the service of other lands; but her heart and her hands 
are young and strong. And we shall see again her ships on every sea, her harbours forests of 
Masts, her merchantmen in every Port. 
 
You can help by subscribing to the Dáil Éireann Loan. 
 
_____ 
 
Ireland has burst through the Trade Wall which England built round her. 
 
Ireland today has Consular Representatives in six countries. She needs them in a shore. 
 
YOU can help by buying Dáil Éireann Bonds. 
 
_____ 
 
WILL YOU LET THEM GO? MacPherson says they must. 
 
“The chief difficulty in governing Ireland is the presence of the 90,000 young men who 
should have emigrated in the last five years. They must be forced to go”. 
 
These young men are Ireland’s chief wealth. They are THE MEN WE WANT. You can keep 
them at home and defeat the plans of THE MEN WE DON’T WANT, by buying Dáil 
Éireann Bonds. 
 
_____ 
 
“The Celt is gone – gone with a vengeance”. So wrote the “London Times” 70 years ago. 
Today Ireland faces the future full of hope and courage. 
 
Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS and show your faith in the indestructible Nation. 
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_____ 
 
The Englishman – John Morley, M.P. said:- 
 
“The Irish people have done the greatest part of hard work in the world.” 
 
Turn your eyes on your own country. There is hard work to be done there. Now is the time to 
do it. 
 
Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS and help the Old Country. 
 
_____ 
 
Ireland has been SOLD often enough. Subscribe to the Dáil Éireann Loan and help to BUY 
Ireland for the Irish, 
 
Act today. 
 
_____ 
 
YOU CAN: 
Recover Ireland for the Irish. 
Repeople the land. 
Harness the Rivers. 
Put the Flag on every Sea. Plant the Hillsides and the Wastes. 
Set the Loom spinning. 
Abolish the slums. 
Send her ships to every Port. 
Set the Hammer ringing on the Anvil. 
Garner the harvest of the Seas. 
Drain the Bogs. 
Save the Boys and Girls for Ireland. 
You can restore Ireland’s Health, her Strength, her Beauty and her Wealth. 
 
Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS Today. 
 
_____ 
 
Leave Ireland better than you found it. 
 
Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS today. 
 
_____ 
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There are many dead who would have given all for the chance you have got to free Ireland. 
 
Be worthy of this generation. 
 
Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS to Finance the Republic. 
 
_____ 
 
THE GREATEST OF THE SMALL NATIONS. 
 
IRELAND is larger than Belgium, Holland, Denmark or Switzerland. 
IRELAND is more populous than Norway, Denmark or Switzerland. 
IRELAND pays a bigger revenue than Denmark, Greece, Bulgaria, Switzerland and Norway Combined. 
IRELAND has a greater trade than Greece, Bulgaria, Portugal, Norway and Romania Combined. 
IRELAND has the highest birthrate in Europe. 
 
Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS today, and be worthy of the Greatest of the Small Nations. 
 
_____ 
 
“I swear to you there are blood and brains in Ireland still as the world one day shall know”. 
John Mitchell. 
 
Have you have a tithe of Mitchell’s National Faith? Show it by subscribing to the DÁIL 
ÉIREANN LOAN. 
 
_____ 
 
The conveniency of ports and harbours, which Nature has bestowed so liberally on this 
country is of no more use to us than a beautiful prospect to one shut up in a dungeon. 
 
Give the key to the man who can open the Dungeon Gates. Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS 
and help to free the Nation. 
 
_____ 
 
The Exiles have their eyes on the cradle of the Race. They are proud of the Old Country. See 
that their pride is justified. 
 
Show the Exiles and the world that you are in earnest by subscribing to the DÁIL ÉIREANN 
LOAN. 
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_____ 
 
Won’t it be Grand – the day we see them clearing out, Bag and Baggage? 
 
You can hasten the day. Buy DÁIL ÉIREANN BONDS and lose no time about it. 
 
_____ 
 
The Story of a Nation’s Resurrection. 
 
CHAPTER 1 – Easter Week 
CHAPTER 2 – No Conscription 
CHAPTER 3 – The General Election 
CHAPTER 4 – The National Loan. 
CHAPTER 5 - ? 
 
What is it going to be? Buy a NATIONAL BOND today and make sure. 
 
GO SAORIDH DIA ÉIRE. 
 
_____ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Promotional material for the internal Dáil Loan (N.L.I., IR 300 P47). 
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Appendix V: First internal Dáil Éireann Loan – constituency totals 
 
Net amounts received at Head Office as on 27 September 1920 
 
Connacht 
 
COUNTY DISCTRICT POUNDS SHILLINGS PENCE 
     
Galway Connemara 1,564 13 4 
 East 4,388 0 0 
 North 5,019 5 0 
 South 3,295 10 0 
     
Leitrim County 5,087 7 2 
     
Mayo East 5,613 10 0 
 North 4,021 5 0 
 South 7,057 0 0 
 West 5,073 0 0 
     
Roscommon North 4,606 0 0 
 South 4,667 0 0 
     
Sligo North 3,675 0 0 
 South 3,709 9 6 
     
TOTAL  £57,977 0 0 
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Munster 
 
COUNTY DISCTRICT POUNDS SHILLINGS PENCE 
     
Clare East  13,816 14 6 
 West 7,713 0 0 
     
Cork City 12,067 0 0 
 East 6,534 15 0 
 Mid 7,237 2 6 
 North 6,497 0 0 
 North East 3,787 10 0 
 South 4,876 15 10 
 South East 2,086 0 0 
 West 4,350 0 0 
     
Kerry East 5,154 10 0 
 North 9,229 0 0 
 South 3,104 2 0 
 West 8,571 15 10 
     
Limerick City 5,991 0 0 
 East 32,285 0 0 
 West 17,385 0 0 
     
Tipperary East 4,864 10 0 
 Mid 2,961 6 6 
 North 4,377 0 0 
 South 4,458 0 0 
     
Waterford City 636 5 0 
 County 4,550 0 0 
     
TOTAL  £172,533 6 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
Leinster 
 
COUNTY DISCTRICT POUNDS SHILLINGS PENCE 
     
Carlow County 3,383 5 0 
     
Dublin Clontarf 2,204 10 0 
 College Green 2,101 5 0 
 Harbour 1,058 15 0 
 Pembroke 2,580 0 0 
 Rathmines 1,235 0 0 
 St James 1,455 0 0 
 St Michans 2,781 15 0 
 St Stephens 2,322 10 0 
 St Patricks 2,161 10 0 
 North County 1,370 5 0 
 South County 2,125 10 0 
     
Kildare North 2,381 10 0 
 South 3,445 0 0 
     
Kilkenny North 2,912 0 0 
 South 5,281 10 0 
     
Longford County 5,802 0 0 
     
Louth County 2,575 5 0 
     
Meath North 1,902 4 0 
 South 2,262 0 0 
     
Offaly County 9,198 1 6 
     
Leix & Ossory County 10,030 12 6 
     
Westmeath County 4,660 0 0 
     
Wexford North 3,280 10 0 
 South 4,457 0 0 
     
Wicklow East 819 4 6 
 West 3,713 0 0 
     
TOTAL  £87,499 2 6 
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Ulster 
 
COUNTY DISCTRICT POUNDS SHILLINGS PENCE 
     
Antrim Belfast 2,355 6 6 
 East & North 196 0 0 
 Mid 162 0 0 
 South 427 0 0 
     
Armagh Mid 527 10 0 
 North 322 10 0 
 South 1,665 0 0 
     
Cavan East 4,227 4 8 
 West 3,211 5 0 
     
Derry City 1,376 0 0 
 North 772 10 0 
 South 713 0 0 
     
Donegal East 1,032 0 0 
 North 855 0 0 
 South 13,333 10 0 
 West 673 0 0 
     
Down East & Mid 2,672 0 0 
 South 1,845 10 0 
 West 199 0 0 
     
Fermanagh North 1,768 0 0 
 South 1,458 0 0 
     
Monaghan North 2,457 18 0 
 South 5,705 0 0 
     
Tyrone North East 2,307 10 0 
 North West 1,466 10 0 
 South 1,561 0 0 
     
TOTAL  £41,319 4 2 
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Grand Totals 
 
PROVINCE POUNDS SHILLINGS PENCE 
    
Connacht £57,977 0 0 
Leinster £87,499 2 6 
Munster £172,533 6 4 
Ulster £41,319 4 2 
Cumann Na mBan £801 0 0 
Britain & France £11,719 8 0 
    
TOTAL £371,849 1 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Net amounts received at head office as on 27 Sept. 1920 (N.L.I., ILB 300 P2). 
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Appendix VI: Constituency map showing internal loan subscriptions 
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Appendix VII: Terms of reference of the March 1920 banks inquiry 
 
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (IRELAND) ACT, 1887. 
50 and 51 Vic., cap. 20, and 
5 and 6 Vic., CAP. 24. 
_______________ 
 
FORM OF SUMMONS TO WITNESS. 
(Preliminary Inquiry). 
     The King. 
            v.    Police District of Dublin Metropolis. 
Persons Unknown. 
WHEREAS by a special Proclamation made under the provisions of the Criminal Law and 
Procedure (Ireland) Act 1887 dated the 3rd day of July 1918 the Associations known by the 
names of The Sinn Féin Organisation, Sinn Féin Clubs, The Irish Volunteers, The Cumann-
na-mBan and the Gaelic League were declared to be dangerous Associations. And Whereas 
by an Order dated the 10th day of September 1919 the Lord Lieutenant in Council prohibited 
and suppressed the Association known as The Dáil Éireann under the provisions of the said 
Statute throughout Ireland and whereas by our further Order in Council dated the 15th day of 
October 1919 the Lord Lieutenant in Council prohibited and surpressed the said 
Organisations known as The Sinn Féin Organisation, Sinn Féin Clubs, The Irish Volunteers, 
The Cumann-na-mBan and the Gaelic League throughout the County of Dublin and the 
County Borough of Dublin: And Whereas it has been sworn in an Information made known 
by Colonel Walter Edgeworth-Johnstone, Chief Commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan 
Police that in the City of Dublin being a District so Proclaimed under the Provisions of the 
afore-mentioned Act that an offence to which the first Section of the said Statute applies was 
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committed within six months last past, to wit on the 31st day of October 1919 at Harcourt 
Street in the said City of Dublin in the Dublin Metropolitan Police District being a 
Proclaimed District as aforesaid in that on the said 31st day of October 1919 some persons 
did unlawful pursuant to the provisions of the said Statute.  
This is to command you to appear as a Witness before me at the Police Courts, Inns 
Quay, Dublin on the 11th day of March 1920 at 11 o’clock, and then and there to be 
examined before me touching the premises and to bring with you and produce for 
examination, securities, telegrams, copies of telegrams, letters, copies of letters, all Books of 
Account, Ledgers, Vouchers, Bills, Cheques, Orders, or Drafts, Records, Memoranda or 
notes of Telephone messages sent or received in all Memoranda and other Documents in any 
way relating to any details or transactions between your Bank and the said Organisations or 
any of them or persons on behalf of the said Organisations or any of them or any Committee 
or body constitutes by or acting in privity with them or any of them which are now in your 
power possession or procurement or in the power possession or procurement of your Bank. 
Dated at the Police Courts, Inns Quay, Dublin, this 11th day of March 1920. 
    Signed, 
     Alan Bell, 
     Resident Magistrate for the County of Dublin,  
     duly qualified according to Law. 
To: James Charles Lloyd Davidson Esq. 
of : Munster & Leinster Bank 
  Dame St. 
 
Source : Papers of Alan Bell (T.N.A., Dublin Castle papers, CO 904/177/1) 
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